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SYNOPSIS 
Insider trading is an offence under the 
Securities Industry Act, 1983 (Act 280) and the 
Companies Act, 1965 (Act 12S) but it is difficult to 
prosecute in a criminal court. 
This thesis considers an overview of the 
laws on insider trading in the Securities Industry Act, 
1983 when a person is charged as an insider and when he 
deals directly, or indirectly in securibies. The 
elements of actus reus and the mens rea of the person 
should be clearly elaborated in the Securities Industry 
Act. However in the present state of the laws, the 
elements of actus reus and mens rea in the of fence of 
insider trading are not adequately defined in section 89 
and section 90 of the Securities Industry Act 1983. 
The words "improper use" in section 89 (1) 
of the Securities Industry Act 1983 is not defined in 
the Securities Industry Act, nor has it been subjected 
to judicicial interpretation. It is not certain how the 
words should be defined from the viewpoint of the 
issuer, and the investing public. The word "information" 
has been referred to as specific, confidential, 
unpublished, price sensitive, and if 
(i) 
generally known to the public, might reasonably be 
expected to affect materially the price of the subject 
matter of the dealing on the stock exchange under 
section 89 of the Securities Industry Act 1983. Yet, for 
each aforesaid words which described the nature of 
information required under the Securities Industry Act 
1983, such words are not defined in the Securities 
Industry Act 1983, though subject to judicial 
interpretation. 
The most effective remedy to prevent and 
minimise the incidence of insider trading by the 
authorities and the self-regulatory authority ie. the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, is the mandatory public 
disclosure of the particulars relating to dealings in 
securities on the Stock Exchange. Under section 45 of 
the Securities Industry (Central Depositories) Act, 1991 
(Act 453) disclosure of particulars relating to dealings 
are not permitted except with the approval of the 
Minister of Finance on the ground of public interest. It 
is pertinent to amend Section 45 of the Securities 
Industry (Central Depositories) Act 1991 to enable any 
person who dealt in listed transferable securities, and 
was aggrieved by insider dealing, to have access to such 
data on the dealings in securities. 
(ii) 
No doubt the laws on insider trading are 
contained in section 89 and section 90 of the 
Securities Industry Act 1983, but the most powerful 
weapon against the issuer for any offences committed 
under the securities industry law is the enforcement of 
the laws under section 87A of the Securities Industry 
Act . 1983. 
charged 
public 
insider 
The Securities Commission has recently 
Chua Seng Huat, the managing director of a 
listed company, Kim Hin Industry Ber had for 
trading under section 89 and 90 of the 
Securities Industry Act 1983 in the Sessions Court in 
Kuching in the state of Sarawak. 
In the Securities Commission Report of 
1996 released on the 10th June 1997, the Securities 
Commission intends to push for more recognition on the 
civil remedies such as restitution and disgorgement of 
gains for any violations of the securities laws. 
(iii) 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Malaysia is a developing country. In the 
development of its economy towards industrialisation, it 
requires a lot of capital investments. Under the Seventh 
Malays~a Plan of Malaysia for the year 1997 to 2002, an 
estimated Malaysian Ringgit of 535. 6 billion of gross 
investment will be required to achieve its objectives under 
the Plan. The bulk of the funds to support the growth of 
the economy will be derived from the equity issues, and 
debt securities. Equity issues have increased its share of 
the capital market by four percent (4%) to fourteen percent 
(14%) and the share of debt financing was maintained at 
thirty eight percent (38%) of the capital market. The 
authorities involved in the capital market, will protect 
the investors by ensuring that they place surplus funds in 
the capital market without undue loss in their asset value, 
by formulating sound macroeconomic policies and 
comprehensive regulatory frameworks so as to reduce their 
risks in dealings in securities . 1 To provide a good 
regulatory framework, the laws relating to securities 
should be adequate, enforceable and certain to undermine 
all malpractices in the securities industry, and to prevent 
1 Bank Negara Annual Report 1996. 
2 
offences such as insider trading and manipulation. The 
laws on insider trading in the securities market are found 
in the Companies Act 19652 and the Securities Industry Act 
1983. 3 The present laws on insider trading in the 
Companies Act 1965 and the Securities Industry Act 1983 
have been subject to minor amendments but the provisions of 
the laws remain vague in view of the fact that the courts 
have not had the opportunity to interpret them. 
1.1 Objectives 
The intention of this thesis is to present an 
overview of the laws on insider trading in the market for 
securities, in particular the laws contained in the 
Securities Industry Act 1983 and the Companies Act 1965. 
A detailed study of the self-regulatory measures adopted by 
the Stock Exchange to curb insider trading will be 
undertaken to assess its effectiveness in the light of 
existing developments in the securities market. It is 
evident that both the regulatory and self-regulatory 
authorities have to play a complementary and/or 
supplementary role to curb insider trading in the 
securities market. 
2 
3 
This thesis deals with a comprehensive study of 
Act 125. 
Act 280. 
3 
the securities law on insider trading in Malaysia, both 
statutory and non-statutory. A comparative study is made 
with the insider trading laws in the Corporations Law 1991 
in Australia to study the weakness in the laws on insider 
trading in Malaysia. The reason is that the laws in insider 
dealing in Australia are to a certain extent in pari 
materia with the laws in Malaysia. Both countries adopt the 
common .law system of administration of laws. In Australia, 
the laws on insider trading under the Corporations Laws has 
superimposed the concept of fiduciary relationship-the 
company law approach with the "market oriented approach", 
whereas in Malaysia, the laws still emphasise on the 
concept of fiduciary relationship-company law. It may be 
relevant and, if, proved to be beneficial to Malaysia in 
the long term, to streamline the Malaysian laws in line 
with the Australian laws on insider trading to meet the 
future needs of a developed economy. 
1.2 Outline of Study 
This thesis is divided into several chapi:ers, and 
each chapter deals with a specific area of study. 
Chapter 2 deals with the offence of insider 
tradir.g in the Securities Industry Act 1983, the Companies 
Act 1965, and the Malaysian Code On Takeovers & Mergers. 
The meaning of the main elements in the of fence of insider 
4 
dealing such as insider, insider dealing, information, 
securities, losses, defence and lastly, penalties will be 
examined in detail. A comparative study will be made with 
the like elements in the laws of insider trading in 
Australia. The laws of other jurisdictions such as the 
European Economic Community, the United States of America 
and England are ref erred to from time to time to provide a 
better · understanding of the definition of the various 
elements in the offence of insider trading. 
In Chapter 3 the self-regulating measures of the 
Stock Exchange against the members of the exchange and of 
the issuer in curbing insider dealing are discussed and 
critically reviewed. The specific provisions on the 
misconduct of the members relating to their business 
practices in the Rules Relating To Member Firms And Member 
Companies, and the provisions in the Rules For Trading By 
Member Firms And Member Companies on improper practices in 
their dealings are commented upon in this chapter. As for 
the issuer, the role of the Stock Exchange to prevent 
incidence of insider trading in the securities market 
through the self-enforcement of the Stock Exchange's 
insider trading policy by the issuer, such as, through the 
disclosure of information, withholding of information, and 
the purchase of securities by the insiders are also dealt 
with. 
5 
The role of the Securities Commission and the 
Registrar of Companies in enforcing the law on insider 
trading is the subject of Chapter 4. The Securities 
Commission's powers under t?e Securities Commission Act 
19934 relating to its investigation and prosecution of the 
securities laws on insider trading and its preventive 
actions to minimise insider trading are commented in this 
chapter. The effectiveness of the Registrar of Companies' 
role in enforcing the laws relating to the prospectus of 
the listed issuer and its updates on the material 
information supplied or to be supplied by the issuer in the 
context of the disclosure-based regulatory framework of the 
Securities Commission are also reviewed critically in this 
chapter. 
Chapter 5 deals with the proposals for reforms to 
the laws. A new regulation on insider trading known as "The 
Prohibition Of Insider Trading Order" is proposed to be 
enforced by the Securities Commission, and a set of audit 
rules to control the dealings in securities by the insiders 
be formulated for the Audit Committee of each issuer. 
1.3 Research Methodology 
The research material for the whole thesis 
4 Act 498. 
6 
comprises references to local and foreign, textbooks, 
journals, law reports, seminar papers and acts of 
parliaments. 
There is no Malaysian case law on insider 
trading. Certain questionnaires on insider trading were 
forwarded to the directors of public listed companies to 
assess ·their understanding of the laws on insider trading, 
but the response to the questionnaires was poor. It is not 
possible to undertake an empirical study on the 
effectiveness of the rules of the stock exchange in dealing 
with insider trading as most of the information required 
for the study is classified by the Stock Exchange and the 
Securities Commission as confidential. 
Interviews were conducted with the officials of 
both the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, the Securities 
Commission and the Registrar of Companies' Office to gain 
a better understanding of the workings of the machinery, 
both self-regulatory and regulatory, in the enforcement of 
the self-regulations and regulations on insider trading. 
1.4 Nature of the Securities Industry 
In Malaysia there is a primary market for 
securities where securities are issued and listed for 
7 
subscription through initial listing, and a secondary 
market for securities where listed securities are traded 
freely and openly by the public. 
As mentioned earlier the securities industry in 
Malaysia is governed by the securities regulation and self-
regulation. The underlying objective of the regulations is 
to protect the integrity of the capital market by ensuring 
that the investor make informed investment decision in 
their dealings in securities ; to preserve the investors' 
confidence in the capital market by ensuring the 
irregularities in the capital capital market are reduced 
and eventually eradicated; and also to ensure the growth of 
a healthy and orderly capital market. 
The aim of the laws on insider dealing is "to 
protect corporate confidence and to prevent insiders privy 
to such confidences from benefitting from an unfair 
advantage when they deal in the securities market. When 
they do deal in those circumstances, they abuse their 
position and confidences reposed in them which, in turn, 
undermines the integrity of the market." Public Prosecutor 
v Allan Ng Poh Meng. 5 
s [1990] 1 MLJ v per Senior District Judge EC Foenander 
at p. xiv. 
8 
The Legislations which govern the securities 
industry are as follows:-
(a) Companies Act 1965; 
(b) Securities I~dustry Act 1983; 
(c) Securities Commission Act 1993; 
(d) Securities Industry (Central Depositories) 
Act 1991; 
(e} Penal Code; 6 
(f) Trustee Act 1949; 7 
(g} Civil Law Act 1956; 8 
The securities industry is under the supervision 
and management of five (5) regulatory bodies as follows:-
6 
7 
8 
9 
(a) The Securities Commission; 
(b) The Registrar of Companies; 
(c) The Licensing Officer of the Ministry of 
Finance; 9 
(d) The Foreign Investment Committee; 
(e) The Stock Exchange; 
F.M.S. Cap. 45. 
Act 208. 
Act 67. 
The powers of the Licensing officer in the issuance of 
licences to the intermediaries in the securities 
market have been assumed by the Securities Commission. 
9 
The Securities Commission is set up under the 
Securities Commission Act 1993, and is vested with powers 
to enforce the laws on securities. 
The Registrar of Companies enforces the Companies 
Act 1965. 
The Licensing Officer in the Ministry of Finance 
regulates the issuance of licences to the dealers, dealers' 
representatives and investment advisers under the 
Securities Industry Act 1983. 
The Foreign Investment Committee implements the 
guidelines formulated by the Government on the acquisition 
of assets, interests, mergers or takeovers of companies and 
businesses by foreign concerns. This includes inter alia, 
any proposed acquisition of assets or interests exceeding 
RM 5 million in value whether by Malaysian or foreign 
concerns, and any acquisition of 15% or more of the voting 
rights in a Malaysian company. 
The Stock Exchange that is the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange is governed by its own memorandum of association 
and articles of association. The workings and machinery of 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange rtre governed by two (2) 
10 
sets of rules namely: 
(a) Rules Relating to Member Firms and Member 
Companies; and 
(b) Rules For T~ading by Member Firms and 
Member Companies; 
The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange oversees the market for 
securities in a self regulatory capacity by enforcing the 
Listing Requirements of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
Main Board and the Listing Requirements of the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange Second Board, ex-ante listing and ex-post 
listing. 
11 
THE REGULATORY BODY AND THE SELF-REGULATORY BODY OF THE 
SECURITIES MARKET UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS 
MINISTER OF DOMESTIC 
TRADE & CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
MINISTER OF FINANCE 
REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES SECURITIES COMMISSION 
Companies Act 
1965 
Securities Commission 
Act 1993 
Code of Takeovers And Mergers 
Securities Industry Act 1983 
Securities Industry (Central Depositories) Act 1991 
I 
KUALA LUMPUR STOCK EXCHANGE 
(SECURITIES CLEARING AUTOMATED NETWORK SDN.BHD. [SCANS)) 
(MALAYSIAN CENTRAL DEPOSITORY SDN.BHD. [MCD)) 
Memorandum of Association 
Articles of Association 
Rules Relating to Member Firms and Member Companies 
Rules For Trading By Member Firms and Member Companies 
Member Firms 
and 
Member Companies 
Listing Requirements 
Issuers Participants 
2.1. 
CHAPTER 2 
INSIDER TRADING 
The Meaning of Insider Trading 
Insider trading occurs in a particular 
transaction when a person buys or sells securities, 
whilst · in possession of price sensitive information 
- relating to the securities in question. He obtained the 
price sensitive information from his direct or indirect 
connection with the issuer of the securities concerned. 
Insider trading may connote trading in the 
securities of a particular company by its insiders. The 
phrase is often intended to mean only the improper 
trading by such person, when he purchases or sells 
securities in order to make a profit or avoid a loss, 
when he is in possession of confidential information 
that will affect their value when the information become 
public. Insider trading is essentially a problem of non-
disclosure. A person whose position provides him with 
access to information that indicates a disparity between 
the value of a corporation's securities and the price at 
which they may be acquired, or disposed of, acts on the 
information before it becomes available to those with 
whom he trades, in order to obtain for himself, without 
risk, the benefit of his early knowledge .... The general 
12 
13 
purpose of securities legislation is to enhance the 
efficiency of trading markets in order to encourage 
investors to provide funds to primary users by 
purchasing securities. Insider trading may undermine 
those goals by discouraging investment at both levels. 
Investors may be reluctant to invest in a company whose 
insiders are reputed to trade on confidential 
information, and they may be less willing to invest in 
securities generally because their confidence in the 
market's integrity has been diminished. . . . While the 
fiduciary concept provides ~- ~seful starting point, it 
requires supplementation to complete even the 
definitional task. Because they derive information from 
a position of trust that gives them an advantage over 
their ultimate beneficiaries, directors and officers are 
easily treated as owing fiduciary obligations to 
existing shareholders. A slight extension of the 
principles is required to encompass transactions with 
non-shareholders that is, sales, and to impose 
obligations on controlling shareholders who do not 
participate formally in the management of the company 
but who do have access to confidential information .... 
The concept of 'equal access to information' that is, 
that all investors are entitled to have equal access to 
information that is likely to affect their investment 
decision making, is sufficiently broad to include all 
such persons and also relates to the goals of market 
efficiency and investors protection .... In short, 
14 
information obtained through a position or relationship 
with a company, or in the market which, because it is 
not available to others, enables a person to engage in 
essentially riskless transaction in securities is 
usually sufficient to disentitle him from trading. 1 
Insider trading is defined under section 
340(3) (b) (i) of the Listing Requirements (Main Board) of 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange as the purchase or sale 
of company securities, put~! ~ calls, 3 or other options 
with respect to such securities. Trading in securities 
or options is deemed to be done by an insider whenever 
he has any beneficial interest or option, regardless of 
whether those rights or interests are actually held 
under his name. 
Under section 340(3) (b) (iii) of the Listing 
Requirements (Main Board) of the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange insider trading is defined to include tipping 
1 
2 
3 
Professor Anisman in the Australian National 
Companies And Securities Commission Discussion 
Paper titled "Insider Trading Legislation For 
Australia: An Outline of the Issues And 
Alternatives 1986 . " 
Put means a contract to sell a specified quantity 
of stock at a fixed price for a stipulated period 
of time. 
Call means a contract purchased for a premium 
entitling the holder at his option to buy from the 
vendor on or before a fixed date a specified member 
of shares at a predetermined price. 
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or, revealing inside information to outside individuals, 
to enable such individuals to trade in the company's 
securities on the basis of undisclosed information. 
Three theories exist behind the laws on 
insider trading such as:-
(a) the fiduciary duty theory; 
{b) the misappropriation theory; 
(c) the equal access theory. 
Under the fiduciary duty theory those persons 
having fiduciary relationship with the company are not 
supposed to engage in a position of conflict, and to 
make a prof it by any dealing in the securities of the 
company. 4 
In Chiarella v United Sta tes5 the Supreme 
Court stated that the "disclose or refrain provision" of 
rule lOb-5 under section lO(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act 1934 is limited to cases where the insider-
trader owes a disclosure duty based on a pre-existing 
relationship of trust and confidence, or in which the 
trader is an agent or a fiduciary to the complaining 
party. 
5 
See Percival v Wright (1902) 2 Ch.421. 
445 U.S.222. 
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However in other cases where the parties are 
not in a fiduciary relationship, the courts have 
inferred a relationship of trust and confidence based on 
the special facts of the case. In a New Zealand case of 
Coleman v Myers6 the court held that under the special 
circumstances of the case, the directors may owe duties 
to the shareholders not to mislead them, and to disclose 
all material information to them. In an American case of 
Strong v Repide7 the court held that where the officers 
of the company have knowledge of the company by virtue 
of being officers ?f the co~~~ny, or from the nature of 
his or her dealings with the shareholders, then based on 
the special facts of the case, they are under a 
fiduciary duty to the shareholders. They should make 
available to the shareholders, all material and non-
public information with respect to those securities. In 
a English case of Allen v Hyatt8 the court held that 
where officers of the company held themselves out as 
willing to act as agents for shareholders, then they may 
be considered fiduciaries. 
Under the misappropriation theory, any person 
who trades on non-public information acquired by theft, 
or a breach of a duty of confidentiality misappropriates 
6 
7 
8 
[1977) 2 NZLR 225. 
213 U.S. 419 (1909). 
(1914) 30 TLR 444. 
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corporate information. In Carpenter v United States9 a 
Wall Street Journal reporter provided stockholders with 
information that was to appear in Wall Street Journal 
newspapers column. He misappropriated material non-
public information when he breached a duty arising from 
a relationship of trust and confidence to his employer 
by revealing information which belonged to the newspaper 
company·. 10 
The equal access theory mandates all 
participants should have equ~f_opportunity to obtain and 
evaluate the information relevant to their investments 
and trading decisions. All traders owe a duty to the 
market either to disclose or to refrain from trading on 
non-public information. Policy considerations aside, the 
basis for this duty is said to be the 'inherent 
unfairness of exploiting an erodable informational 
advantage, that is, confidential information from which 
other traders are legally excluded. 11 All insiders 
9 
10 
ll 
91 F.2d 1024 (2nd Cir.1986), aff'd,108 S.Ct.316 
(1987). 
Kim Lane Scheppele noted in footnote 3 of his paper 
"It's just not right": in 'The Ethics of Insider 
Trading' in vol. 56 L & CP 123, that based on the 
view of the Supreme Court in Carpenter v United 
States, 484 U.S.19 (1987) and the dicta in 
Chiarella and Dirks, the court might be willing to 
think of those securities fraud as a fraud on the 
source of information rather than fraud on the 
holder of the security. 
See Brudney, 'Insiders, Outsiders and Informational 
Advantages under the Federal Securities Laws.' 
(1979) 93 Harv.L.Rev. 322, 346. 
18 
should not be allowed to derive a benefit from using the 
information which is not available, whether by research 
or analysis, to other investors, but would affect the 
investment decision of the later if it were. In its 
unqualified form, the equal access theory implies a 
wholesale allocation of trading rights in non-public 
information to investors at large, except where informed 
traders· earn an exclusive right to private information, 
the hard way, through their own research and analysis. 12 
In Cady, Roberts & Co. 13 the Commission relied on two 
principal element i.e. 
'[F]irst, the existence of a relationship giving access, 
directly or indirectly, to information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose, and not for the 
personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent 
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of 
such information, knowing it is unavailable to those 
with whom he is dealing.' 
However the Supreme Court in Chiarella v 
United Sta tes14 rejected the equal access theory and 
held that the printer had acquired the information not 
from the target companies, Therefore he had no 
12 
13 
14 
See Reiner Kraakman in the 'The Legal Theory of 
Insider Trading Regulation in the United States' 
cited at page 41 in the European Insider Dealing, 
Law And Practice edited by Klaus J.Hopt & Others. 
London, Butterworth 1991. 
40 SEC 907 (1961) . 
Supra note 5. 
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connection with the target shareholders and thus he was 
under no duty to disclose. 
To understand insider trading, one has to 
analyse information from the economics point of view and 
the . contractual perspective on the allocation of 
property rights to information, if any, between the 
principal-agent and/or shareholders and managers15 , and 
whether the unfettered operation of the market will lead 
to the optimal production and allocation of information 
which may affect the value of the assets of the company. 
It is evident that information cannot be 
classified as "property" with the concept of property 
and, since it is not movable property16 , it also cannot 
be stolen by a third party. 
Under the common law the recipient's 
liability for unauthorised access or use of inside 
information depends on his relationship with the issuer 
of information. In Oxford v Moss17 the court held that 
the acquiring of an examination paper by a student and 
the 'information' contained therein did not constitute 
15 
16 
17 
Whether there should be an action in rem through a 
claim by the issuer for its proprietary right in 
information is still debatable. 
See section 22 Penal Code in 'illustration' on 
movable property. It refers to writings, relating 
to real or personal proper~or rights. 
[1979) Crim.Law Rev.119. 
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theft. An issuer may file an action in contract, based 
on the breach of confidence, an express trust or on his 
fiduciary obligation. Whereas under the American 
jurisdiction, information is treated as an economic 
good. In Malaysia the basis of the defendant's 
obl~gation to the issuer depends on the contract or his 
relationship with the issuer, rather than treating 
information as a good having a proprietary interest, 
which is enforceable against all persons. It is 
submitted that in an era of information technology it 
may be appropriate that inside information, may it, 
confidential information, trade secret or official 
secret, should be accorded proprietory right under the 
law to prevent unauthorised access or use of 
information. 
The concept of separate legal entity and the 
doctrine of privity of contract fail to provide a basis 
for the relationship between the shareholder/participant 
and the insider for an offence of insider dealing. What 
is the juristic basis on which an insider is held liable 
to a shareholder or a participant for insider dealing? 
Under the common law courts, the courts have applied the 
consensual theory or, in equity, based on an obligation 
to act in good faith. Whereas in the American 
jurisdiction, it was implied to be a 
market. It is submitted that it may 
fraud on the 
be worthy of 
consideration to analyse the relationship between the 
21 
insider and the shareholder, ex-post or ex-ante, and 
determine its relationship as an exemption to the 
doctrine of legal entity, and to find whether fraud did 
exist in the market with all the market distortions such 
as nondisclosure of material information by the issuer 
and the non-disclosure of dealings to the participants. 
2 .1.1 Insider Trading Under Section 89 of the 
Securities Industry Act 1983 
Section 89(1) of the Securities Industry Act 
1983 provides that: 
" An officer, agent or employee of a corporation, or 
officer of a stock exchange, who is or in relation to a 
dealing in securities of the corporation by himself, or 
any other person makes improper use to gain, directly or 
indirectly, an advantage for himself or any other 
person, of specific confidential information acquired by 
virtue of his position as such officer, agent or 
employee or officer of the stock exchange which if 
generally known might reasonably be expected to affect 
materially the price of the subject matter of the 
dealing on a stock exchange shall, in addition to any 
penalty imposed under section 91, be liable to a person 
for loss suffered by the person by reason of the payment 
by him or to him of a consideration in respect of the 
securities, greater or lesser, as the case may be, than 
the consideration that would have been reasonable if the 
22 
information had been generally known at the time of the 
dealing". 
Section 132A of the Companies Act 1965 also 
deals with insider trading and this section is in 
parimateria with section 89 Securities Industry Act 
1983, except for the penalty provision which provides 
for a term of imprisonment for five years or thirty 
thousand ringgit or both. The penalty for any conviction 
under section 89 is a fine not less than one million 
ringgit and to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten 
years . 18 
Under section 89(1) of the Securities Industry 
Act 1983 the person who is involved in an insider 
trading may be related to an issuer such as an officer, 
an agent or an employee of the issuer, or a person who 
is not related to the issuer such as an officer of a 
Stock Exchange. 
The phrase "in relation to" may imply that the 
insider may deal directly or indirectly in securities 
through a third party. When an insider deals directly 
in securities, he should have the intention to make use 
of the information to deal in securities. This shows 
that mens rea should exist in the offence. 19 Mens rea is 
18 See section 90 of the Securities Industry Act 1983. 
19 Lim Chin Aik v Regina [1963) MLJ 50 Privy Council. 
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a defined state of mind in relation to the causing of 
the event. A person's state of mind refers to his 
knowledge, intention, opinion, belief or reasons. Wright 
J. observed in Sherras v De Ru tzen 20 that there is a 
presumption that mens rea, an evil intention, or a 
knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act, is an 
essential ingredient in every offence; but that 
presumption is liable to be displaced either by the 
words of the statute creating the offence or by the 
subject matter with which it deals, and both must be 
considered. 
In Tan Joo Cheng v Public Prosecutor21 the Court of 
Criminal Appeal held that intention is a matter of 
inference. In Gurcharan Kaur v Rochi Silk Store22 
Thomson CJ. referred to the words of Asquith LJ. in 
Cunlife v Goodman [1950] 2 KB 237 on intention at page 
253. 11 The question to be answered in whether the 
defendant on whom the onus lies) has proved the 
plaintiff... 'intended' to pull down the premises on 
this site. This question is a question of fact. If the 
plaintiff did no more than entertain the idea of this 
demolition, if she got no further than to contemplate it 
as a ( perhaps attractive ) possibility, then one would 
have to say (and it matters not which way it is put ) 
20 
21 
22 
[1895] 1 QB 918. 
[1992] 1 SLR 620. 
[1959] MLJ 229 at 231. 
24 
either that there was no evidence of a positive 
'intention' or the word 'intention' was incapable as a 
matter of construction of applying anything to tentative 
and so indefinite. An 'intent_ion' to my mind connotes a 
state of affairs which the party 'intending' ... does more 
than merely contemplate: it connotes a state of affairs 
which, on the contrary, he decides, in so far as in him 
lies, to bring about, and which, in point of 
possibility, he has a reasonable prospect of being able 
to bring about, by his act of volition." In Chew v R23 
the court stated that to pro"'.'.:~ _that "to gain directly or 
indirectly an advantage for himself, or for any other 
person, or to cause detriment to the corporation" in 
section 229(4) of the Companies {WA) Code, 24 it is 
necessary to establish that the accused intended that a 
result would ensue and that the accused believed that 
the intended result would be an advantage to himself. 
An insider should have direct or indirect 
access to the inside information before he is deemed to 
be in possession of inside information with the 
requisite knowledge that the information is the inside 
23 
24 
7 ACSR 481. 
Under section 229(4) of the Companies {WA) Code an 
officer or employee of a Corporation shall not make 
improper use of his position as an officer or 
employee, to gain directly or indirectly, an 
advantage for himself or for any other person or to 
cause detriment to the corporation. 
information. 
Devlin J. 
In Roger v 
elaborated 
25 
Taylor's Central Garages25 
on the degrees of 
knowledge." ... There are, I think, three degrees of 
knowledge which it may be re~evant to consider in cases 
of this kind. The first is actual knowledge, which the 
justices may find because they infer it from the nature 
of the act done, for no man can prove the state of 
another · man's mind; and they may find it even if the 
defendant give evidence to the contrary. They may say, 
'We do not believe him, we think that this was his state 
of mind' . They may feel that the evidence falls short of 
that, if they do, they have then to consider what might 
be described as knowledge of the second degree; whether 
the defendant was, as it has been called, shutting his 
eyes to an obvious means of knowlege .... I do not think 
it necessary to look further, certainly not in cases of 
this type, than the phrase which Lord Hewart C.J. used 
in a case under this section, Evans v Dell (1937) 53 
T.L.R.310, where he said (at p.313): ' ... the respondent 
deliberately refrained from making enquiries, the result 
of which he might not cause to have.' The third kind of 
knowledge is what is generally known in law as 
constructive knowledge: it is what is encompassed by the 
words 'ought to have known' in the phrase 'knew or ought 
to have known'. It does not mean actual knowledge at 
all; it means that the defendant had in effect the means 
of knowledge. When, therefore the case of the prosecutor 
25 (1951] 2 T.L.R. 284. 
26 
is that the defendant failed to make what they think 
were reasonable inquiries it is, I think incumbent on 
them to make it plain which of the two things they are 
saying. There is a vast distinction between the state of 
mind which consists of deliberately refraining from 
making inquiries, the result of which the person does 
not care to have, and a state of mind which is merely 
neglecting to make such inquiries as a reasonable and 
prudent person would make .... The case of shutting the 
eyes is actual knowledge in the eyes of the law: the 
case of merely neglecting - ~<? make inquiries is not 
knowledge at all-it comes within the legal conception of 
constructive knowledge, a concept which, generally 
speaking, has no place in the criminal law. 
When an insider is in possession of inside 
information, 26 he may or may not have intention to make 
use of the inside information. It is up to the 
prosecution to prove that he has the intention to make 
use of the information and did make use of the inside 
information. 
Clause 35(5) of the Criminal Justice Bill of 
1992 provides that a person who has inside information 
to deal in price affected securities in relation to the 
26 See section 165 of the Evidence Act 
which states that when any fact 
within the knowledge of any person, 
proving that fact is upon him. 
19 5 0 ( Act 5 6) 
is especially 
the burden of 
27 
information shall be presumed to take advantage of the 
information. It will be for the defendant to overturn 
that presumption on a balance of probabilites. 27 In 
Public Prosecutor v Yuvaraj28 a Privy Council case, the 
court held that the onus of proof in a criminal 
proceeding was on the defendant to disprove a 
presumption arising from the existence of facts, and 
that the standard of proof was the same as that 
applicable to civil proceedings ie. on the balance of 
probabilities. 
When an insider deals indirectly in 
securities, he may encourage, or procure a secondary 
insider [or a tippee] 29 to deal in securities by 
disclosing the information to him. Unless the tippee is 
deemed to obtain insider information from the insider, 
it is difficult to establish the causal link that an 
insider has disclosed insider information to the tippee, 
to enable the tippee to deal in the securities. 30 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Tony Woodcock in Insider Dealing: the Future Sol. 
Journal November 6th 1992. 
[1969) 2 MLJ 89. 
'Tippee' refers to a person who is not an insider 
but has learned non-public information from a 
company insider See Shapiro v Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. 7 3 - 7 4 CCR Fed. Sec 
L.Rep.para 94,473(3d Cir 1974). 
See section 114 of the Evidence Act 1950 whereby 
the court may presume the existence of any fact 
which it thinks likely to have happened, regard 
being had to the common course of natural events, 
human conduct, and public and private business, in 
their relation to the facts of the particular case. 
28 
However in drawing presumption of facts in the 
circumstances of any case, the presumption of facts must 
not be drawn automatically or, as it were, by the rule 
of thumb, without first considering whether in the 
circumstances of each particular case, there were 
adequate grounds to justify any presumption being 
raised. 31 The insider must have the requisite mens rea, 
that is) he knows, or have reasonable cause to believe 
that the tippee would deal in the securities by making 
use of the information. What is the degree of knowledge 
required from a tippee, a third party, who knowingly 
participates in a director's improper use of the inside 
information? 
In Baden Delvaux & Lecuit v Societe Generale etc32 the 
court distinguishes the degree of knowledge as actual 
knowledge, wilfully shutting one's eyes to the obvious, 
wilfully and recklessly failing to make enquiries as an 
honest and reasonable man would make, knowledge of 
circumstances which would indicate the facts to an 
honest and reasonable man, and knowledge of 
circumstances which would put an honest and reasonable 
31 
32 
Ong J. in Mohamed Ali v Public Prosecutor [1962] 
MLJ 230 in a case when the court deliberated on the 
presumption of facts under section 114 of the 
Evidence Act 1950. 
(1992] 4 ALL ER 161 at 235. 
29 
man on enquiry. 33 
In Dirks v SEc34 the Supreme Court held that 
a tippee was liable for insider trading when he traded 
on inside information with an improper motive, and when 
the .tippee knows or has reason to know that the insider 
had disclosed inside information to him. 
Section 89 (1) of the Securities Industry Act 
1983 does not provide for the mens rea and the actus 
reus of the insider when he communicates the inside 
information to a tippee to deal in securities. 
When an insider deals in securities he makes 
improper use of information. The word "improper" is not 
defined in the Securities Industry Act . Does it mean 
illegal or contrary to law or contrary to normal 
business practices? In the Oxford Dictionary35 
"improper" is defined as "unseemly, indecent, inaccurate 
or wrong". Under section 340 (2) (a) (b) of the Listi_ng 
Requirements (Main Board) of the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange it is stated that the price sensitive 
information is withheld by the issuer for corporate use 
and not for personal use. It appears that "use" other 
33 
34 
35 
See also note 25 Roger v Taylor's Central Garages. 
463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
Current English Eighth Edition 1992 
30 
than "an authorised corporate use" may constitute 
"improper use. " Lord Greene M. R. in Saltman Engineering 
Co. Ltd and Others v Campbell Engineering Co. Ltd. 36 
stated that "unauthorised use" mean 11 use 11 or 
"disclosure". 
In Grove v Flavel 37 the Supreme Court of 
South Australia held that it was a breach of Section 
124 (2) of the Companie·s Act 1962 (SA) for a director who 
knows that his company had liquidity problems and a lack 
of bank finance, to arrange for the disposition of its 
assets to the prejudice of external creditors, but to 
the advantage of internal creditors. The use of the 
information was improper because of his failure to 
consider the interests of creditors generally. The 
court observed that the word "improper " is not a term 
of art. It is to be understood in its commercial 
context to refer to conduct which is inconsistent with 
the proper discharge of the duties, obligations and 
responsibilities of the officer concerned. 
It appears that there must be conscious use of 
the insider information by an insider before an insider 
may be held liable for insider dealing. 
36 
37 
The information relating to that specific 
(1963] 3 All ER 413, at 414. 
(1986) 11 ACLR 161. 
31 
issuer is specific, confidential and if generally known 
might reasonably be expected to affect materially the 
price of the subject matter of the dealing on a stock 
exchange under section 89 of the Securities Industry Act 
1983. 
As a result of his dealing in securities he 
gained an advantage for himself or for any other person. 
To gain an advantage may mean that he has made 
a profit or avoided a loss. 38 Is the purpose of the 
person dealing in securities with inside information 
relevant? If the law were to prohibit the use of inside 
information to gain an advantage the prosecution would 
face a difficult task in court. 39 
A person who contravences or fails to comply 
with section 89(1) of the Securities Industry Act 1983 
commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine 
of not less than Malaysian ringgit one million ringgit 
and to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years. 
38 
39 
It is not very clear whether an insider who sells 
shares on the basis of inside information which he 
has acquired by virtue of his position is liable to 
account if he sells in order to avoid a loss. See 
Hammigan, Insider Dealing (Kluwer, London, 1988). 
HAJ Ford & Professor RP Austin Principles of 
Company Law (Sydney,Butterworth 5th edition). 
32 
An insider shall be liable for any losses 
suffered by the other party who dealt at the opposite 
end of the transaction concerned. It is questionable 
whether he is liable for th~ losses suffered by those 
persons who traded contemporaneously with the insider in 
the securities concerned. 
The insider has a defence against any action 
brought by a person who has suffered losses caused by 
his dealing in securities, if the other party who 
suffered losses, has knowledge of the information, or 
ought reasonably to have known of the information before 
he entered into the transaction. 
Any person whose losses are brought about by 
an insider dealing, must commence civil proceedings to 
recover the losses within two years from the date of 
completion of the transaction in question. 40 
2 .1. 2 Insider Trading Under Section 90 of ~he 
Securities Industry Act 1983 
Section 90 of the Securities Industry Act 1983 
provides that: 
II Any person, who is or in relation to dealing in 
securities of a corporation, has any information which 
if generally known might reasonably be expected to 
40 Infra paragraph 2.6 on losses. 
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affect materially the price of the subject matter of the 
dealing on a stock market and which -
(a) he holds by virtue of his official capacity or 
former official capacity; 
(b) it would be reasonable to expect a person in his 
official capacity or former official capacity not to 
disclose except for the proper performance of the 
functions attaching to that official capacity; and 
(c) he knows is unpublished price-sensitive information 
in relation to securities of the corporation, 
shall not make improper use of such information to gain, 
directly or indirectly, an advantage for himself or for 
any other person and any person who contravenes or fails 
to comply with the provisions of this section commits an 
offence. 
Section 90 is in parimateria with section 
132B of the Companies Act 1965 except for the penalty 
provision under section 132B which provides for an 
imprisonment for five years or thirty thousand ringgit 
or both, whereas the penalty provision for a conviction 
under section 89 is a fine not less than one million 
ringgit and to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten 
years. 
Section 90 relates to the prohibition on abuse 
of information obtained by officials in official 
34 
capacity. Under this section, the insider may be an 
official or former official who possesses information 
which is unpublished price sensitive information, and if 
generally known might reason~bly be expected to affect 
materially the price of the subject-matter of the 
dealing on a stock exchange. When he deals directly, or 
indirectly in securities he makes improper use of the 
information to gain an advantage for himself or for some 
other person. He is expected not to disclose the 
information except for the proper performance of his 
duties as an official. 
It is worthy of note that the element of actus 
reus and mens rea of the official's indirect act of 
insider dealing is not mentioned in the section. Hence 
it is extremely difficult to prove the case of insider 
trading under this provision in court. Under this 
section there is no stated defence for an official or 
former official nor is he liable for any losses suffered 
by the person at the opposite end of the transaction~ 
2.1.3 
that : 
Insider Trading Under Section 132(2) of the 
Companies Act 1965 
Section 132(2) of the Companies Act provides 
"An officer or agent of a company or officer of the 
Stock Exchange shall not make improper use of any 
35 
information acquired by virtue of his position as an 
officer or agent of the company or officer of the Stock 
Exchange to gain directly or -indirectly an advantage for 
himself or for any other per~on or to cause detriment to 
the company. 
Under Section 132(2) of the Companies Act 1965 
an insider may be an officer, agent or officer of the 
Stock Exchange. He shall not directly, or indirectly 
make improper use of the information to gain an 
advantage for himself or for some other person. Unlike 
the earlier provisions of the law on insider trading, 
here the term "information" is defined as "any 
information", and is not confined to information which 
specific, confidential, or price sensitive. An insider 
shall be liable to the issuer for any prof it made by him 
or any damage suffered by the company. 41 
Under the common law, the directors and 
officers of the company, have to discharge the fiduci~ry 
duties of acting in good faith, to exercise skill and 
care, to exercise their powers for a proper purpose and 
41 There is no reported decision in Britain on a claim 
by a company to recover insider trading prof it from 
an insider. Hence the issue of whether insider are 
accountable to their companies for such prof it is 
unresolved. Jacqueline A.C. Suter in the Regulation 
of Insider Dealing in Britain ( Butterworth, London 
& Edinburgh 1989 at p.122 ) 
36 
to avoid a conflict of interest situation. 42 
This common law position was reproduced in 
section 132(1) and section 132(5) of the Companies Act 
1965. 
Section. 132(1) provides that: 
"A director shall at · all times act honestly and use 
reasonable diligence in the discharge of the duties of 
his office." 
Section 132(5) provides that: 
"This section is in addition to and not in derogation of 
any other written law or rule of law relating to the 
duty or liability of directors or officers of a 
company." 
In Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver 43 Lord 
Russell of Killowen stated that it is the rule of equ~ty 
that whenever a person is a fiduciary and he uses his 
position to make a profit, he is liable to account for 
the profit. It is not a question of fraud or absence of 
bona fide or considerations as whether the profiteer is 
under a duty to give the profit for the plaintiff, or 
42 
43 
Boardman v Phipps [1966] 3 All ER 721; Industrial 
Consultants Ltd v Cooley [1972] 1 All ER 162. 
[1967] 2 AC 134 at 144. 
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whether he took a risk or acted as he did for the 
benefit of the plaintiff, or whether the profit would or 
should otherwise have gone to the plaintiff. 
2 .1.4 Insider Trading in Takeover or Merger 
Transactions 
The law governing insider trading in a 
takeover or merger transaction is contained in Rule 30 
of the Malaysian Code On Takeovers And Mergers 1987 and 
Section 89(5) of the Securities Industry Act 1983. 
Rule 30 .1 provides that a person who is a 
party to confidential price sensitive information 
concerning an of fer or contemplated of fer must treat 
that information as confidential and must not disclose 
the information to any other person nor make any 
recommendation to any other person to enable that other 
person to deal in securities, unless it is necessary to 
do so. The person in possession of such information 
must ensure that such information is not leaked out to 
an unauthorised person. 
Rule 30.2 states that save for the dealings 
conducted by the of feree related to a contemplated offer 
or an offer, no dealings in securities relating to such 
38 
classes of securities of the offerer company shall take 
place during the time when there is reason to suppose 
that there is an announcement of an approach to an 
offer, an offer or the termination of the discussions 
leading to the offer. 
Rule 30.3 provides that save where when the 
proposed offer is not deemed price sensitive in relation 
to such classes of securities in the offeree, dealings 
in the offeror's securities shall not take place during 
this period of the offer. 
Under the Malaysian Code On Takeovers And 
Mergers a person other than the offerer and the offeree, 
who is privy to confidential price sensitive information 
concerning an of fer or contemplated offer, should not 
deal or recommend any other person to deal in the 
securities involved in the takeover or merger. The 
price sensitive information may relate to an offer or a 
contemplated off er or an announcement of the approach ~o 
an offer or an event leading to the termination of the 
offer. 
Section 89(5) of the Securities Industry Act 
1983 provides that: 
11 [Section 89] shall be extended to apply to an officer, 
agent or employee of a corporation or officer of the 
stock exchange who makes improper use to gain, directly 
39 
or indirectly, an advantage for himself or any other 
person, by means of specific confidential information 
acquired by virtue of his position as such officer, 
agent or employee of the corporation or officer of the 
stock exchange, regarding -
(a) the possibility of a take-over offer or bid being 
made to · another corporation by the corporation to which 
he belongs; or 
(c) the possibility of his corporation entering into a 
substantial commercial transaction with another 
corporation, 
to deal in the securities of that corporation in the 
expectation that, if this information becomes generally 
known the price of the securities of that other 
corporation on a stock exchange might be materially 
affected. 
1983 
Section 89(5) of the Securities Industry Act 
states that section 89 shall apply to fan 
officer,agent or employee of a corporation or officer of 
the stock exchange who makes improper use of specific 
confidential information regarding the possibility of a 
takeover of fer or bid being made to another corporation 
by the corporation to which he belongs or the 
possibility of his corporation entering into a 
substantial commercial transaction with another 
corporation. Since the aforesaid events such as the 
40 
possibility of a takeover offer or a bid and the 
entering into a substantial transaction is specific 
confidential information, section 89(1) is applicable. 
The whole provision of section 89(5) of the 
Securities Industry Act 1983 refers to the improper use 
of information from the events from a takeover or 
merger, · and in the event when an issuer undertakes a 
substantial transaction which affects materially the 
price of its securities. It appears that the whole 
provision of section 89 (5) is neither redundant nor 
superfluous as matters relating to takeovers and mergers 
are contained in a Code such as the Malaysian Code On 
Takeovers And Mergers. 44 Takeovers and mergers 
transactions are amenable to changes and the parties 
involved in takeovers may inadvertently be caught 
contravening section 89(5). In ICAL Ltd v County Natwest 
Securities Australia Ltd & Transfield (Shipbuilding) Pty 
44 Under Division 2 of Part IV to the Securities 
Commission Act 1993 "Takeovers, Mergers And 
Compulsory Acquisitions, the Malaysian Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers is a subsidiary legislation 
with criminal sanctions for the breach of its 
provisions. But the Minister has not prescribed nor 
published the Malaysian Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers. The existing Malaysian Code on Mergers and 
Takeovers 1987 has been repealed. However in the 
Listing Requirements of the Main Board and the 
Second Board of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, 
the companies listed on the Stock Exchange have to 
comply with the Malaysian Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers 1987. The Securities Commission, in its 
task in overseeing takeovers and mergers has 
adopted the Malaysian Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
1987. 
41 
Ltd. 45 the merchant bankers are placed in a situation in 
which they have to release non-public information to 
encourage the rival bidder to make a more attractive 
counter-bid. The merchant bankers and the directors of 
the target company are, on one hand, to fulfil their 
duty as an adviser to the target company, and on the 
other hand, to avoid being caught under section 89 (5) 
Securities Industry Act. Disclosure of non-public 
information by the target company to a potential bidder 
to facilitate a counter-bid would inadvertently cause 
both parties to contravene section 89 (5) of the 
Securities Industry Act. It is submitted that there 
should be defence or an exemption clause which provides 
a defence or an exemption to the parties involved in the 
takeovers and mergers from being inadvertently caught 
contravening the insider trading provisions under the 
Securities Industry Act 1983. 
In Australia the principal provision of the 
law on insider trading is provided in Section 1002(G) _of 
the Corporations Law 1991. Section 1002G (1) provides 
that: 
Subject to this Division, where: 
(a) a person (in this section called the 'insider') 
possesses information that is not generally available 
but, if the information were generally available, a 
reasonable person would expect it to have a material 
45 (1988) 6 ACLC 467. 
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effect on the price or value of securities of a body 
corporate; and 
(b) the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, 
that: 
(i) the information is not generally available; 
and 
(ii) if it were generally available, it might have 
a material effect on the price or value of those 
securities; 
the following subsection apply. 
( 2) The insider must not (whether as principal or 
agent) ; 
(a) subscribe for, purchase or sell, or enter into an 
agreement to subscribe for, purchase or sell, any such 
securities; or 
(b) procure another person to subscribe for, purchase 
or sell, or to enter into an agreement to subscribe for, 
purchase or sell, any such securities. 
(3) Where trading in the securities referred to in 
subsection (1) is permitted on the stock market of a 
securities exchange, the insider must not, directly or 
indirectly, communicate the information, or cause the 
information to be communicated to another person if the 
insider knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the 
other person would or would be likely to: 
43 
(a) subscribe for, purchase or sell, or enter into an 
agreement to subscribe for, purchase or sell, any such 
securities; or 
(b) procure a third person to subscribe for, purchase 
or sell, or to enter into an agreement to subscribe for, 
purchase or sell, any such securities. 
Under 1002G an insider is a person in 
possession of information which is not generally 
available, and if generally avaliable, a reasonable 
person would expect it to have a material effect on the 
price of the securities. An insider may deal directly in 
insider dealing when he subscribes for, purchases or 
sells or enters into an agreement to subscribe for, 
purchase or sell the securities. He may deal indirectly 
in insider dealing when he procures another person to 
subscribe for, purchase or sell or enter into an 
agreement to subscribe for, purchase or sell the 
securities. An insider may also communicate the 
information or cause the information to be communicated 
to another person if he knows or ought reasonably to 
know that the other person would or would be likely to 
subscribe for, purchase or sell or enter into an 
agreement to subscribe for, purchase or sell the 
securities. The person to whom the insider discloses 
information, may procure a third person to subscribe 
for, purchase or sell or enter into an agreement to 
subscribe for, purchase or sell securities. 
44 
An insider is liable to the other person who 
traded in the transaction who suffered any losses as a 
result of his insider dealing. The person who suffered 
the losses, may commence the _proceedings to recover the 
losses within six (6) years from the date the cause of 
action arises, and irrespective of whether the insider 
is convicted of the offence of insider dealing or not. 
This provision of the law in Australia 
requires an insider to abstain from all dealing in 
securities whilst in possession of inside information. 
In Loke Tham Chuan v Public Prosecutor 46 the court 
commented on the question of possession for purposes of 
criminal matters in that "a man has not possession of 
the existence of which he is unaware". The test of "in 
possession" of inside information has been criticized 
based on the argument that it extends the limit of 
liability for insider trading by prohibiting conduct 
that did not in fact involve the misuse of information. 
The opponents of the proposed "use" test argued that _it 
was inappropriate to impose liability for trading that 
was motivated by factors other than reliance upon the 
confidential information. 47 
46 
47 
[1955) MLJ 3 at 5. 
See Thomas Lee Hazen in Refining Illegal Insider 
Trading Lessons from the European Community 
Directives on Insider Trading Vol. 55 L & CP 25. 
45 
The insider trading provisions under section 
89 of the Securities Industry Act and section 132A 
Companies Act emphasise on the fiduciary relationship of 
the parties before a person i~ held liable as an insider 
for purpose of insider trading. This is based on the 
fiduciary duty theory. 48 Section 90 of the Securities 
Industry Act 1983 and section 132B of the Companies Act 
deal with insider trading for officers acting in an 
official capacity based on 11 abuse of information" or 
the "misappropriation theory" . On the other hand the 
Australian provisions on insider trading under section 
1002 (G) of the Corporation Laws 1991 refers to 11 the 
possession of information which is not generally 
known ... 11 • This is attributed to the fact that their 
laws on insider trading are based on 11 the equal access 
theory" on a securities market approach, without any 
fiduciary or any form of relationship with the issuer or 
others. 
2.2. Insider 
An Insider may be defined as a person who has 
access to and in possession of price sensitive 
information, which is not generally available, on the 
securities of a particular issuer, through his 
connection with the issuer. 
48 Supra at p 15. 
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Under Section 89(1) of the Securities Industry 
Act 1983 an insider is referred to as an officer, agent 
or employee of a corporation or an officer of a Stock 
Exchange. Under section 89(4) of the Securities Industry 
Act 1983 an agent is defined to include a banker, 
advocate and solicitor, auditor, accountant or 
stockbroker of the corporation, or any person who is or 
at any . time in the preceding six months has been 
knowingly connected with the body corporate, and has 
information which he knows is unpublished price 
sensitive information. An officer is defined to include 
a person who at any time within the preceding twelve 
months was an officer of the corporation. 
An insider is also defined to include an 
official or former official who has had access to 
unpublished price sensitive information whilst acting in 
his official capacity. 49 The word "former official" has 
not been defined in the law to mean an official who has 
already resigned from his post or a~ official who has 
been temporarily relieved from his official post. It is 
arguable that 11 former official 11 in section 90 refers to 
an official who has knowledge of information which is 
price sensitive and unpublished at the time of his 
resignation from his post as an official in a statutory 
organisation dealing in unpublished, price sensitive 
information from the issuer. 
49 See section 90 of the Securities Industry Act 1983. 
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Under section 340(1) (a) (b) of the Listing 
Requirements (Main Board) of the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange the term "insider" .is defined to include all 
persons who come into possession of material inside 
information before its public release, such as the 
controlling shareholders, directors, officers and 
employees, outside attorneys, accountants, investment 
bankers. public relations advisers, advertising 
agencies, consultants · and any independent contractors. 
This includes the husbands, wives, immediate families 
and those persons under the control of insiders. 
Insiders also include tippees who come into possession 
of material inside information. so Any person who is 
involved in a negotiation or an acquisition of 
securities relating to a takeover or merger etc. may be 
classifed as an insider. 
It is noteworthy that the word "insider" is 
merely used in the Listing Requirements (Main Board) of 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, and not in the 
regulations. In the regulations the persons who are 
insiders are clearly spelt out in detail such as 
officer, agent and officers of the Stock Exchange and 
persons who act in an official capacity or former 
so Tippee liability is recognised under the Kuala 
Lumpur Listing Requirements (Main Board) and by 
virtue of section 11 of the Securities Industry Act 
1983, insider dealing by a tippee constitutes a 
breach of an obligation to the Stock Exchange. 
48 
official capacity. The persons who are classified as 
insiders must be connected with the issuer. An agent is 
an insider provided that he is connected with the issuer 
within the preceding six months from the date of his 
dealing in securities. An officer of the issuer is an 
insider provided that he is an officer of the issuer 
within the preceding twelve months from the date of his 
dealing . in securities. An employee of the issuer, an 
officer of the Stock Exchange and any official acting or 
has acted in an official capacity are insiders. However 
a substantial shareholder or any person who may 
reasonably be expected to give them access to the 
information is omitted as insider in the laws. 
Under section 122 (1) of the Securities 
Industry Act 1983 a body corporate may commit an of fence 
under the Securities Industry Act 1983 and therefore a 
body corporate can be an insider. Under section 89 and 
90 of the Securities Industry Act 1983 an insider is 
referred to as an individual and it excludes a corporate 
entity. However it is arguable that an insider may in 
law be an individual or a corporate entity. If a body 
corporate is charged for insider trading under section 
122 (1) of the Securities Industry Act 1983 51 a 
51 Section 39B (2) of the Securities Commission Act 
1993 states that where a person convicted of an 
offence under this Act is a body corporate, every 
person who at the time of the commission of the 
offence was a director, an executive director, an 
employee or the secretary of the body corporate or 
was purporting to act in such capacity shall be 
49 
director, a chief executive of the body corporate is 
deemed to have committed the offence of insider trading 52 
unless he proves that the of~ence was committed without 
his consent or connivance and that he exercised due 
diligence at all times to prevent the commission of the 
offence. In Chaddock v British South Africa Company 53 
the court observed that the person who represents the 
company. may be the secretary, director or other proper 
officer. He must not ·state what is known to him as an 
individual but what is within the knowledge of the 
company. But what does a company know? Does the 
company have the same "knowledge" for all legal 
purposes? But what if it forgets what it has known? In 
Stanfield Properties Ltd v National Westminster Bank 
P. L. c. 54 the court held that the company must make 
reasonable inquiries in answering interrogations to a 
court. This includes inquiries from the officers or 
former off ice rs, servants or agents unless they have 
disappeared or left a long time before the commencement 
52 
53 
54 
deemed to be guilty of that offence unless he 
proves that the offence was committed without his 
consent or convenience and that he exercised all 
such diligence to prevent the commission of the 
of fence as he ought to exercise having regard to 
the nature of his functions in that capacity and to 
all the circumstances. 
In the absence of the deeming provision, the 
decision in Dunlop Malaysia Industries Bhd v PP 
[1985) 1 MLJ 313 would prevent the court from 
committing any officer of the corporation for an 
offence committed by the corporation. 
[1896) 2 QBD. 153. 
[1983) 1 WLR 568. 
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of the case. The test to be applied is reasonableness. 
Under the circumstances where any person is an obvious 
source of knowledge, he must be questioned. If he is 
not, the company should say why. 
This deeming provision under section 122 (1) 
of the Securities Industry Act 1983 must be applied with 
caution. In a Canadian case of R v Chapin 55 Dickson J. 
was called upon to · enunciate the defence of due 
diligence.The court held that an accused exercises due 
diligence when he took all the care which a reasonable 
man mi$ht have been expected to take in all the 
circumstances or, in other words that he was in no way ·• 
negligent in the case. 
In United States Of America under section 11 
of the Securities Act 1933 a person exercises due 
diligence if he can establish that he had, after 
reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe 
and did believe that the statement is true or not 
misleading. 
In Bryne v Baker 56 the Full Court of Victoria 
commented that a director in discharging his duties of 
his off ice must act honestly and exercise such degree of 
skill and diligence which an ordinary man might 
55 
56 
(1979) 45 C.C.C. (2d) (S.C.C.) at 344. 
[1964] VR 443 
':J 
. . 
. 
\,i, 
51 
reasonably be expected to take in the circumstances. 
In an American case, Escott v Bar Chris 
Construction Corpora tion51 the court found that a 
prospectus issued by the Bar Chris Corporation contained 
false and misleading statements and omissions of 
material facts relating to the corporation's financial 
position. When the corporation became insolvent the 
purchasers of its securities brought an action for 
damages under Section 11 of the Securities Act. The 
defendants in the case were the corporation's five 
executive directors, four non-executive directors, an 
officer of the corporation and the underwriters. All 
defendants in the case were found liable for 
misstatements and omissions and failed to establish 
their due diligence defences. With regard to the 
executive directors, the court states that the greater 
the depth of involvement of the corporation's affairs, 
the higher the standard of due diligence will be 
expected from them. The Managing Director and the Chief 
Finance Director were held to have knowledge of all the 
relevant facts and were precluded from relying on the 
defence that they had reasonable grounds to believe in 
the truth of the prospectus. The court imposed a strict 
liability standard on the executive directors. A 
57 United States District Court, J. D., New York 1968 
283 F. Supp. 643 in Securities Regulation Cases 
and Material by Richard W.Jennings Harold 
Marsh JR University Casebook Series 1987, 6th 
edition. 
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director who has specialised knowledge or skill of the 
area to which the misstatement relates must discharge a 
higher standard of diligence .. An executive director who 
is a lawyer should have kno~n that he was required to 
make a reasonable investigation of the truth of all the 
statements in the unexpertised portion of the 
prospectus. He is presumed to know his responsibility 
when he· is a director. A lower standard of due diligence 
was applied to the non-executive directors who were 
found liable only for those parts of the prospectus that 
were not the responsibility of the experts. The judge 
held that these directors should have asked questions 
and then checked the truth of the answers by reference 
to the company's records. 
In AWA Ltd v Daniels t/a Deloitte Haskins & 
Sells & Ors 58 the court held that the executive and 
non-executive directors were to have different standards 
of conduct and that in a large corporate bureaucracy the 
board of directors will not assume to have knowledge of 
every detail of the corporation's operations. In 
Universal Telecasters Queensland Ltd v Guthrie 59 the 
court held that due diligence defence requires proof 
that the defendant has laid down a proper system to 
check against contraventions of the Act. In that case 
the defendant had provided adequate supervision to 
58 
59 
(1992)10 ACLC 933. 
(1978) 32 FLR 360. 
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ensure that the system was properly carried out. 
In Vrisakis v Australian Securities Corrunission 60 
the court stated that whether a director has exercised 
a reasonable degree of care and diligence can only be 
answered by balancing the foreseeable risk of harm 
against the potential benefits that could reasonably 
have been expected to accrue to the company from the 
conduct in question. 
In State Pollution Control Commission v R.V. 
Kelly 61 a Corporation was charged with negligently 
causing a substance likely to harm the environment 
contrary to the provision of section 6(1) of the 
Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989 (NSW). 
The defendant had the onus to discharge that he had 
"used all due diligence" to prevent the contravention. 
In the course of the judgment Hemmings J. commented that 
whether a person exercises due diligence depends on the 
circumstances of the case. A person's mind must 
concentrate on the likely risks that may exist and take 
appropriate precautions to prevent the contravention 
Whether a person has taken precaution is a question of 
fact and this must be decided objectively from the 
viewpoint of a reasonable man. 
60 
61 
(1993) 9 WAR 395 at 449. 
(1991) 5 AC SR 607 at 609. 
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As for the tippee, there is no express 
provision in the Securities Industry Act that insider 
dealing by tippee are expressly prohibited. However in 
section 89 the phrase "in relation to a dealing in 
securities ... or any other person" , and in section 90 
the phrase " ... in relation to dealing in securities ... " 
impliedly connotes that an insider may deal indirectly 
in securities through any other person i.e. the tippee, 
by communicating inside information to him to enable him 
to deal directly in securities and makes improper use of 
the information, or deal in securities through a third 
party without the disclosure of inside information. 
The tippee's liability is derivative i.e. its 
liability is derived from the insider's liability for 
the insider dealing. It is submitted that if the insider 
is not liable for the offence of insider dealing, the 
tippee should not be liable for the offence. In Dicks v 
SEC' 2 the Supreme Court held that the insider-tipper 
must violate his fiduciary duty by tipping improperly 
before a tippee is found guilty of the offence under 
Rule lOb-5. 63 
The insider may procure64 the tippee to enter 
into the transaction of securities without the 
communication of the inside information. The tippee 
62 
63 
64 
Supra note 34. 
Infra Chapter 4 paragraph 4.1.4.3 on Other Actions. 
Procuring does not require a common intention 
between the principal and the accessory. 
SS 
involved in the transaction, may not guilty of the 
offence of insider dealing when he does the act without 
the fault element required . for the offence i.e. the 
improper use of information in the dealing in securities 
with an advantage. 
As mentioned earlier, under the of fence of 
insider· deaing by tippee, a person may be liable for an 
of fence under the criminal law provided that he had 
actual knowledge that inside information has been 
communicated to him or, he shut his eyes to the obvious 
with knowledge that he is a tippee, and not merely 
having constructive notice that he is a tippee. 65 Unlike 
in criminal case, in a civil case, dicta of Megarry J. 
in Coco v A.N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd66 suggested that a 
person will owe an equitable duty of confidence if he 
ought to have known that the information was being given 
to him in confidence. In Attorney General v Guardian 
Newspapers Ltd (No.2) 67 Lord Goff stated obiter 11 I 
start with the broad principle (which I do not intend 
in any way to be definitive) that a duty of confidence 
arises when confidential information comes to the 
knowledge of a person (the confidant) in circumstances 
when he has notice, or is held to have agreed, that the 
information is confidential, with the effect that it 
would be just in all the circumstances that he should be 
65 
66 
67 
Supra note 23 Roger v Taylor Central Garages. 
[1969) R.P.C. 41 at 49. 
[1990) 1 A.C.109 at 281. 
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precluded from disclosing the information to others. I 
have used the word 'notice' advisedly, in order to avoid 
the (here unnecessary) question of the extent to which 
actual knowledge is necessary, though I of course 
understand knowledge to include circumstances where the 
confidant has deliberately closed his eyes to the 
obvious." 
In the case of Attorney General Reference 
(No .1 of 1988) 68 the court held that a recipient of 
inside information about a company become a secondary 
insider, whether he procures the information from the 
primary insider by purpose, or effort, or come by it 
without any positive action on his part. 
In Public Prosecutor v Yong Teck Lian69 the 
court accepted that the accused had information on a 
prospective takeover bid but, the prosecution failed to 
prove that the accused had obtained the information by 
virtue of his position as the company's stockbroker 
rather than market rumours. As such the case against the 
accused was dismissed. 
68 
69 
(1989)1 ALL ER 3321 affirmed in (1989] 2 WLR 729. 
[unreported] District Court decision of F.G. 
Remedios reproduced in Pillai, Sourcebook Of 
Singapore And Malaysian Company Law (Second 
Edition) at p.966 - 978. 
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Walter Woon in his comment on section 103 of 
the Securities Industry Act of Singapore70 stated that 
if the nexus between the insider and the tippee cannot 
be shown there is no prohibition on the tippee using the 
information. 
In the European Economic Directive71 Article 
2(1) which deals with insider trading, insider trading 
apply to remote tippees, in that where a remote tippee 
who overhears the information knowing it to be material, 
and non-public, would qualify as a secondary insider, 
since the direct or indirect source of the information 
could not be other than a primary insider. 72 Article 2 
of the European Economic Directive prohibits the use of 
inside information by those persons (ie. primary 
insiders) who are members in the administration, occupy 
a management or supervisory position in the issuer; has 
a share in the capital of the issuer;or has access to 
such inside information in the course of his employment, 
profession or duties. Article 4 of the European Economic 
Directive prohibits those persons (ie. secondary 
issuers) who have a direct or indirect relationship with 
these persons mentioned in Article 2. 
70 
71 
72 
Insider Trading And The 
Information [1987)1 MLJ cxc, 
Abuse of Corporate 
at p. cxcviii. 
Council Directive 89/592 of 13 Nov 1989 co-
ordinating regulations on insider dealing, OJ EC 
18 Nov 1989, L, 334/30. 
Supra note 27 at 231. 
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It appears that there are two classes of 
insiders ie. the primary insiders and the secondary 
insiders. The primary insiders are the directors, 
employees and shareholders of the issuers. The secondary 
insiders are those who have access to the inside 
information through their family, professional, or 
business relationship. Whether an insider should be 
liable . for insider trading by mere possession of 
information as shown · in the insider trading laws in 
Australia, irrespective of his connection with the 
issuer is still debatable. The reason is that it may 
expose a wider and indeterminate class of persons to the 
risk of being considered as insiders, and that a tippee 
should know the actual identity of his immediate or 
ultimate source of the information if he is found liable 
as a tippee. 73 
Under section 1002 (G) (1) of the Australian 
Corporations Laws 1991, a person is an insider if he is 
in possession of information that is not generally 
available, and if such information were generally 
available, would expect to have a material effect on the 
price or value of securities from a reasonable man's 
point of view. A person does not have to be an insider 
to be an "insider" under the law. It is irrelevant how 
and 
73 
from what source the insider obtained the 
Insider Dealing The New Law: Part V of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1993 by Keith Wotherspoon at 
pg 432. 
59 
information. This new provisions indiscriminately apply 
to any market participant whether diligent analyst, or 
fraudulent director, who by whatever means is in 
possession of material price sensitive information. 74 
In Australian an insider may also mean a 
natural person or a body corporate as shown in section 
1002 (E) · of the Australian Corporations Law 1991 where a 
body corporate is taken to possess certain information 
possessed by one of its officers. 
The basis of the liability for an insider 
under insider trading is is the breach of fiduciary duty 
to the issuer, or a duty which may be owed to the 
shareholders for their derivative interest, being 
derived from their property right in their share. 75 
Tippee liability for insider trading may be 
determined on the basis of the misappropriation theory76 
and the equal access theory. 77 
74 
75 
76 
77 
See Insider Trading The Need for Conceptual 
Clarity by Justin Mannolini 14 C & SLJ 151 at 154. 
See Sheldon Leader in Private Property and 
Corporate Governance Part 1: Defining Interests in 
Company Perspectives cited in Perspectives on 
Company Law edited by Fiona Macmillan Patfield. 
London, Kluwer International 1995. 
Supra note 9. 
Supra note 13. 
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As stated earlier, a tippee who indulges in 
insider dealing, has an informational advantage over 
other participants in the stock market. Based on the 
principles of integrity and ~airness in the securities 
market, the participants should be equal access to any 
information which is derived from the issuer. However in 
Chiarella78 the Supreme Court held that the printer [a 
tippee] · who had knowledge of pending takeover bids , no 
doubt traded with the target shareholders, but he had no 
connection with them and was under no duty to disclose. 
In Malaysia, a person may be considered an 
insider only when he is connected to the issuer, whether 
as employee, agent or through his connection in business 
or otherwise. This reflects the importance of the 
fiduciary relationship between the parties before a 
person can be considered an insider. 79 
In Australia, an insider under section 
1002(G) (1) Corporations Law 1991 may refer to any person 
in possession of insider information. This reflects the 
emphasis of the equal access theory instead of the 
fiduciary relationship of the parties. 
78 
79 
Supra note 5. 
Section 89 of the Securities Industry Act 1983 and 
section 132B of the Companies Act 1965 re-emphasise 
the concept of fiduciary duty of the insiders under 
the common law and section 132(5) of the Companies 
Act 1965. 
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2.3 Dealing 
Dealing in securities80 refers to an act when 
a person purchases or disposes securities in the market 
for securities. This act of dealing in securities may be 
undertaken by an officer,an agent or an employee of an 
issuer or an officer of a Stock Exchange or an official 
or former official of the authorities. 
A person deals in securities, whether as a 
principal or an agent, acquires, disposes of, subscribes 
for or underwrites securities, or makes or offers to 
make with any person or induces 81 or attempts to induce 
any person to enter into or to off er to enter into any 
agreement for or with a view to acquiring, disposing of, 
subscribing for or underwriting securities; or any 
agreement (other than a future contract) the purpose or 
avowed purpose of which is to secure a prof it to any of 
the parties from the yield of securities or by reference 
to fluctuations in the value of securities. 
In Hooker Investments Pty Ltd v Baring Bros. 
Halkerston & Partners Securities Ltd & Ors (No:2) 82 the 
Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales 
held that section 128 of the Securities Industry Code 
80 
81 
82 
Section 2 of the Securities Industry Act 1983. 
Bring out, give rise to or persuade as defined in 
the Oxford Dictionary Of Current English 1992. 
10 ACLR 524. 
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(NSW) is directed to transactions between insiders and 
outsiders concerning trading in securities, and not to 
underwriting agreements in respect of shares proposed to 
be issued. 
It is submitted that "to deal in securities" 
under the of fence of insider trading should be read to 
exclude· the act of underwriting since an insider only 
deals in transferable; listed securities and not shares 
proposed to be issued. 
It is noteworthy that to secure a profit in 
the dealing in securities may mean to avoid a loss. 
However in section 89(1) of the Securities Industry Act 
1983 it is stated that an insider deals in securities to 
gain an advantage for himself or for another person. It 
is arguable that the actus reus of the offence of 
insider dealing ie "to deal" in securities in section 89 
(1) of the Securities Industry Act 1983 should be 
redefined to include the words "to gain an advantage or 
avoid a loss for himself or for another person". 
Under section 1002G(3) of the Corporations Law 
of Australia a person deals in securities when he 
subscribes for, purchases or sells or enters into an 
agreement to subscribe for, purchase or sell any such 
securities. He may procure another person to subscribe 
for, purchase or sell or to enter into an agreement to 
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subscribe for, purchase or sell any such securities. He 
may disclose the information to another person to enable 
that person to subscribe etc . for securities. 
The word "purchase" is defined in section 
1002A of the Corporations law of Australian to include 
a party who acquires an option or right from another 
party in an option contract; to acquire the option or 
right under the contract or to take an assignment of the 
option or right whether or not on another's behalf. The 
word "sell" is defined to include to grant or to assign 
the option or right in an option contract, to take or 
cause to be taken such action as releases the option or 
right, whether or not on another behalf. In section 
1002(D) (2) of the Act if a person incites, induces or 
encourages an act or omission by another person, that 
person is taken to procure the act or omission by the 
other person. 
It appears that "to deal in securities" in 
both Malaysian Securities Industry Act 1983 and in 
Australian Corporations Laws 1991 refers to the same act 
of acquiring, disposing of, 
and/or inducing any person 
subscribing for securities 
to acquire, dispose 
of, subscribing for securities, except that, in Malaysia 
the act of dealing includes the act of underwriting. 
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2.4. Information 
2.4.1 Definition 
Generally information83 may mean inside 
information or market information. Inside information84 
refers to information which arises from the issuer and 
market information is information of any event of 
general interest which may affect the market for 
securities. 
Market information is commonly defined as 
information about the events or circumstances which 
affect the market for a company's securities but do not 
affect the company's assets or earning power. 85 
Under the Securities Industry Act 1983 the 
term "information" is not defined. 86 However under 
section 340 (a) (bl of the Listing Requirements (Main 
Board) of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange "information" 
83 The American Law Institute has defined information 
as possession of a natural fact such as a promise, 
prediction, estimate, projection or forecast or a 
statement of intention, motive, opinion or law. 
84 In TSC Industries Inc v Northway Inc. ( 1976) 426 US 
438 the US Supreme Court held inside information to 
include these inferences which a reasonable 
investor would draw from fact in his possession. 
85 Fleischer,Mundheim and Murphy,An Initial 
into the Responsibilty to disclose 
information (1973) 121 U.Pa.L.Rev. 798. 
Inquiry 
market 
86 11 Information" in the Criminal Justice Act 1993 
refers to information which relates to particular 
securities or issuer(s) of securities and not to 
securities or issuer generally; 
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is defined as inside information which has not been 
publicly released and which is intended solely for 
corporate use and not for personal use and which the 
Company withholds. 
In Australia in section 1002 (A) (1) of the 
Corporations Law, information includes matters of 
supposition and other matters that are insufficiently 
definite to warrant being made known to the public; and 
matters relating to the intentions or the likely 
intentions of a person. 
It appears that the definition of information 
include all matters, both facts and future events, that 
are likely to affect the price of the securities from a 
reasonable man point of view. 
In Public Prosecutor v G. Choudbury8 1 Justice 
Sinnathuray of Court of Criminal Appeal in Singapore 
held that 'specific confidential information' is a 
question of fact in each case to be resolved on the 
evidence adduced at the hearing of the case. According 
to his Lordship "specific information" means knowledge 
of a kind if generally known might reasonably be 
expected to affect materially the value of the shares of 
a company and information under section 113(1) of the 
Securities Industry Act, 1966 (Singapore) means 
87 [1981) 1 MLJ 76. 
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knowledge of a particular event or situation such as 
advice, communication, intelligence, news, notification 
and the like. 
2.4.2 The Characteristics of Information 
In the Securities Industry Act 1983 
information is described as specific, confidential, 
unpublished ,price sensitive, and as information which 
if generally known to the public might reasonably be 
expected to affect materially the price of the subject 
matter of the dealing on a Stock Exchange. 
Under the Australian Corporations Laws 1991 
the term "information" merely refers to information that 
is not generally available but if the information were 
generally available, a reasonable person would expect it 
to have a material effect on the price or value of 
securities of a body corporate. 
2.4.2.1 Specific 
The term 11 information is specific 11 may mean 
that the information is clearly defined in relation to 
a particular subject with its full particulars. In a 
decided case in England Chaloner v Bolckow8 8 Lord 
88 (1877-8) LR 3 App. Cas. 933. 
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Hatherley of Privy Council stated that specific is 
ordinarily used in the common parlance of language as 
meaning distinct from general. 
In the Australian ·case of Ryan v Triguboff8 9 
the phrase "specific" was judicially considered in 
Justice Lee's dictum as "specific information" to which 
the section refers must have an existence of its own 
must be capable of being pointed to and identified, and 
its entire content must be capable of being expressed 
precisely and unequivocally. 
2.4.2.2 Confidential 
The term "information is confidential 11 may 
refer to information received in confidence or which is 
so classified by the company as confidential. In a 
decided case in England Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v 
Guinle90 Sir Robert Megarry V. C. stated that the 
information must be information, the release of which 
the owner reasonably believes, would be injurious to 
him, or of advantage to his rivals or others. The owner 
must reasonably believe that the information is 
confidential or secret, that is, it is not already in 
the public domain, and that the information must be 
judged in the light of the usage and practices of the 
particular industry, or trade concerned. 
89 
90 
(1976)1 ACLR 337. 
(1979) Ch. 227 at 248. 
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2.4.2.3 Unpublished 
The term "information is unpublished" in the 
context of insider trading may mean that information is 
not published in accordance with the mode of publication 
as stated in the Listing Requirements (Main Board) of 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange that is information has 
been released to the press and other media for a period 
sufficient to permit thorough dissemination and 
evaluation of the information. 
2.4.2.4 Price Sensitive 
The term "information is price sensitive" may 
ref er to the effect of the release of inside information 
on the price of the securities in question. 
2.4.2.5 Material 
The term "information which materially affect 
the price " may mean the extent to which the 
information may affect the price of securities from the 
point of view of a reasonable man.In Singapore in Public 
Prosecutor v Allan Ng Poh Meng9 1 the court laid down the 
standard by which materiality is to be judged is whether 
the information on the particular share of the market is 
such that it would influence an ordinary investor to 
decide whether to buy or sell securities. 
91 (1990) 1 MLJ v. 
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In TSC Industries Inc v Northway Inc. 92 the 
United States Supreme Court held that information will 
be material if there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable shareholder would consider the information 
important in deciding how to exercise voting rights 
attached to its shares. There must be substantial 
likelihood that the omitted information would have been 
viewed · by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the "total mix" of information 
made available. The information will be material if it 
is information of a kind that will affect a reasonable 
investor's decision whether he will invest in the 
securities or not. 
The price sensitiveness or materiality of 
information was considered by Bryson J. in ICAL Ltd v 
County Natwest Securities Australia Ltd & Transfield 
(Shipbuilding) Pty Ltd. 93 This is a takeover case in 
which insider trading issues were raised. His Honour 
observed that materiality has to be treated as a 
question for the Court, although it is conceivable that 
evidence may be tendered to enable the court to 
understand why certain matters were material or why they 
were not. 
92 (1976) 426 U.S. 438 at 449. 
93 Supra note 45. 
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In Australia and in Malaysia whether a piece 
of information may materially affect the price of 
securities will depend on how a reasonable man would 
expect the information to have a material effect on the 
price or value of securities. 
2 .4 .2 . 6· Generally Known 
The term "information that is generally known 
"may mean that the information is generally known to 
those who are accustomed or would be likely to deal in 
the securities. It may be worth considering the 
significance of the time factor required for the 
dissemination of the information to enable the 
information to be understood by the market. In Kinwat 
Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors v Platform Pty Ltd.94 the court 
held that notification by letter to the stock exchange 
in combination with a sufficiently detailed news story 
in a capital city newspaper made information generally 
available. 
In England under the Criminal Justice Act 1993 
inside information is treated as having been made public 
when it is published under the rules of a regulated 
market for the purpose of informing investors and their 
professional advisers; or when the information is 
inserted in records which are opened to inspection by 
94 (1982) 6 ACLR 398. 
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the public; or the information becomes readily available 
to persons who are likely to deal in securities to which 
the information relates; or .information can be derived 
from information which has been made public; or 
information may be treated as public even though it can 
be acquired only by exercising diligence or expertise; 
or it has been available only to a section of the public 
and nob to the public at large; or it can be acquired 
only by observation and it is only upon the payment of 
a fee. 
In the Securities Industry Act 1983 
information is generally known appears to refer to a 
situation when the information is available to those 
persons when the information is published in a national, 
business newspaper or in professional journal and/or to 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. It is submitted that 
there should be a definition of the term "information is 
generally known" in the Securities Industry Act 1983 "to 
mean "information is generally available when the 
information is published in accordance with the rule of 
the Stock Exchange in which the securities is traded; 
and such information can be acquired from a search in 
the office of the Registrar of Companies." 
Under section 10028(2) of the Australian 
Corporations law 1991 information is generally available 
if information consists of readily observable matter or 
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its deductions, conclusions or inferences from such 
matters, and it has been made known in a manner that 
would or would be likely to ·bring it to the attention 
of persons who commonly inv~st in securities of bodies 
corporate of a kind whose price or value might be 
affected by the information provided that a reasonable 
period has elapsed from the time of the release of the 
information. 
As mentioned earlier the term "Information" in 
the Securities Industry Act 1983 refers to information 
which is specific, confidential, unpublished, price 
sensitive and if generally known might reasonably be 
expected to affect materially the price of the subject 
matter of the dealing on a Stock Exchange. Whereas in 
Australian Corporatios Law 1991 information merely 
relates to information which is not generally available 
and if generally available, a reasonable man would 
expect it to have a material effect on the price of the 
securities. 
It is suggested that the term "information" be 
redefined as specific information relating to particular 
issuers and particular securities, that is not generally 
available and if available might materially affect the 
price of the securities listed on the Stock Exchange. 
The reason is that the objectives of the Legislation in 
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formulating Section 89(1) of the Securities Industry Act 
1983 is to prevent those persons who make use of 
unpublished insider information that is specif ic95 
information that is not g~nerally available and if 
available might materially affect the price of 
securities under the Securities Industry Act 1983. 
2.5 Securities 
Securities96' is defined in section 2 of the 
Securities Industry Act 1983 to include debentures, 
stock shares in a public company or corporation, or 
bonds of any government or of any body, corporate or 
unincorporate, and includes any right or option in 
respect thereof and any interest in unit trust schemes. 
Dealing in securities under section 132A(4) of 
the Companies Act 1965 in relation to a corporation 
means a transaction relating to shares in or debentures 
of the corporation or interests within the meaning of 
section 84 made available by the corporation or by a 
related corporation; or rights or options in respect of 
the acquisition or disposal of such shares, debentures 
or interests. 
95 
96 
Specific information is precise information and it 
is not deduction and hunch or rumour. 
Under Article 1(2) of the EEC Directive securities 
refer to transferable securities but exclude unit 
trusts, currency and commodity derivatives. 
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Under the Securities Industry (Central 
Depositories} Act 1991 security means debenture, note, 
stock and share in a public ·Company or corporation, or 
bond of any government or ~f any body, corporate or 
unincorporate and includes any right or option in 
respect thereof and any interest as defined in section 
84 of the Companies Act 1965. Under this Act security is 
also classified as listed deposited security and 
unlisted deposited security. 
Securities under the Rules For Trading By 
Member Firm and Member Companies of the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange is defined to include such other 
securities as may be admitted for quotation on the 
Exchange as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Committee 
may from time to time determine. 
Under section 89 and section 90 of the 
Securities Industry Act 1983 securities include the 
subject matter of the dealing on a stock exchange. At 
present the subject matter of dealing on a stock 
exchange includes transferable subscriptions rights, 
warrants, call warrant, convertible loans, unconvertible 
loans, shares, 'A' shares, and preference shares. 
It is evident that "securities" has been 
variedly defined under the various regulations in 
Malaysia. It is submitted that securities should be 
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defined as listed transferable securities and unlisted 
securities. To define concisely the term 'securities' 
it should include ordinary shares, preference shares, 
debentures, loan stock~, warrants/transferable 
subscription rights, bonds, notes rights, property trust 
and foreign securities and such other subject matter 
that are admitted for trading on the Stock Exchange. The 
phrase ·"the subject matter of the dealing" on a stock 
exchange should be substituted with the words "listed 
transferable securities" as used in Section 2 of the 
Securities Industry (Central Depositories) Act 1991. 
Securities in relation to a body corporate in 
Australia is defined under section 1002A(l) of the 
Corporations Law 1991 to mean shares in the body 
corporate; debentures (including convertible notes 
issued by the body corporate; prescribed interests made 
available by the body corporate; units of shares of 
prescribed interest; an option contract under which a 
party acquires from another party; an option or right 
exercisable at or before a specified time to buy or sell 
securities referred to as above at a price specified in, 
or to be determined in accordance with the contract, but 
does not include a futures contract or an excluded 
security. 
It appears that the classes of securities 
under the Securities Industry Act 1983 relates to the 
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same classes of securities as stated in section 1002A(l) 
of the Corporations Law 1991. 
2.6 Losses 
Under section 89(2) of the Securities Industry 
Act 1983 an insider shall be liable to a person for the 
losses suffered by the person who deal in the 
securities. In this provision of the regulation "a 
person" may mean the · person who traded at the opposite 
end of the transaction with the insider, or 
alternatively it may mean all those persons who suffered 
losses whilst trading contemporaneously with the 
insider. 
Based on the doctrine of privity of contract, 
the person who traded at the opposite end of the 
transaction may entitled to claim the losses suffered 
therein. When an insider with inside information, sell 
securities in the stock market, he sell the securities 
to a participant in the stock market, it is a normal 
contractual transaction between two parties. Is there 
any reliance on the part of the participant that the 
insider will not indulge in insider dealing, and that 
the participant will suffer expectation losses for loss 
of bargain, and/or reliance loss for expenditure 
incurred in reliance on this contractual transaction 
caused by the insider's wrongful act? It is submitted 
the insider does not rely on the insider's transaction 
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when he deals in securities. However if the said 
transaction is tainted with insider dealing, it is may 
be construed as a fraud ·on the source of inside 
information. 97 The word "fraud" is explained as mere 
silence as to facts likely to affect the willingness of 
a person to enter into a contract is not fraud, unless 
the circumstances of the case are such that, regard 
being had to them, it is the duty of the person keeping 
silence to speak, or unless his silence is, in 
itself,equivalent to speech. 98 If an insider does not 
disclose inside information and deal in securities, his 
nondisclosure may tantamount to silence yet he is under 
a duty on his part to speak. He may breach his duty to 
speak under the circumstances of the case by his non-
disclosure and through his fraudulent insider dealing 
act. But there is a missing element of causation in the 
transaction. It is only when consent to an agreement is 
caused by fraud, the agreement is voidable at the option 
of the participant whose consent was so caused. 
On the other hand, if privity which limit the 
liability to reasonable proportions were abolished, 
liability could be indeterminate for an indeterminate 
time to an indeterminate class. 
97 Supra note 10. 
98 section 17 of the Contracts Act, 1950 (Act 136). 
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There is no privity of relationship, nor is 
there reliance by the participant or inducement by the 
insider, in the absence of . the insider's implied or 
express terms of the transaction, that the insider will 
not make use of inside information in his dealing with 
him. An insider being a participant in the stock market 
is subject to certain obligations99 as shown his 
application to be a participant to the Stock Exchange 
before he is admitted as a participant in the stock 
market. Unless one could rely the law of obligations, 
instead of the law of contract with its doctrine of 
privity of contract, reliance and inducement, there is 
no cause of action against the insider by the 
participant. 
In a market for securities where the trading 
in securities is anonymous and match-up of trading is 
fortuitous, it is not possible to identify the party who 
traded at the other side of the transaction. Yet the 
insider has been "unjustly enriched" 100 at the expense 
of a participant who disposes securities to him in a 
99 By virtue of section 11 (1) and (2) of the 
Securities Industry Act 1983, a person who is 
under an obligation to comply with, observe, 
enforce or give effect to any rule of the stock 
exchange, and failed to comply with the rule, shall 
be be in default of the rule and be subject to 
certain penalties. 
loo It is up the court to conclude whether it would be 
unjust unjust for the insider to retain the benefit 
that he should make restitution to the 
participation or the issuer. 
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transaction tainted with insider dealing. The insider 
has committed a wrongful act through his misuse of 
inside information in his dealing in securities, but he 
is not · accountable to the participant for the 
participant's losses or damages [which may be 
theoretical rather than real] , due to the element of 
causation. As an insider, be it a tipper or a tippee, he 
is liable in restitution to the issuer, where he has 
access or indirect access to inside information 
classified as only 'confidential' in the sense that an 
unauthorised disclosure of such information to a third 
party while the employment [or contract] subsisted 
between the parties would be a clear breach of the duty 
of good faith. 101 
In an American case of Shapiro v Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc102 the Second Circuit 
suggested that the persons who suffered losses may 
include all those persons who traded on the opposite 
side of the transaction with the insider during the same 
period as the insider trades. In Wilson v Comtech 
Telecorrununication Corp. 103 the court refused to award 
damages to those persons who traded between the time the 
defendant traded and the time the information is made 
101 See Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Foo1er[l987] Ch.117 at 
136. 
102 495 F. 2d. 228, 241 (2d Cir 1974). 
103 648 F. 2d. 88 (2d Cir. 1981) 94-95. 
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public. 
Section 20A{a) of the Securities Exchange Act 
1934 expressly provides for_a private right of action 
for an investor who trade contemporaneously with any 
person in the securities of the same class when that 
person has violated any provision of the Securities 
Exchange Act 1934 or any provisions made thereunder. 
It is submitted that the insider who indulges 
in insider dealing should be liable to all participants 
who traded contemporaneously at the same time as the 
insider, for any losses suffered by them, based 
purportedly on the obligations to be observed by all 
the participants in the stock exchange. 104 
No doubt the court may have to determine the 
participants who traded contemporaneously with the 
insider. But strict contemporarity is not required so 
long as there is a reasonable temporal relationship 
between the event giving rise to the lawsuit and the 
harmful act which contributed to the event. 105 
Under section 89(1) of the Securities Industry 
Act 1983 the losses suffered by a person is the 
104 see section 11 (2) of the Securities Industry Act 
1983. 
105 Decision No:309/90 (1991) 20 WCATR 108 at 124 (ONT 
w.c.A.T. Strachan (Vice-Chair) Klym,Apsey. 
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difference between the payment made by him or the 
consideration given by him in respect of the transaction 
and whatever consideration . deemed reasonable if the 
information had been generally known at the time of the 
dealing. 
The person who suffered losses from a 
transaction tainted with insider dealing, is a contract 
claim based on the breach of contract by the insider due 
to his non-disclosure of information not generally known 
at the time of the dealing. If an insider made a 
fraudulent misrepresentation i.e. he did not indulge in 
insider dealing in a transaction tainted with insider 
dealing, his wrongful act is a tortious act. Based on 
the element of "fault" and "the test of proximity" a 
victim may claim for economic losses caused by his 
wrongdoing subject to the elements of remoteness and 
measure of damages. 
In an American case of Elkind v Liggett & 
Myers Inc106 the District Court awarded damages to all 
purchasers who purchased Liggett & Myers stock on the 
open market during the one week period when Liggett & 
Myers officials gave securities analysts advance warning 
of a sizeable drop in the company's quarterly earnings. 
The damages were awarded from the time the information 
was acted upon by a tippee analyst till the public 
io6 472F Supp.123 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
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announcement of the earnings one week later. The 
insider's liability was limited to his profit or loss 
avoided. 
It is submitted that the measure of losses by 
any party against the insider should be limited to the 
amount of profit made, or the losses avoided by the 
insider·. The reason is that the claim by the party 
against the insider should be a "tortious" claim under 
the law, and that the insider is to be to be placed in 
the position he would be had the wrong not been 
committed. 
Under section 89 ( 3) of the Securities 
Industry Act 1983 the person who suffered losses must 
commence the civil suit to recover the losses within a 
period of two (2) years from the date of completion of 
the transaction of the dealing in securities. Under 
section 6 (1) (a) of the Limitation Act of 1953 a person 
can commence a suit in contract or in tort within a 
period of six ( 6) years from the date the cause of 
action arises. It is suggested that since the losses 
caused by the insider trading are contractual and 
economic losses, the limitation period under section 
89(3) should be extended to six (6) years and to run 
from the date the cause of action arises. 107 
107 A participant may wish to rely on the fact of 
conviction in a criminal court of law under section 
89(1) of the Securities Industry Act 1983 to file 
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Under Section 125 of the Securities Industry 
Act 1983 the losses caused by insider trading can only 
be recovered from the insider in the form of a 
compensation provided that t?e insider is convicted of 
the offence of insider trading under the law. 
In Muniandey v Public Prosecutor1°8 the court 
held that an award of compensation under section 
426(i) (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be made 
to the witness as the damage to the witness was not 
caused by the charge of which the appellant was 
convicted. 
It is submitted that a victim of insider 
trading may not have the locus standi to appear before 
the court to claim compensation on the ground of 
causation. How would a seller who sells to an insider be 
identified,and how would his losses be quantified? 
In Australia under section 1013 (2) (3) (4) &(5) 
of the Corporations Law 1991 the person who suffered the 
losses shall claim from the insider the difference 
between the price at which he dealt in the securities 
and the price of the securities had the information been 
generally available in the market. That person has to 
108 
a civil suit and a criminal hearing may take a few 
years to dispose of the case. 
(1955] MLJ 231. 
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establish a relationship of privity with the insider 
before he can commence a civil suit for loss . To 
recover the losses under section 1015, he must commence 
proceedings within six (6) years from the date the cause 
of action arises and irrespective of whether the accused 
is convicted of the offence or not. 
It appears in Australia and in Malaysia that 
a victim of insider trading who .suffered losses may only 
claim losses based on a claim in contract. If the 
insider were to purchase the securities from a 
participant in the stock market, that participant, being 
a shareholder of the issuer, has had a relationship with 
the insider because he derived his interest from his 
interest in the securities he possessed. Based on this 
special relationship between the parties, there may be 
a cause of action in contract, but subject to the 
elements of causation and remoteness and measure of 
damages. 
If the insider mis:epn~sents to the other 
participant in the transaction, and induces him to enter 
into the contract with the insider, his 
misrepresentation may constitutes a breach of contract 
on one hand, and a deceit [fraudulent misrepresentation] 
on the other. An insider, being involved in insider 
trading when he is in possession of inside information, 
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but without any fraudulent misrepresentation but, a mere 
non-disclosure or silence do not constitute inducement 
to enter into a contractual relationship. 
2.7 Defence 
Under section 89(2) of the Securities Industry 
Act 1983 an insider shall not be liable for the offence 
of insider dealing if the person who is affected by the 
transaction knew or ought reasonably to have known of 
the information. 
In a criminal case whether the person knew or 
ought reasonably to have known of the information is 
irrelevant to the prosecutor. It does not affect the 
culpability of the offender in committing the offence.In 
a criminal case the defence was a matter to be 
established by the defendant and it is not necessary for 
the prosecutor to disprove the defence to establish a 
case against the defendant. 109 The defence of whether 
he knew of the information or ought reasonably to have 
known of the information may be a defence to a person 
who wishes to institute a civil suit against the 
insider. 
It may be a defence under Section 89(1) of the 
Securities Industry Act 1983 if the insider makes 
lo9 R v Cross (1990] BCC 237. 
authorised use of the information. 
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Alternatively the 
insider shall not be liable for the offence if he did 
not directly or indirectly make any gain or avoid any 
loss in his transaction in securities. 
In England under section 53 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1993, a person will not be regarded as 
taking ·advantage of inside information if he shows at 
the time of the alleged offence that he lacked the 
necessary intent to make use of the information. A 
person lack the necessary intent if in the dealing he 
does not intend any person to secure a prof it or avoid 
a loss, and in disclosing inside information he does not 
expect any person to deal or secure a prof it or avoid a 
loss. If he encourages another person to deal in 
securities, he .does not intend that person will secure 
a profit or avoid a loss. 
It is submitted that the Securities Industry 
Act 1983 should state explicitly the defences available 
to the insiders when he is charged in an insider trading 
as an insider-tipper for disclosing inside information 
to outsiders. The reason is that he may in the eyes of 
justice, qualify for certain defences which may not run 
against the law on insider trading. 
In Australia it is a defence to insider 
trading under section 1002(7) of the Corporations Law if 
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the court is satisfied that the information came into 
possession solely as a result of the information having 
been made in a manner that would or would be likely to 
bring to the attention of pe~sons who commonly invest in 
securities of bodies corporate of a kind whose price or 
value might be affected by the information, and the 
other person knew or ought reasonably to have known of 
the information before the information was communicated 
to him. 
In the securities market there are certain 
acts that have to be performed by the market makers and 
certain market intermediaries such as dealers, dealer's 
representatives, underwriters and trustees of unit 
trusts or pursuant to a legal requirements imposed by 
the court, even though their acts of dealing may 
technically constitute insider dealing. However there 
is no statutory provision in the Securities Industry Act 
1983 which sets out such exemptions for such market 
makers etc. 
In an Australian case of Hooker Investments 
Pty Ltd v Baring Bros. Halkerston & Partners Securities 
Ltd & Ors (No. 2) 110 the court held that whatever 
information passed by the underwriter to induce other 
parties to enter into sub-underwriting agreement was not 
in breach of the insider trading provisions. 
110 Supra note 82. 
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It is submitted that the securities laws in 
Malaysia should provide certain exemptions to protect 
those market makers and market intermediaries including 
underwriters etc who deal in good faith in the event 
they are charged for the offence of insider dealing. 
In Australia there are express exemptions in 
the Corporations Law 1991 which exempt certain 
categories of persons from contravening the laws under 
insider trading. Section 1002G(2) of the Corporations 
Law 1991 provides that insider trading does not apply to 
trustee who redeem a prescribed interest under a buy-
back covenant in a trust deed under section 1002H; to 
underwriters under section 1002J; for purchase of 
securities pursuant to a legal requirement under section 
1002L; disclosure of information pursuant to a legal 
requirement under section 1002L; chinese wall 
arrangements by bodies corporate under section 1002M and 
partnership under section 1002N; exemptions for bodies 
or its agents who enter or propose to enter in the 
course of agreement for the securities of the other body 
corporate under section 1002Q and under section 1002R 
re spec ti vely; transactions by market makers such as 
dealers or dealers' representatives under section 10028. 
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2.8 Penalties 
Under section 91 of the Securities Industry 
Act 1983 a person who contravenes or fails to comply 
with the sections relating t~ insider dealing is liable 
to a fine of not less than one million ringgit and to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years. Whereas 
under section 132A(6) of the Companies Act 1965 dealing 
with the same offence the penalty is a mere 
imprisonment for five years or . thirty thousand ringgit 
or both. It is submitted that this anomaly in the 
regulations relating to insider dealing has to be 
rectified by the authorities immediately. Since a body 
corporate can be liable for the offence of insider 
dealing the combined sentence of fine and imprisonment 
should be imposed disjunctively. 
Other than section 132(2) of the Companies Act 
1965, there is no civil penalty imposed on the offender 
of an insider dealing offence. 
In America, under the Insider Trading 
Sanctions Act 1984, the court is authorised to impose a 
civil penalty of up to three times the insider's (or his 
tippees') profits. 
offence 
In Australia the penalty provisions 
of insider trading is dollars two 
thousand or imprisonment for . five years or both. 
90 
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Options For Reforms to the Securities Industry 
Act 1983 
Section 89(1) of the Act should read as 
"A person who is in possession of specific 
information, which if generally available 
might materially affect the price of 
transferable, listed securities of particular 
issuers, and makes use of such information to 
deal in the securities commits an offence." 
Section 89(2) should .read as follows:-
"A person who causes the use of specific 
information which if generally available might 
materially affect the price of transferable 
listed securities of particular issuers, by 
any other person to deal in such securities 
commits an offence unless he proved that he 
had no knowledge that the other person will 
deal in such securities or he believed on 
reasonable ground that the other person will 
not deal in such securities." 
Section 89(3) should read as follows:-
"He shall be liable to those persons who 
suffered loss whilst trading contemporaneousy 
in the particular listed transferable 
securities with him at the material time." 
In this section -
"a person" means those persons who are 
connected to the issuers such as directors, 
substantial shareholders or those persons in 
the employment of the issuer by way of 
contract of service or contract for service 
but the expression does not include:-
(a) a trustee who had to redeem the 
prescribed interest under a deed of trust 
which contained a buy-back covenant in 
the trust deed; 
(b) the underwriter 
(c) the person who is a dealer or a dealer's 
representative. 
section 91 of the Act on penalty should read 
as follows:-
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"A person who commits an offence under section 
89 is liable upon conviction to a fine not 
less than Ringgit Malaysia one million and/or 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten 
years." 
The following words or phrases that form part 
of the offence of insider dealing should be amended to 
make their meaning clearer:-
(a) information to mean inside information 
which has not been publicly released and 
which is intended for a corporate purpose 
of the issuer. 
(b) "the subject matter of dealing in the 
stock exchange" should be substituted 
with the words "listed securities on the 
Stock Exchange". 
(c) "securities" should be defined as listed 
transferable securities and unlisted 
securities. Listed transferable 
securities should be defined as stocks, 
shares, debentures, warrants and such 
other subject matter that are admitted to 
trading in the Stock Exchange. Unlisted 
securities should include all classes of 
securities not included in the definition 
of listed transferable securities. 
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It is proposed to include a new section in the 
Securities Industry Act 1983 that no prosecution for an 
offence under this Act shall commence after the 
expiration of: 
(a) three years from the commission of the 
offence; or; 
(b) one year from its discovery by the 
prosecutor, whichever is the earlier: 
Provided that it shall not be a bar to the 
commencement of a prosecution for an offence under this 
Act notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified 
in the above paragraph (b) if the Public Prosecutor 
certifies in writing that the accused by his own conduct 
contributed to the delay in the commencement of the 
prosecution. 
CHAPTER 3 
SELF-REGULATION BY THE STOCK EXCHANGE 
3.1 Introduction 
The Stock Exchange in Malaysia is a self-
regulatory body. In Malaysia, there is the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange. As a frontline self-regulating body, it is 
governed by its memorandum of association and the articles 
of association. 1 In its operation, it has formulated rules 
governing the membership, management, operations or 
procedures of the stock exchange such as:-
( i) rules relating to member firms and 
member companies; and 
(ii) rules for trading by member firms and 
(iii) 
member companies; 2 and 
the initial listing requirements and 
the continuing listing requirements of 
the stock exchange. 
1 The memorandum of association and articles of 
association constitute a statutory contract between 
each member and the company and between the members 
inter se Hickman v Kent or Romney Marsh 
Sheepbreeders' Association [1915] 1 Ch 881. 
2 Article 52 of the Articles of Association. 
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Section 33 (1) of the Companies Act 1965 
(Act 125) states that subject to this Act, the memorandum 
and articles shall when registered bind the company and the 
members thereof to the same ~xtent as if they respectively 
had been signed and sealed by each member, and contained 
covenants on the part of each member to observe all the 
provisions of the memorandum and of the articles. 
Professor Gower proposes that the memorandum and 
articles have direct contractual effect in so far they 
purport to confer rights or obligations on a member 
otherwise than in his capacity of a member. 3 Whereas 
Professor Wedderburn' s assertion was that a member can 
compel the company not to depart from the contract with the 
member under the articles. But it may indirectly enforce 
outsider's rights vested in third parties or in the member 
so long as he sues qua member and not qua outsider. 4 G.D. 
Goldberg the Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Victoria5 
contended that a member of a company has under section 
20(1) of the Companies Act 6 a contractual right to have any 
of the affairs of the company conducted by the particular 
3 
5 
6 
In L. c. B. Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law 4th 
edition. 
[1957]CLJ 194. 
48 MLR 158. 
This section is in pari materia with section 33(1) of 
the Malaysian Companies Act 1965. 
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organ of the company in accordance with the Companies Act 
or the company's memorandum and articles, even though in 
enforcing that member's right (and the correlative 
obligation) he may incident~lly enforce also a right or 
power bestowed by the memorandum or articles on a person in 
a capacity of an outsider rather than as a member of the 
company. 
It is submitted that the members of the exchange 
that is, the member firms and member companies can enforce 
their rights stated in the memorandum and the articles, but 
in doing so, they may incidentally enforce the powers and 
rights bestowed by the memorandum and articles on them as 
outsiders, but cannot sue otherwise than as a member. 
The objectives of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
in the memorandum of association are inter alia, to 
regulate the conduct of business in securities of a stock 
exchange through the establishment of just and equitable 
principles in the market for securities; to institute a 
policy of market surveillance and corporate disclosure; to 
promote and protect the interests and welfare of the 
members of the exchange through arbitration amongst 
members; amendments of the rules relating to members and 
rules for trading by members; to provide, enact and amend 
the. listing requirements of the issuers and to enforce a 
code for mergers, takeovers, etc. 
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The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange is subject to the 
control of the Minister of Finance' and the Securities 
Commission. The Minister of Finance has the power to 
approve the setting up of a ~tock exchange, and to appoint 
any person to the stock exchange committee. 
The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange is controlled by 
the Securities Commision through the amendment of its rules 
of the stock exchange. Whenever the Stock Exchange wishes 
to amend its rules, it has to forward the proposed draft 
amendments of the rules (except those rules declared by the 
Securities Commission that do not require approval of the 
Commission) for the Securities Commission's approval. 
Amendments to the rules of exchanges made by the Stock 
Exchange without the approval of the Securities Commission 
shall have no effect. 8 If the Stock exchange fails to 
comply with a direction from the Securities Commission 
pertaining to the amendment of the Rules, the Exchange 
commits an offence under section 9(8) of the Securities 
Industry Act 1983. 
Under the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Articles of 
Association, there is only one article 52 in the Articles 
of Association which mentions the Rules of the Exchange but 
7 section 8 of the Securities Industry Act 1983. 
s section 9(1) of the Securities Industry Act 1983. 
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the words "Listing Requirements" do not appear in the 
Articles of the Stock Exchange. Rule 2(2) of the Rules For 
Trading By Member Firm and Member Companies merely provides 
that companies who wish to quote their securities on the 
Official List of the Exchange shall apply in such form and 
on such terms and conditions as the Committee of the Stock 
Exchange determines from time to time after consultation 
with the Securities Commission. The Committee of the Stock 
Exchange may admit, refuse to admit any company to the 
official list or suspend any company for any period or 
delist any company at any time without assigning any reason 
therefor and the decision of the committee shall be final 
and conclusive. 
In Australia the relationship between the issuer 
and the Stock Exchange is governed by its listing rules and 
the business rules. The Australian Stock Exchange is 
empowered under Article 74(1) of its Articles of 
Association to quote the securities of the issuer on the 
official list of the Exchange. Article 4(4) of the Articles 
of Association of the Australian Stock Exchange provides 
that the Exchange shall admit corporations to the list 'on 
such terms and conditions ... as the Board of the Exchange 
shall from time to time determine. The Listing Rules of 
the Exchange are defined in section 761 of the Corporations 
Law 1991 as the rules, regulations and bye-laws relating to 
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the admission to or removal from the official list of the 
body corporate, governments, unincorporated bodies or other 
persons for the purpose of quotation on the stock market of 
the securities of the bodies concerned. 9 
Under the articles of association of the 
Australian Stock Exchange, the Australian Stock Exchange 
has the power to make listing rules. However the 
amendments to the listing rules must be filed with the 
Australian Securities Commission, and subject to approval 
by the Minister. 
There appears to be a lacuna in the Articles of 
Association of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange on the 
Listing Requirements. In Article 52 of the Articles of 
Association it should stipulate that the Exchange shall 
establish an official listing of issuer whose securities 
are quoted on the official list, and that the issuers are 
bound by the Listing Requirements of the Exchange. The 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange merely requests the issuer to 
execute a letter of undertaking to comply with the listing 
requirements upon its admission for listing to the official 
List of the Stock Exchange. The Listing Requirements by 
such listing rules are considered to be commercial 
rules to be policed by commercial people : ?ire & All 
Risks Insurance Co Ltd v Piont-:-er Concrete Services Ltd 
(1986) 10 ACLR 760 at p. 764. 
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itself lack statutory force but derive its effect from the 
law of contract between the Exchange and the issuer. 
Several case laws in Australia confirm the fact 
that upon the issuer's application to the Stock Exchange 
for the listing of the issuer on the stock exchange, and 
the quotation of its securities on the exchange, and its 
subsequent acceptance by the exchange for listing,there 
exists a contract between the issuer and the exchange. 10 
If any issuer commits a breach of any provisions 
in the Listing Requirements, the Kuala Lumpur Stock ~ 
'=; 
Exchange may take action against the issuer concerned under 
section 11 (1) of the Securities Industry Act 1983. It 
should be noted that subsection 11(1) of the Securities 
Industry Act 1983 does not deem the rules of the Stock 
Exchange (which includes the listing requirements) to be 
equivalent to the provisions of the law. It merely enables 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange to enforce the rules 
against those persons who are under an obligation to comply 
with the requirements. It appears that if the issuer fails 
to comply with the rules, it has breached the rules ie. 
indirectly a provision of the law under the Securities 
io Ampol Petroleum v R. W Miller (Holdings) Ltd and Others 
[1972) 2 NSWLR 850; Repco Ltd v Bartdon Pty Ltd [1981) 
VR 1; Designbuild Australia Pty Ltd v Endeavour 
Resources Ltd [1980) ASLC 86, 120. 
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Industry Act 1983. 11 
In section 11(2) of the Securities Industry Act 
1983 the stock exchange may, _ in addition to or in lieu of 
any action which it may take under the rules of the stock 
exchange (which includes the listing requirements) give a 
direction to the person in default to comply with, observe, 
enforce or give effect to any of the listing requirements 
or impose a penalty not exceeding ringgit two hundred and 
fifty thousand on the person in default or reprimand the 
person in default. 
It is submitted section 11 (2) is a redundant 
provision, based on the premise that the listing 
requirements constitute the rules of the stock exchange. 12 
Rules of the stock exchange should be clearly defined in 
the Articles of Association of the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
11 can section 11(1) of the Securities Industry Act 1983 
be interpreted in such manner that a decision by the 
Stock Exchange not to enforce a breach of the rules be 
deemed improper by any aggrieved person and that an 
aggrieved person may apply to the court for an order 
to seek compliance. 
12 Rules in section 2 of the Securities Industries 
Industry Act 1983 refers to rules governing the 
quotation of securities of the stock market. It is 
submitted since the Listing Requirements include 
matters relating to listing of securities, based on a 
liberal interpretation, rules of the stock exchange 
should include matters governing the dealing in 
securities. 
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Exchange. 13 The rules of the stock exchange are defined in 
section 2 of the Securities Industry Act 1983 as rules 
contained in the memorandum of association and articles of 
association, 14 rules and procedures governing the 
quotation of securities on the stock market of the stock 
exchange, rules to ensure compliance by member companies of 
any obigations imposed by the laws and rules for the proper 
operation and management of the stock exchange. 
The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange may rely on 
section 100 (1) (b) of the Securities Industry Act 1983 by 
way of an application to the High Court to seek directions 
or orders from the Court to seek compliance with the 
listing requirements or to secure compliance with the rules 
of the stock exchange . 15 
Section 777 of the Corporations Law 1991 in 
Australia provides inter alia, that where a person is under 
an obligation to comply with or enforce the business rules 
1 3 The rules of the stock exchange is defined in section 
2 of the Securities Industry Act 1983 to include rules 
contained in the memorandum of association and the 
articles of association or other constituent document 
of the stock exchange. It should exclude the rules 
contained in the memorandum of association. 
14 The memorandum and articles of association governed 
the framework of the stock exchange setting out its 
objectives and functions but does not affect the 
actual workings of the exchange through its rules. 
15 This provision is applicable to an 
who has suffered losses or likely 
caused by the person who was 
contravention. 
aggrieved person 
to suffer losses 
engaged in any 
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or listing rules of the stock exchange and that person 
fails to comply with, observe ... or give effect to those 
rules, on the application by .the appropriate person [which 
includes the Australian Stock Exchange, Australian 
Securities Commission and a person aggrieved by the failure 
to comply with rules of the stock exchange] the court may 
make an order giving directions to the person who has 
failed to give effect to the rules. An aggrieved person is 
defined under section 1114(a) of the Corporations Law 1991 
as the person being aggrieved by a contravention of the 
rules of the stock exchange when he is a holder of 
securities in the body corporate whose securities are 
quoted on the stock market of the Stock Exchange. 
In Australia section 1114 of the Corporations Law 
1991 provides that a person who has contravened the listing 
rules or is about to do an act, if done, would constitute 
such a contravention, the stock exchange may apply to the 
court for orders to deal with the matter. 
It appears that an aggrieved person16 in 
Malaysia may be informed by the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
of its intention to take any of the actions under 
subsection (1) against the person who breached the rules of 
the Stock Exchange. But an aggrieved person cannot take 
l6 see section 11 (4) (b) Securities Industry Act 1983. 
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action against the person in default of the rules of the 
Stock Exchange in a court of law. Whereas in Australia the 
aggrieved person has a statutory right to take action under 
Section 777 of the Corporati?ns Law 1991. 
It is submitted that there should be a provision 
in the Securities Industry Act 1983 which provides that an 
aggrieved person should be able to file a civil remedy in 
a court of law in the event he suffered losses caused by 
the person who breached the rules of the Stock Exchange. 
In Malaysia the Listing Requirements of the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange has yet to be subjected to 
interpretation in a court of law even though there are 
several provisions in the Listing Requirements relating to 
insider trading which are not clear. 17 
In Australia the courts have adopted both a 
narrow and broad interpretation of the Listing Rules. In 
Hillhouse & Ors v Gold Copper Exploration NL & Ors18 the 
court stated that the listing rules still need to be proved 
according to the rules of evidence. 
17 see chapter 2 on section 89 of the Securities Industry 
Act 1983. 
18 (1989) 7 ACLC 332 at p. 336. 
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In Repco Ltd v Bartydon Pty Ltd, Canadian Tire 
Corporation Ltd & Mc Ewans Ltd19 the court stated that a 
person will only assume an obligation to observe the 
Listing Rules when that person is bound by contract or 
statute to do so. However in TNT Australia Pty Ltd v 
Poseidon Ltcf 0 Jacobs J. stated that a strict and literal 
interpretation of the rule would defeat the purpose of the 
rules .under the prevailing circumstances and such 
commercial document ought to be construed and interpreted 
by the court in such a way as to give effect to the spirit 
and letter. 
It is submitted that the Listing Requirements of 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange should be made precise and 
clear in its interpretation so as to eliminate any 
ambiguity and contradiction as the case may be. 
The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange or any person 
acting in the name of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange shall 
not suffer any liability for any acts or omission in the 
purported performance or performance of its duties and 
powers under the Securities Industry Act 1983 if the Stock 
Exchange acts in good faith.ll 
19 ( 19 8 O ) CLC 6 41 . 
20 (1989) 7 ACLC 303 · 
21 section 10(3) of the Securities Industry Act 1983. 
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In Australia under section 779(7) of the 
Corporations Law the Australian Exchange has qualified 
privilege for the publication of the information about a -• 
request by the exchange to a _listed entity for information 
in relation to compliance by the entity with or a 
contravention by the entity of the law or the exchange 
rules ; or information or a document to the exchange by a 
listed ·entity in response to such a request. 
3.1.1. Against the Members of the Stock Exchange 
Rule 2(2) of the Rules Relating To Member Firms 
and Member Companies, 22 states that every member firm and 
member company may use the trading facilities on the 
exchange, and to be a member of the exchange, he shall 
execute a letter of undertaking in favour of the exchange 
that he will comply with the rules of the exchange. 
Rule 7(1) of the Rules Relating To Member Firms 
and Member Companies, 23 states that a member firm or 
member company shall not sell, dispose of, purchase, 
exchange, or acquire securities through share hawking, or 
through any other methods not duly approved by the 
Committee, nor knowingly permit any its interested bodies 
22 Rule 2 relates to the Mode of Trading. 
23 Rule 7 relates to Conduct of Business by Member Firms 
and Member Companies. 
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to effect the same. Every member firm or member company 
shall not, in the opinion of the Committee, advertises 
securities for sale or purchase, nor knowingly transact -' 
business for or on behalf o~ any person, firm or company 
whose businesses are conducted in such like manner. 
As for the control over the employees, Rule 18 ( 1) 
of the Rule For Trading By . Member Firms And Member 
Companies, 24 states that, provided that a partner of a 
member firm or member company consented to the transaction, 
and that transaction does not involve a conflict of 
interest situation, a member firm or member company shall 
not deal in any transaction in securities with its 
employees or the employees of another member firm or 
company. 
Rule 18(2) of the Rules For Trading By Member 
Firms and Member Companies also states that, provided that 
each transaction by an employee of a member firm or member 
company is authorised in writing by a partner or a director 
of the member firm or member company, a dealer's 
representative of any member firm or member company shall 
not deal in transactions for securities for any employee of 
a member firm or member company. 
24 Rule 18 deals with employees' transactions. 
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Any member of the Exchange who violates any 
articles, rules, or fails to comply with the Committee's -
decision made under the Rules Relating To Member Firms and 
Members Companies and Rules For Trading By Member Firms and 
Member Companies in their dealing in securities, or is 
found by the Committee to be guilty of misconduct as a 
member -shall be liable to a fine, suspension or expulsion. 
In Australia the Board of Exchange may impose any 
penalty as it deems fit, or order the member to pay the 
total commission or gross profit or part thereof arising 
from the relevant transaction, and reasonable costs or 
proportions therefor incurred by the stock exchange in the 
conduct of the hearing. 
Under Rule lSA (ii) of the Rule Relating To 
Member Firms And Member Companies if the Committee is of 
the opinion that a review of the policies of the management 
and business practice of any member firm or member 
companies is necessary in the interests of the members, 
exchange and the public, the Committee shall take over the 
control and the management of the said member firm or 
member company. This power to take over control of the 
management of the member firm or member company by the 
committee of the Stock Exchange is extremely wide and 
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sweeping in scope and needs further clarification and 
explanation in its scope of work. It is suggested that in 
the event that workings of the member firms or member -• 
companies breached the rule~ of the exchange, receivers or 
managers should be appointed as agent to manage the member 
firms or member companies, but under the direction of the 
stock exchange. 
Under Rule 4(1) and (2) of the Rule For Trading 
By Member Firms and Member Companies, if the Committee is 
of the opinion that there has been manipulation or 
excessive speculation in any dealing in any listed 
securities, the Committee may consult the Securities 
Commission, and then make a declaration that a particular 
listed security is a designated security. Upon such 
declaration by the Committee and to facilitate the 
committee's investigation in the malpractices in dealing in 
securities, the Committee may impose restrictions or 
prohibitions in the dealing in securities by imposing a 
margin25 of cover in the dealing; by restricting the 
dealing in securities to immediate or prompt bargains; 
prohibiting any sale, and if the sale is permitted the 
seller shall deliver the share or stock certificate 
2s There has arisen a practice of buying and selling of 
options and a custom of the agent advancing the needed 
cash called margins, for the purpose of securing or 
of p~otecting the bargain ... William E Beamish v James 
Richardson & Sons Limited (1914)8.C.R.595 at 597. 
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together with the duly executed transfer forms at the time 
of execution of the contract of sale. 
-• 
In view of the numerous cases relating to JI 
securities laws in particular insider trading26 Rule 4(1) 
to (2) of the Rule For Trading By Member Firms And Member 
Companies which deal with manipulation and speculation 
should .also apply to insider trading. Furthermore there 
should be a provision which enables the Committee to 
withhold the proceeds of sale from the dealing in 
securities in a suspense account. However it is not 
possible for the Committee to ascertain whether there is 
manipulation in the market for securities under the law. 
As such Rule 4 should provide for cases when the Committee 
may withhold the proceeds of sale from those persons 
suspected to be involved in insider trading or manipulation 
when the Committee suspect them to be involved in insider 
dealings or manipulation. However those persons may apply 
to a court of law for the release of their sale proceeds. 
As such the stock exchange must be absolutely certain that 
there is a prima facie case for insider trading or 
manipulation before it proceeds under subparagraph (iii) 
Of Rule 4 of the Rule For Trading By Member Firms and 
Member Companies . 
26 see the securities Corrunission Report 1993,1994,1995 
and 1996. 
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Since it is extremely difficult to detect 
offences of insider dealings under the securities laws, a -• 
new rule should be included in the Rules For Trading by 
Member Firms & Member Companies that places an obligation 
on the member firms, or member companies, who are involved 
in the dealing in securities, to report to the Committee , 
any dealings in securities, suspected to be tainted with 
insider dealings. If the member firms or member companies 
suspect that any dealing is an insider dealing, then they 
should report the facts of such transactions to the stock 
exchange. 
In Australia Business Rule 3 .15 of the Australian 
Stock Exchange provides that the brokers shall report to 
the Surveillance Department of the Australia Stock Exchange 
on the nature of the dealings in securities by its clients. 
Since the Business Rules formed part of the securities 
contract which involved the broker and the client, the 
client may be taken to have acquiesced to the breach of 
confidence when the broker report to the Stock Exchange on 
this matter. 
The Kuala Lumpur stock exchange should take 
preventive measures to advise the member firms and member 
companies on insider dealings and suggest to them to take 
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self-regulatory measures to reduce the incidence of insider 
trading by the dissemination of guidelines or circulars. 
3 .1. 2. Against The Issuers Of Listed Securities 
The issuers of listed securities on the official 
list of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange are required to 
comply with the Stock Exchange Initial & Continuing Listing 
Requirements. If the issuer commits a breach of the 
Listing Requirements, the Committee may, after consultation 
with the Securities Commission issue a public reprimand; or 
suspend its trading of securities for a certain period; or 
restrict all dealings in securities to immediate or prompt 
bargains; or prohibit the sale in securities unless the 
seller deliver the share certificates together with the 
duly executed transfer; or deli st the issuer from the 
official list; or any other penalties and conditions as the 
Committee thinks fit. 
It is pertinent to note that whatever penalties 
the Committee wishes to impose on the issuers for every 
breach of the listing requirements are enforceable in 
practice. It is difficult if not impossible to delist the 
issuer from the official list of the stock exchange when it 
may jeopardise the interests of the investors and/or 
participants in the securities market and at the same time 
disrupt the workings of the capital market. 
-• 
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Even though it is clearly stated in section 392 
of the Listing Requirements that the Committee of the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange shall,_ after consultation with the 
Securities Commission reprimand the issuer who breached the 
rules, in practice the reprimand . is issued by the 
Securities Commission. This is as stated in the Securities 
Commission Annual Report of 1993 the case of UCM Industrial 
Corporation who was reprimanded by the Securities 
Commission on 2nd July 1993 by the Securities Commission 
for material deviation in actual pretax profit achieved 
relative to forecast pretax profit. In addition Samanda 
Holdings Berhad on the 11th October 1993 was reprimanded by 
the Securities Commission for material deviation in the 
utilisation of rights issue proceeds, and deviation in 
actual pretax profit achieved relative to forecast pretax 
profit. 
Apart from the penalties stated in Section 392 of 
the Listing Requirements, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
may under Section 11(2) of the Securites Industry Act 1983 
direct the person who breached the Listing Requirements to 
comply with, observe, enforce or give effect to any such 
listing requirements and to impose the penalties stated in 
section 11(2) (b). Section 392 of the Listing Requirements 
should be amended to include the penalties stated in 
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Section 11(2) of the Securities I~dustry Act 1983 such as 
to direct those persons to comply with the listing 
requirements and impose a fin~ of not less than ringgit two 
hundred and fifty thousand. 
In Australia the Listing Rules of the Australian 
Stock Exchange merely provide that breach of compliance by 
the issuer of the Listing Rules may cause the issuer 
securities to be suspended from 911otation or the issuer may 
be removed from the official list of the Exchange. 
Under Section 340 of the Listing Requirements of 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, the Stock Exchange defines 
what is insider trading, insider and inside information. It 
is evident that the definition of insider trading is 
imprecise in that one element of tp.e offence "improper use 
of information resulting in a loss (if any) to any person" 
is not stated at all. 27 Insider is clearly defined to 
include all persons who come into posession of material 
information before its public release. Inside information 
is defined to mean information which has not been publicly 
released and which the company withhold for corporate use. 
The Kual~ Lumpur Stock Exchange has formulated a 
policy on corporate disclosure of information, whereby each 
21 Section 340(3) of the Listing Requirements. 
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issuer of securities is obliged to adopt the policy as part 
of its corporate policy. The Stock Exchange cannot 
enforce the policy on corporate disclosure of information 
(which includes the policy _ on insider trading) without 
explicit rules. The Stock Exchange should formulate precise 
rules on insider trading and disclosure of information in 
mandatory terms and thereafter to enforce the rules with 
zeal and efficiency. 
It is a rule of practice of the Stock Exchange 
that the issuer of listed securities should formulate its 
own insider trading policy in consonance with the policy of 
the Stock Exchange on insider trading. It is a policy of 
the Stock Exchange on insider trading that insiders should 
not trade on the basis of material information that is not 
known to the investing public. 
It is submitted that the policy should be reduced 
to a rule that the insiders shall not trade in the 
securities when in possession of material inside 
information.Rules do not work when those willing to comply 
do not know what compliance involves and also those less 
willing to comply are not informed or stimulated in the 
appropriate manner. Effective rule demand that those who 
design rules take into account the enforcement strategies 
that will have to be used to achieve compliance. 28 
28 See "Why Rules Don't Work" by Robert Baldwin in [1990] 
53 MLR 321 at 336. 
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Insiders should refrain from trading in their 
securities even after material information on such 
securities has been released to the public through the 
press and other media for a _ sufficient period to permit 
thorough dissemination and evaluation by the public. The 
waiting period may vary between a period of twenty four 
(24) hours to forty eight (48) hours depending on how 
widely . the information is disseminated to the public. 29 
This policy should be reduced to a rule that insiders are 
prohibited from trading in securities 
twenty (24) hours to forty eight (48) 
dissemination of material information 
public. 
for a period of 
hours after the 
to the investing 
If the issuer learns that insider trading is 
taking place or has taken place, the issuer has to make 
immediate public disclosure of the unpublished, material 
inside information. 30 Here the Issuer should report the 
cases of insider trading,if any,to the Exchange. 
Whenever unpublished material inside information 
is disclosed to the employees of the issuer, the issuer 
should draw the attention of the employees to the 
prescribed act of insider trading. It may be appropriate 
29 Section 340 (4) (b) of the Listing Requirement. 
30 Section 335 (7) (b) of the Listing Requirement. 
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to require any employee who gained access to such 
information to report his dealings, if any, in the issuer's 
securities. This appears to .be the best deterrent against 
insider trading by the issuer by insisting that the 
insiders file insider trading report with the issuer. 
The issuer may establish, publish and enforce 
effective procedures in the purchase or sale of its 
securities by the director, employees and other insiders 
designed to prevent improper trading and to avoid any 
question of impropriety in insider purchases or sales. The 
procedure stated by the stock exchange involves restricting 
their purchases or sales to the period following the 
release of annual statement, financial conditions or the 
conduct of the sales and purchases of securities on a 
regular basis. It is not possible to verify whether the 
issuer has adopted this policy and implemented this policy 
effectively that is the scheduling of the purchase and sale 
of securities unless the issuer conducts an internal audit 
on the purchase or sale of securities by the insiders. The 
issuer should give a notice to all insiders including its 
employees who have access to such unpublished material 
inside information to declare by way of statutory 
declaration on their dealings in securities whenever the 
issuer suspects that insider dealings has taken place. 
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In Australia under the Listing Rules there is no 
written policy on insider trading. 
The Policy on the Corporate Disclosure of 
Information states that each issuer discloses material 
inside information that affects materially the price of its 
listed securities on the stock exchange, that is accurate, 
sufficient and in a timely fashion. 
In Australia under the Listing Rule 3A(l) a 
listed company is required to immediately notify the 
Exchange . . . any information which is likely materially to 
affect the price of the securities of the listed company or 
is necessary to avoid the establishment or continuation of 
a false market in the company's securities; or investors 
and their professional advisers would reasonably require 
and reasonably expect to be disclosed to the market for the 
purpose of making an informed assessment of the assets and 
liabilities, financial position, profits and losses, and 
the prospects of the listed company and the rights 
attaching to the security of the listed company. 
3.1.2.1. Policy on immediate disclosure 
of material information 
An Issuer is required to make immediate 
disclosure of material information on all facts relating to 
its affairs except for events that will prejudice the 
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ability of the issuer to pursue its corporate objectives31 
or events may be in a state of flux. 32 Disclosure of such 
information will have more adverse effects on the issuer 
than on the investing members of the public. This imply 
that the issuer may withhold information to further the 
issuer's interest at the expense of the public's interest. 
It should be emphasised that the issuer should disclose 
both good and bad information with equal intensity and 
disclosure of information should be made on a continuous 
basis and not in a sporadic manner as and when the issuer 
desires. When should an Issuer disclose information? In 
an American case of Kohler v Kohler Co. 33 the court held 
that honest and good judgement and common sense as to what 
is fair will in general suffice as guidelines when to 
disclose the material information. 
It appears that this policy of disclosure is 
inconsistent with Section 9B (2) (a); (b) of the Securities 
Industry Act 1983 which provides that the Stock Exchange 
shall ensure that any interest of the issuer which is 
protected under any law relating to the corporation 
conflict with the public interest, the public interest 
31 
32 
33 
Section 335(5) (b) (i) of the Listing Requirement. 
Section 335 (5) (b; (iii) of tliA Listing Requirement. 
319F 2d 634, 642 (7th Cir.1963). 
shall prevail. 
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From this, it is appropriate that this 
specific rule should be further clarified and amended to 
avoid any ambiguity in its interpretation. 
Under section 335(3) (b) (ii) of the Listing 
Requirements of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange the issuer 
shall not indiscriminately disclose information on the 
ownership of securities when the owner of the securities 
has a legitimate interest in preserving its 
confidentiality. This rule should be read subject to the 
laws under the Companies Act 1965 where the issuer is 
mandated to disclose in its registers the shareholdings of 
securities of its directors, its substantial shareholders 
and its members. In the case of Raja Nong Chik v Public 
Prosecutor34 Justice Raja Azlan Shah (as he then was) held 
that directors are expected to observe a high standard of 
conduct in connection with dealings in their shares,and 
when they do buy or transfer shares, they have to notify the 
company. However information pertaining to ownership of 
securities in the issuer is not current in that it is only 
after a period of 14 days from the day of its occurrence 
that the identity of the owners of securities is revealed 
in the respectve registers of the Issuer. 35 
34 [1971) 1 MLJ 190. 
35 Section 69E & 135 of the Companies Act 1965. 
-• 
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An investing member of the public can have access 
to the particulars of the dealings in the securities of a 
depositor on the Stock Exchange only when the depositor or -' 
his personal representative ~as given permission in writing 
to disclose such information. 36 Disclosure of dealings in 
securities is also permitted where the depositor was 
declared a bankrupt or has been wound up; 37 or when the 
depositor was involved in any civil proceedings between a 
central depository or an authorised depository agent 
relating to the securities account of the depositor, or in 
any adverse claims by any parties, where the central 
depository or the authorised agent seeks relief by way of 
interpleader; or the depositor was being investigated for 
any offence under any law. Such information may be 
disclosed in a summary form so as not to enable the 
identity of any depositor, to whom the information relates, 
to be ascertained. However the above provisions are 
subject to the proviso that no person shall refuse to 
disclose any information or document to the Minister if the 
disclosure is required in the interests of investors or in 
the public interest. 
36 
37 
Section 45 (1) (a) Securities Industry 
Depositories Act) 1991 (Act 453) 
Section 45(1) (b) Securities Industry 
Depositories Act) 1991. 
(Central 
(Central 
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If a participant in the securities market 
suspects that he is a victim of insider trading and wishes 
to institute civil proceedings against the . . -· insider 
involved in the dealings, he does not have access to the 
data on dealings in securities under the law. To enable an 
aggrieved participant to take civil action against a person 
for insider dealing, he must have access to the particulars 
of the· person who dealt in the opposite end of the 
transaction. He has to rely on Section 45 of the 
Securities Industry (Central Depositories) Act 1991. The 
participant does not meet the requirements where disclosure 
of the data on the dealings are permitted under the present 
state of the law. 
The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange had declared the 
securities of an issuer of the second board, Orlando 
Holdings Bhd. as a designated security on the 27th January 
1997. A share analyst commented that since most share 
analysts had not monitored the counter, it is difficult for 
them to identify the participants who dealt in the stock. 
On the other hand, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange is in a 
position to know the identity of the buyers and the sellers 
to determine whether in that particular occasion the stock 
was being manipulated. 38 
3 8 Star Newspaper 28th January 1997. 
Section 
123 
It may be pertinent to know the reason behind 
45 of the Securities Industry (Central 
Depositories) Act 1991 which prohibit the disclosure of 
information relating to sha!eholdings in the securities 
listed in the Stock Exchange.Why is it that the data on 
dealings in listed securities are classified as private and 
confidential whereas information on the shareholdings of 
directors, substantial shareholders and members of the 
issuer are available to members .of the public on payment of 
a small fee at the registered office of the issuer under 
the Companies Act 1965? To encourage the participants in 
the securities market to police the market and to institute 
civil proceedings for insider dealings, it appears that 
Section 45 of the Central Securities Industry (Central 
Depositories) Act 1991 should be amended to enable the 
aggrieved person as described in section 11 ( 2) of the 
Securities Industry Act 1983 to file a suit against the 
offender of the securities laws. 
If a participant wishes to have data on the 
dealings in listed undeposited securities, he has to 
approach the member firms and member companies of the Stock 
Exchange or the Stock Exchange itself, and they have also 
classified such information as private and confidential. 
Yet the Securities Commission has urged the investing 
public and the minority shareholders to be pro-active in 
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helping the authorities to curb irregularities or 
manipulations in the local stock market and encouraging the 
public to come forward with .whatever information they may -' 
have rather than wait for the Securities Commission or 'the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange to start investigation. 39 
It appears that information relating to dealings 
of listed securities, both deposited and undeposited, are 
readily available only to the authorities, but not to the 
participants in the market. To enable the participants in 
the market to verify the identity of the purchaser, or 
seller of securities in case of suspected insider dealing, 
and indirectly police the market for any malpractices in 
the dealings in securities, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
should advocate a system of full or permitted disclosure of 
information on dealings in securities whenever the 
circumstances of the case warrant it. Section 45 of the 
Act should be amended to include those persons, being 
holder of securities, and are aggrieved by the person who 
failed to comply with the rules of the Stock Exchange. 
3.1.2.2. Policy on Response to Unusual Market Action 
Under section 338 of the Listing Requirements of 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, whenever there is any 
unusual market activity in the issuer's securities, the 
39 Star Newspaper July 17 1996. 
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issuer should make the appropriate enquiry to determine its 
conditions and take corrective action. The issuer may make 
an announcement that there is no material development in -' 
its business and that there is no reason for the price 
movements in its securities or the issuer may choose to 
remain silent, lest they are wrongly interpreted by the 
public and this may cause uninformed investment decision. 
It appears to be the practice among the issuers when 
queried by the Exchange on the unusual market movements in 
its securities to state that they are not aware of any 
reasons for such unusual market actions. 40 
It should be the duty of the issuer to notify the 
stock exchange whenever any unusual market movement occurs 
in its securities and to conduct an audit on the sales and 
purchases of securities for suspected cases of insider 
dealing (if any) under such conditions. 
40 Pilecon Engineering said in the Star Newspaper dated 
5th March 1997 that it was not aware of any rumours or 
other conditions which contributed to the sharp 
increase in price and the substantial turnover in the 
company's shares; Seng Hup Corporation Bhd. said that 
it was not aware of any rumours or other conditions 
that had contributed to the unusual market action 
towards its shares. In its reply to the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange queries it said that there were no 
material developments in its business that had not 
been previously disclosed to the stock exchange for 
public release. 
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Whenever the issuer withholds material 
information the issuer should keep watch on the market 
conditions of its securities for any unusual movements in -• 
its prices or volumes of transactions. If he detects any 
leak of information, such information should be released to 
the public immediately. 41 It is observed that the issuer 
in general do not comply strictly with this policy. 
3.1.2.3. Withholding of information 
Under section 335 (8) (i) of the Listing 
Requirement of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, whenever 
the issuer withhold the information from the public, the 
issuer should maintain strict confidentiality and only the 
highest possible echelon of the management should have 
knowledge of the inside information. The information should 
only be disclosed to their employees on a need to know 
basis, and employees are reminded of the confidential 
nature of the information and in particular the law of 
breach of confidence. There should be an express term in 
the contract of employment for those employees who have 
access to confidential information that they do not use, or 
cause the unauthorised disclosure of confidential 
information, and also to avoid the conflict of interests 
situation in their course of dealings in securities. The 
4 1 Se ction 335 (5) (c) of the Listing Requirements of the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. 
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unauthorised disclosure or use of information which is of 
a confidential nature and which has been entrusted to them 
imposes an obligation on them to respect its -• 
confidentiality. An issuer should take strict action 
against those persons subject to the obligation of 
confidentiality, whenever they have knowledge that they 
have made use of the information obtained through lawful 
means or not. One form of action is to take an action for 
breach of confidence. Should the law of confidence be made 
a statutory offence instead of an offence based on common 
law? 
In Australia there is an express provision in 
the Listing Rules of the Australian Stock Exchange that 
there should be continuous disclosure of material 
information. The Rule states that timely disclosure of 
information is required to keep the market informed of 
events and developments as they occur, and that once an 
entity is or becomes aware of any material information, the 
entity (that is the issuer) must immediately notify the 
Australian Stock Exchange. 
In Malaysia, there is an express provision on 
insider trading policy in the Continuing Listing 
Requirements, whereas in Australia, the matters relating to 
insider trading are contained in the Corporations Law 1991 
and not in their Listing Rules. 
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3.1.2.4. Independent Directors 
Under the Listing Requirements of the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange every issuer should 
-· 
have 
directors, 42 that is, independent directors, who are not 
related to the officers of the issuer, not related to the 
substantial shareholders of the issuer, but represent the 
interests of the shareholders in general, and able to 
exercise independent judgment. The issuer may appoint 
independent directors to appraise its management, to 
provide checks and balances against malpractices, if any, 
in management. 43 Are the independent directors, 
independent of management, or do the independent directors 
have access to the flow of information of the vital events 
which may affect the issuer? 
To strengthen the position of independent 
directors, who are the linchpin of any board based system 
of corporate accountability, they should be answerable to 
the shareholders and not to the board of directors. The 
board of directors of the issuer should owe. a duty to 
disclose to the independent directors, both favourable and 
unfavourable information on the issuer. However directors 
42 Directors are noc recognisec by their title but by 
their function depending on the nature of business of 
the company and the provisions in its articles of 
association. 
43 Section 9 of the Listing Requirements. 
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of the issuer share a common bond - directorship of a 
company and this may cause the independent directors not 
to make adverse judgment · On their "fellow directors 
behaviour". Independent di~ectors should be appointed by 
the institutional shareholders to protect their own 
interests, and that the board of directors should take a 
serious view · of the matters raised by the independent 
directors. However all directors, be it independent or 
not, shall be under an obligation to procure the issuer to 
comply with the listing ~equirements. 44 
A.F. Conard observed that the presence of 
independent or outside directors may benefit the 
corporation in terms of management selection and wiser 
choices in major corporate policy. But they may be unable 
or unwilling to challenge the managers, and may be 
less informed than executive directors. And this may deter 
judicial investigation of corporate management. 45 
44 
45 
Section 11 (3) (e) of the Securities Industry Act 1983. 
The supervision of Corporate Management: A comparison 
of developments in European Community and the United 
States Law in (1984) 82 Mich.L . Rev.1459 . 
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It is arguable that the law should be reformed to 
ensure that the board of directors are able to carry out 
their legal duty, and strict . standard should be imposed on 
them, as well as to provide a!l incentive to them to perform 
their legal duties of supervision. V.Brudney suggested 
tha.t the ambiguity in the standards of fairness, the 
difficulty in ascertaining and weighing the relevant facts, 
the psychological and social pressure on independent 
directors and the limited incentives and weak sanctions 
available to them, may . affect the effective role of 
independent directors in management. To monitor management 
effectiveness, it requires a set of criteria that can 
compare the behaviour of the independent director being 
monitored, with appropriate and defensible yardstick and 
criteria. However such criteria are difficult to estabish, 
keep current and administer in management. 46 
The Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) publicly 
censored Scotts Holdings and some of its directors for 
repeatedly failing to comply with listing rules and 
demanded that the company's board of directors be filled by 
a majority of independent directors. 47 
47 
The Independent Director -Heavenly City or Potemkin 
Village (1982) 95 Har.L.Rev.597. 
The Star Newspaper March 21st 1997. 
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In Australia the Listing Rules of the Australian 
Stock Exchange are silent on the role of independent 
directors in the management of the Issuer. 
3.1.2.5. Audit Committee 
Under the Listing Requirements of the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange the issuer may appoint an Audit 
Committee which comprises a non-executive chairman and two 
independent directors, independant of management, free from 
any relationship with the management to oversee the 
management of the issuer. 48 The underlying purpose of the 
Audit Committee is to oversee that the issuer will not 
commit legal and unethical wrongdoings which may affect 
the day to day function of the issuer including the acts of 
both management and the board of directors. It serves as 
an early warning system on any impending problems that may 
arise in the organisation. Is the Audit Committee 
answerable to the Board of Directors, or to the 
shareholders? The Audit Committee is supposed to focus on 
the internal controls of the organisation to enhance 
corporate accountability. It cannot be over-emphasised 
that the Audit Committee should be an active aggressive 
body whose acts are answerable to the shareholders, and not 
to the board of directors. The Audit Committee should 
48 Section 15A and section 344(A) (1)&{2) of the Listing 
Requirements. 
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understand its role in overseeing the operation of issuer 
based on the premise that the courts cannot review 
managerial incompetence, under-performance and inefficiency 
in the management. 
In Australia the Cooney Report 1989 has 
recommended that establishing an Audit Committee be a 
requisite for public listing of a company and, in Britain 
the Institutional Shareholders Committee and the 
Association of British Insurers continue to give 
institutional backing for the device. 49 
The President of the Singapore Stock Exchange 
commented on the role of the Audit Committee that the 
Committee had fallen short of the standard in the discharge 
of its duties and had not properly fulfilled its role in 
monitoring the Company. He proposed that guidelines will 
seek to improve the current framework of regulation so as 
to deter errant practices and provide early warning sign of 
any mismanagement. The Chief Executive Officer cannot sit 
on the audit committee and independent directors must form 
a majority in the committee. 50 
49 
so 
V.Finch "Company Directors: Who cares about skill and 
care?" (1992)55 MLR 179 at 208. 
In the Star Newspaper dated January 20 1997. 
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Under the Australian Listing Rules, Rule 4.10.2 
merely provides that at the time of the director's or 
trustee report, the entity (that is the issuer) should have 
an audit committee, if not i _t should provide a reason for 
its non-existence in the issuer. 
3.1.2.6. Chinese Walls 
An issuer may be an ultra-mart in function when 
it is involved in merchant banking, investment services 
and corporate advisory services. Whenever an issuer is 
involved in such varied intermediary functions, it sets up 
Chinese Walls in the flow of information, and it prohibits 
its officers and employees from dealing in the sales and 
purchases of the said clients' securities. It also devises 
the stop list, watch list and restricted list of securities 
as a guide to its investment department so as to avoid a 
conflict of interests in their purchases and or sales of 
securities for its clients. 
A Chinese wall is intended to restrict the 
passing of price sensitive information to employee or 
department of a company or partnership engaged in trading 
or in advising and typically involve policies and 
procedures to limit the dissemination of information; and 
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possibly the physical separation of departments. 51 
In Malaysia there is no specific provision in the 
securities laws52 that pro"'.'ides that a body corporate 
shall set up Chinese Walls nor a body corporate shall 
commit the offence of insider trading if the body corporate 
does not set up chinese walls in its operation of 
management when it is in possession of inside information. 
It is submitted that in Malaysia, Chinese Walls should 
exist in the issuer, whose nature of business may involve 
self-dealing and dual agency in its transactions. 53 
In Australia under section 1002M of the 
Corporations Law 1991 a body corporate does not contravene 
the laws on insider trading if it sets up Chinese walls in 
its management in that the decision to enter into the 
transaction was taken on its behalf by a person, other than 
that officer in possession of inside information pertaining 
to a particular issuer. 
3.1.2.7. Compliance Officer 
Since the Listing requirements relating to 
51 L . E.Herze and DE Colling: the Chinese Wall and 
Conflict of Interest in (1978) 34 Business Lawyer 73 
at 88. 
52 The securities laws refer the Securities Industry Act 
1983, the Companies Act 1965 and the Securities 
Commission Act 1993. 
53 The rules of Chinese Walls may be in conflict with the 
common law fiduciary duties. 
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insider trading are rather complicated and full of 
ambiguity, it is preferred that a compliance officer well 
versed with the securities laws and the listing 
requirements be appointed by each issuer to oversee all 
matters relating to them. 54 A compliance officer can 
establish, maintain and enforce the company compliance 
policies as to timing and accuracy of disclosure as well as 
the timing of purchases by the insiders. 
In Nepline Berhad, a listed Company 55 the 
Audit Committee is formed to carry out, inter alia the 
duties such as to establish and periodically review a 
corporate code of conduct and review compliance with 
relevant government regulations. It is not possible to 
ascertain whether its operation is effective enough to 
achieve its underlying purposes as outlined in its manual. 
The issuer has explicit in-house rules that clearly state 
that management and employees should avoid conflict of 
interest situations, and those who have access to 
unpublished material information must not use the 
information for their own personal benefit and should not 
disclose such information to any third party. 
54 
55 
Hammerman & Pollock "The Need For And Utility of 
Protective Measures", in ALI-ABA, Fraud and Fiduciary 
Duty Under the Federal Securities Laws 91 (1982). 
The name of the listed issuer is not permitted to be 
disclosed for confidential reason. 
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In a particular issuer56 whose securities are 
listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (Second Board) 
there is a code of ethics and conduct where the issuer and 
the staff are reminded of t~e provisions contained in the 
Securities Industry Act 1983 section 89 and section 90. It 
also emphasises the fact that the authorities view insider 
trading as a serious matter. 
3 .1.3. Against the Participants 
The Stock Exchange is faced with a mammoth task 
to self-regulate its members, the issuer and the 
participants of the Stock Exchange. The participant, prior 
to his dealing in securities, has to sign an undertaking to 
the member of the stock exchange that he undertakes to 
abide by the rules, regulations, by-laws, customs, levies 
and usages now in force and any subsequent amendments or 
revisions of the Stock Exchange. However in the Rules of 
the Stock Exchange there is no rule which governs the 
misconduct of the participants which fall short of 
committing an offence of insider trading under the law 
except for Rule 13(1) of the Rules Relating to Member Firms 
and Member Companies. Rule 13(1) states that the Member 
Firm or Member Company shall report to the Committee of the 
Exchange if a non-member (the participant) failed to meet 
an obligation with any Member ?irm or Member Company. The 
Committee may enquire into the case by requesting the 
56 The name of the listed issuer is not permitted to be 
disclosed for confidential reason. 
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Member concerned to furnish the full particulars of the 
case in writing ie. the transactions with which the member 
and the non-member are involved. If the Committee is 
satisfied that the non-member has committed a default in 
payment, the non-member's name will be inserted in the List 
of Defaulters maintained by the Exchange. 57 
It is suggested that participants in the stock 
market may be the potential ~tippee' who commit insider 
trading. It is recommenqed that there should be a Rule of 
the Stock Exchange which provides that if a participant 
commits a contravention of the Listing Requirements (if 
relevant), then the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange can direct 
the participants to comply with the contraventions; impose 
a penalty of RM 2 5 O, O O O . 0 O; reprimand the person in 
default; impose such other penalites as the Committee think 
fit. 58 
In the event that the participant (or the issuer) 
is proposing to engage, is engaging in, or has engaged in 
any contraventions, section 11(1) and 11(2) of the 
Securities Industry Act are not applicable. It is 
suggested that there should be a provision in the Rules of 
57 
58 
The word 'obligation in Rule 13(1) was not explained 
in the Rule. It may imply a financial obligation, but 
not an obligation under the listing requirements. 
The above suggestion is made on the pretext that 
Section 11(1) & 11(2) of the Securities Industry Act 
were amended as proposed earlier. 
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the Stock Exchange (that is the Listing Requirements) to 
enable the Stock Exchange to conduct a private hearing to 
determine to what extent the participant (or the issuer) 
has contravened the rules of" the stock exchange. In the 
conduct of the private hearing by the exchange, its 
procedure will be based on the rules of natural justice, 
with the primary objective to direct the participant to 
comply ·With the rules of the stock exchange. 
In Australia the participants in the Stock 
Exchange fulfil the same requirements as in Malaysia, by 
inserting their personal particulars in the Application 
Form as a participant in the Stock Exchange, and are bound 
by the Listing Rules etc of the Stock Exchange. 
3 .1. 4 The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
It is pertinent to assess whether the rules of 
the Stock Exchange provide an adequate level of investor 
protection, whether there is a satisfactory monitoring and 
enforcement system and whether there is an effective 
mechanism in the stock exchange to deal with investor's 
complaints arising out of the conduct of business in 
securities. 
In the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange there is a 
department named the Advanced Warning And Surveillance 
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Department in charge of monitoring the unusual movements in 
the price and volume of securities to detect any incidence 
of insider trading. For those securities whose prices and 
volumes showed unusual moveme:nts in both prices and volumes 
for a continuous period seven (7) days, the department will 
verify the identity of those purchasers or sellers who 
purchased or sold the securities within a period of thirty 
(30) days prior to the event of unusual market conditions. 
If the Advanced Warning And Surveillance Department has 
enough evidence that such purchasers or sellers are 
suspected insiders, such evidence will be forwarded to the 
authorities for further investigation. 
The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, being a self-
regulatory body enforces its own listing requirements with 
its continuing obligations on all persons involved in the 
securities market. No doubt its Listing Requirements has 
assumed quasi statutory force by virtue of Section 11 of 
the Securities Industry Act 1983 but it is more appropriate 
that the Stock Exchange exercises its power by virtue of 
its own rules which is binding on its members, rather than 
rely on the securities laws for its legal effect. By 
relying on Section 11 of the Securities Industry Act 1983 
it may reflect that the Stock Exchange's own express powers 
to enforce its rules is not at all effective nor does it 
constitute a force to reckon with in the securities market. 
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Has the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange provided 
sufficient information on the dealings to the investing 
members of the public to enable them to evaluate the 
. 
information and discipline the issuers? At present all 
data pertaining to any wrongdoings ie: breach of any rules 
and data on dealings in securities are kept confidential 
and away from the public scrutiny. As a self-regulatory 
body, i ·t is imperative that if the issuers failed to reveal 
any information which reflects on the mal-administration of 
the issuers, then it is incumbent upon the Stock Exchange 
to reveal the information to the public. 
The entire self-regulatory process should be 
essentially one of co-operation between the government 
regulators and the market players. This requires frequent 
and clear communication between the two bodies. To 
supplement the informal information exchange process, 
reporting requirements would be established for the self-
regulatory organisation [SRO] to provide prescribed 
information in a specified format to authorities at the 
prescribed time. This information would relate to 
membership, disclipinary and business matter of the SRO ,or 
other matters of which the Government or the public would 
need to be informed. 59 
59 NCSC, A Review of the Licensing Provisions of the 
securities Industry Act and Codes (AGPS, Canberra 
1985) at p.178. 
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The companies intended to be listed on the new 
Over-The-Counter Market, Mesdaq will have to secure the 
services of a "sponsor"for at least five years after the 
initial public offer. The sponsors' responsibilities 
include promoting research materials and disclosure 
requirements. It is suggested that those listed issuer 
whose prices and volumes show unusual market movements 
should ·be encouraged to appoint a "sponsor" on an adhoc 
basis with responsibilities to· ensure that the said issuer 
comply with the listing requirements. 
The surveillance and enforcement machinery of the 
stock exchange has, with few exceptions yet to prove itself 
effective to regulate insider trading. The rules while 
significant in themselves lack the requisite teeth to 
provide a significant deterrent. The monitoring of the 
market and shareholdings is a necessary concomitant to 
effective regulation which to date does not exist. 60 
Does the public have an erroneous but honestly 
held belief about the Listing Requirements. It is 
60 Philip N.Pillai in Insider Trading in Singapore and 
Malaysia (1974] 16 MLR 333 at p.373. 
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suggested that the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange should 
clarify the rules and make known the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchanges attitude to the market to enable the participants 
to adopt its practices so as to comply with the laws. 
At present there is a good interplay of self-
regulation and regulation in the workings of the securities 
market ·Whereby the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange assume a 
self-regulatory role. To rid the market of insider trading 
it is imperative that the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
should adopt preventive measures to ensure that each issuer 
comply strictly with the Listing requirements relating to 
insider trading that would not impose an unreasonable 
burden on the issuer. 
4.1 
4 .1.1 
CHAPTER 4 
THE REGULATO~Y AUTHORITIES 
THE Securities Commission 
Introduction 
The Securities Commission is an independent 
statutory body vested with power::> under the Securities 
Commis~ion Act 1993. 1 
The objectives of setting up the Securities 
Commission are to promote and maintain the integrity of 
the capital market, and to instill the confidence of the 
investors in the securities market. The Securities 
Commission, to achieve its objectives not only regulates 
the securities laws but also encourages and promotes self-
regulation by those bodies involved in the securities 
market. In its regulation of the securities industry under 
the Securities Commission Act 1993,the Securities 
Commission regulates all matters relating to securities 
such as takeovers and mergers of companies. It supervises 
and monitors the activities of any exchange, clearing house 
and central deposito ' y · as wel~ as suppress illegal, 
dishonourable and improper practices in the dealings in 
securities. This is to ensure that all persons involved in 
Act 498. 
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the securities market comply with the laws of the 
securities. It also considers and makes recommendations 
for the reform to the laws relating to securities. 2 
The funct.ions of the Securities Commission a~o 
carried out by the various divisions such as The Issues and 
Investment Division, the Market Supervision Division3 ,the 
Research and Development Division, and the Legal and Public 
Affairs Division. 
The Department of Surveillance and Compliance in 
the Market Supervisio~ Division of the Securities 
Commission monitors the trading activities of share trading 
on t.he ?:;.;.ala Lumpu= Stock Exchange. They also maintain a 
close liaison with the Advance Warning and Su.::--.reillar:.ce 
(~~rlS) and Liscing Departments of che ~~ala ~umpu= Stock 
E:xchange. .::l.n electronic monitoring system ~as set up in 
Section 15 (1) (j) of che Secu=ities Commission ~ct 
1993. 
!:i the Securities Commission .:......""l!lual Report 1993 the 
offences investigated by the Secu::-ities C:::mrnissicr:. 
include shortselling under section ~l(l) ;l2;1J;89 and 
90 of the Secu=ities Industry ~cc 1933. In the 
secu=icies Commission .!\..nnual Report: 1994 :~e of fe~ces 
unde= invescigacion include illegal dealing, merger and 
takeover, insider crading and abuse of information.In 
che Secu=ities Commission -~'1.nual Repc=~ :~ 0 s t~e 
offences .:-elating co 87 (cl and seccion 37.~ of the 
secu:-ities Industry .~ct 1983 ·,..ere ::hargec! in cou::::-t . 
:n c~e Secu:-icies Commission Ari..nual Repo=: 1996 the 
~=~~r.cos orosecuted includes shor:-se~li~c . ~akinc ~i;i~ading scatement and ~nsi~er :.:-ad~ns . - -
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the department using trading information from the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange to better monitor the trading 
activities in the market place. 
Since the establishment of the Securities 
Commission in 1993 the principal thrust of the regulatory 
frame work of the Securities Commission is merit based. 
The Securities Commission mandates that all proposals 
involving issues or offers of securities to the public be 
subject to the Securities Commission's prior approval. The 
proposals of each issuer are supported by facts and figures 
to justify that the issuer fulfilled both qualitative and 
quantitative terms as set out in the Securities 
Commission's guidelines of initial public offering for 
securities or further issue of securities. 
The increasing importance of the capital market 
as a place to raise funds for the public companies is 
evidenced by the growing number of initial public offeri:igs 
and other capital raising proposals. At present t'.:'le 
Securities Commission has geared the regulatory framework 
towards a disclosure based regulation. A disclosure based 
regulatory system entails the making of investment decis.:.on 
nf 
reliable information provided by the issuer or of::ror Jf 
securities . The disclosure based regulation demands ~ 
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higher standard of disclosure, due diligence and corporate 
governance as well as accountability by public listed 
companies and their advisers · to investors. This is to ensure 
that the information disclo~ed by the issuer at all times 
is sufficient,timely, and that there is no material 
omission of material information from the securities 
market. How does the Securities Commission monitor the 
issue·rs so that the issuers will publish all material 
information at any time, and will not omit any material 
information to the member of the investing public? 
For such a r~gulatory framework to work, it 
requires both the promoters and their advisers to exercise 
a higher degree of duty of care and due diligence, when 
preparing the prospectus for potential investors. An 
investor need to ensure that before any investment is made, 
he has made an indepth evaluation of the information 
provided to him. 4 
In Australia the Australian Securities Commission 
is set up under the Australian Securities Commission Act 
(Cth) 1989. It is responsible for enforcing the securities 
laws in the national scheme law such as the Corporations 
':'his emphasises the importance of the role of the 
securities Commission in monitoring the existing 
issuers of listed, transferable securities on t:he 
disclosure of material information and the omission of 
material information . 
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Act 1989 (Cth), the Corporations Law 1991 and the 
Australian Securities Commission Act 1989. 
As compared to .the Securities Commission of 
Malaysia, the Australian Securities Commis·sion, amongst 
others also carry out the same functions such as to 
supervise and monitor the activities of the stock 
exchanges, clearing houses, central depository etc, and to 
ensure that all bodies involved in the stock exchange 
complied with the securities laws. 
4 .1. 2 Enforcement of the Securities Laws 
The Securities Commission enforces the laws on 
insider trading under section 89 and 90 of the Securities 
Industry Act 1983 and the Malaysian Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers contained in the Securities Commission Act 1993. 5 
In the cases relating to securities laws in 
The Securities Commission has stipulated in the 
Policies and Guidelines on Issue or Offer of 
Securities that non-compliance with their rulings, or 
failure to discharge due diligence and 
resoonsibilities expected of the public companies, 
advisers, experts or disclosure of false, misleading, 
deceptive statement o~ _materia~ ?mission in its 
submission to the Securities Commission may cause the 
securities Commission to issue cautious letter, 
reprimand letter, impose a moratorium, or prohibit 
trading or dealings in securities issues, or issue a 
public statement that the_retentio~ of.the office by 
that director of the public companies is prejudicial 
for the interest of the investing public. 
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particular insider trading, the Securities Commission has 
investigated a case and charged a person named Chua Seng 
Huat in the Kuching Sessions Court, Sarawak under section 
89 and 90 of the Securities_ Industry Act 1983. 6 
To enforce the Code on Takeovers and Mergers, the 
Securities Commission issue rulings to implement the 
letters and spirit of the Code. This includes the 
interpretation of the Code, the practice and conduct of 
persons involved in the transactions of securities and such 
other matters relating thereto. However the Securities 
Commission may in certain circumstances grant exemptions to 
the Code 7 to certain issuers under certain circumstances. 
4.1.2.1. Investigation 
If a person contravenes section 89 or 90 of the 
Securities Industry Act, the Securities Commission [ or 
Registrar of Companies] will investigate the suspected 
cases of insider trading, and later prosecute the 
offenders. 
In the enforcement of the provisions in the Code 
of Mergers and Takeovers and the rulings of the Securities 
The Registrar of Companies is also empowered to 
en:orce the securities laws under the Securities 
Industry Act 1983 but its rol2 has been ~aken over by 
the Securities Commission since 1995. 
Section 33C and section JJA(S} of the Secu::-:.::.es 
Commission Act 1993. 
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Commission on the Code, the Securities Commission may 
either take actions under sectiori 33 D (1) of the 
Securities Commission Act 1993, or alternatively charged 
the person in court. If a p~rson fails to comply with the 
Code or the rulings ·, the Securities Commission may give 
directions under section 33(D) to the person in default to 
sec::ure compliance with the Code and rulings; impose a 
penalty for non-compliance, reprimand him, or direct a 
stock exchange to prohibit the person in default from 
dealing in the securities in the stock market of the stock 
exchange, or if the person in default is a listed 
corporation, direct the stock exchange to suspend trading 
in its securities or to suspend the listing of the 
corporation, or to delist the corporation. 
It appears that the Securities Commission may 
employ section 33D(l) of the Securities Commission Act 1993 
in cases of suspected contraventions of the rulings and the 
Code, and only charge the person in court in blatant cases 
of breach of the Code and rulings. 8 
The investigating officer in the Securities 
Commission has the powers to investigate any of fences unde= 
The provisions in the Code and the rulings should be 
made clear and precise in its interpretation in the 
event of a court case, if not it will cause ambiguity 
and problems in its interpretation in a court of law . 
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the securities laws.' In the course of its investigation 
he may by notice in writing require any person to produce 
to him the books, documents etc. It is not expressly 
stated in the law that the_~erson to whom the notice was 
served, must be related to any issues on the body corporate 
or . securities that they are investigating. 10 If the 
investigating officer wishes to examine any person who is 
acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case 
under investigation, he may by notice in writing require 
him to appear before him to be examined orally, and his 
examination will be reduced into writing. 11 
In Australia the Australian Securities Commission 
has the powers to conduct investigation into any 
contravention of a national scheme law, the Commonwealth or 
State laws, that concern the management of the affairs of 
a body corporate, or matters relating to fraud and 
dishonesty in securities matters. 
Under section 33 of the Australian Securities 
Commission Law, the Australian Securities Commission may by 
a notice in writing require any person to produce the books 
that relates to the affairs of a body corporate, and found 
10 
11 
Section 35 of the Securities Commission Act. 
Seccion 36(2) of the Securities Commission Act. 
Section 38 of the Securities Commission Ac~ . 
in that person's possession. 
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In ASC v Zarro & Ors12 the 
ASC served a notice under section 33 requiring Westpac to 
produce certain documents relating to one of its customers, 
Zarro. When Westpac failed . ~o comply with the notice from 
the Australian Sec·urities Commission, the Australian 
Securities Commission obtained a court order to enforce 
compliance with the notice. The Federal Court upheld the 
validity of the notice to produce documents and ordered 
Westpac to produce the documents. 
In ASC v Lucas13 the Australian Securities 
Commission served a notice on the auditors of a particular 
company and its subsidiaries to produce certain documents. 
In the notice of the Australian Securities Commission, the 
Australian Securities Commission did not stipulate the 
documents required by them. Yet the Federal Court ruled 
that the auditors have to comply with the notice unless the 
auditors can affirmatively prove that the notice was not 
exercised for that legal purpose or that it was served in 
bad faith. 
In the Australian Securities Commiss:.on Laws, the 
Australian Securities Commission may, by a notice in 
writ~ng ~o the pe~son involved in the matter, gain ac8ess 
12 
ll 
( 19 9 2) l 0 .'\CLC. 11 
(1992)10 ~CLC 888 . 
152 
to the book relating to the affairs of the body corporate. 
"Reason to suspect and reason to believe" 
Under 
Commission Act 
section 
1993 an 
36 (1) (b) of 
investigating 
the Securities 
officer of the 
Securities Commission may enter into any place when he has 
reason. to believe that an offence has been committed 
against the securities laws. However in the securities 
Industry Act 1983 section 99 the Registrar of Companies may 
commences investigation if he has reason to suspect that an 
offence has been committe_9-. The words "entitled to inspect" 
in section 36(4) of the Securities Commission Act should be 
redefined to include those persons who are aggrieved by 
those persons who failed to comply with the rules of the 
stock exchange. 
In the case of Tan Eng Hoe v AG of the Straits 
SettlementH a wrongful arrest was committed by the 
Police. The Police arrested the accused whose habits and 
movements fit the description of the suspect wanted by the 
Police for the offence of cheating. The court held that 
any reasonable man under the prevailing circumstances would 
have fairly suspected the accused as the person who had 
committed the offence under the investigation of the 
[ 19 3 3] MLJ 151. 
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Police. 
In Shaaban & Ors . v Chong Fook Kam & Ano.r15 a 
case of false imprisonment,_~he court held that the Police 
were entitled to arrest if a reasonable suspicion exist of 
the respondents (that is the accused) being concerned in 
the offence of reckless driving and dangerous driving 
causing death. It is unnecessary for the Police to show a 
prima f acie case of such offence before the respondents 
were arrested and detained by the police. Lord Diplock in 
his judgement stated that suspicion in its ordinary meaning 
is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking. 
It is submitted that since an investigation may 
be carried out by an investigating officer when he has 
reason to believe that an offence will be committed, or 
when he has reason to suspect that an offence has been 
committed, the law under section 36 (b) of the Securities 
Commission Act should distinguish the prevailing 
circumstances whether an offence is committed or about to 
be committed. 
In Australia under the Australian Securities 
Commission Law whenever the Australian Securiti ' -
Commission has reason to believe that a contravention may 
lS [1969]2 MLJ 219. 
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have been committed or a belief that there may have been 
a contravention of one of the relevant laws as such a 
national scheme law etC;r the Australian Securities 
Commission may commence in~estigation . 
. -. 
In Little River Goldfields NL & Anor v Moulds & 
Ors16 the court stated that so long as the Australian 
Securities Commission has reason to suspect that a 
contravention did occur, it does not have to commit any 
matter in writing or to set out the grounds upon which it 
has reason to suspect a contravention in its investigation 
of the case. 
In Queensland Bacon Pty Ltd v Rees17 Kitto J. 
observed that a suspicion that something exists is more 
than mere idle wondering whether it exists or not. It is 
a positive feeling of actual apprehension or mistrust, 
amounting to a slight opinion but without evidence. 
In Sim v NCSC18 the Supreme Court of Victoria 
held that it would be difficult to form a suspicion that an 
offence has been committed without having in mind one or 
more provisions in respect of a breach of which the 
1 7 
(1992) 10 ~CLC 121 . . 
(1996) 5 CLR 226. 
(1988) 6 ACLC 516. 
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suspicion is entertained. 
It appears that based on the laws in Malaysia and 
Australia pertaining to inve_~tigation of securities matters 
an investigating officer should have reason to suspect that 
., 
an. offence has been commited before he can commence an 
investigation and not otherwise. 
4.1.2.2 Disclosure of information 
Under section 36(4) of the Securities Commission 
Act an investigating officer may permit any person to 
inspect any account, bo~ks or other document seized and 
taken in possession of by him if such pe~son is 'entitled' 
to inspect such account, book or document under this Act. 
The person who is entitled to inspect such accounts may 
refer to the person who wishes to commence civil 
proceedings in the matter. 19 
Disclosure of information by the Securities 
Commission may be made to the police, a public officer or 
to foreign authorities involved in securities · as the 
Securities Commission thinks fit. 
Can the Securities Commissi.-:n disclose 
information on the beneficial shareholdings in an issuer to 
!n section 43(1) of the Securities Commission Act 1993 
the Securities Commission should not disclose 
information except for civil proceeding under any law . 
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any holder of the shares in that particular issuer? In the 
Companies Act 1965 the Registrar of Companies has the power 
under section 69A to · enquire into the beneficial 
shareholdings in a particulq.~ issuer to verify the identity 
of the owner of the shares when the need arises. But there 
is . no provision in the Companies Act 1965 to enable the 
Registrar of Companies to disclose information relating to 
the beneficial ownership of shares to any third party who 
is interested in the information. 
In Australia, under the Corporations Law 1991, 20 
the Australian Securitie~ Commission may supply information 
to the holder of securities if he requests for any 
information relating to the securities. The Australian 
Securities Commission may issue a primary notice to the 
holder of the voting shares to find out the identity of the 
actual owner of the shares. If the holder of the shares 
revealed that he is the trustee of the shares for a 
particular beneficiary, then a secondary notice will be 
issued by the Australian Securiities Commission to the 
party concerned. A person requesting the .Z:\ustralian 
Securities Commission to give a primary or secondar1 
notice, may withdraw the request at any time. Howeve~ the 
Aus~ralian Securities Commission may reject sush ~ re01es~ 
for information if it is satisfied that such infor:natio~ 
Section 717 to 724 and 742. 
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should not be given or that it should be given in a 
particular form. 
Under section 25 (.1) of the Australian Securities 
Commission Law, the' Australian Securities Commission may 
disclose the information obtained to the person if the 
person can satisfy the Australian Securities Commission 
that he is contemplating a proceedings in respect of the 
matter. 
Disclosure of information may be made by the 
Australian Securities Commission to the authorities related 
to securities such as the Takeover Panel, the Auditors and 
Liquidators Disciplinary Board and other bodies if the 
Australian Securities Commission is satisfied that such 
information will assist them. 
No doubt there are 
Securities Commission Act 
express provisions in the 
which provides for the 
examination of persons suspected to have committed a 
contravention of the securities laws or connected with the 
act of contravention. However there is no provisions in 
the laws that enables the Securities Commission or the 
Registrar of Companies to cc~~~ct hea~ings both public or 
private on the matters relating to securities. 
In Australia, under section 51 to 59 of the 
Australian Securities Commission Laws, the Australian 
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Securities Commission has the power to hold both private 
and public hearings where the Corporation Laws requires 
such a hearing. Such hearing may be conducted in camera 
where all matters disclosed are confidential and the 
members of the Commission have the power to summon any 
,,, 
persons to attend the hearing and give evidence or produce 
documents. The hearings are conducted with as little 
forma1ity and technicality as possible as long as the rules 
of natural justice are observed and the Australian 
Securities Commission is not bound by the formal rules of 
evidence. 
It is suggested that in circumstances where there 
is a necessity that informal hearing be conducted to 
resolve certain matters that arise in securities matters, 
the securities laws should provide for such contingencies. 
Under section 37 of the Securities Commission Act 
1993 the Investigating Officer shall enter any premise by 
search warrant. If he reasonably believed that any object, 
accounts, material thing etc may be interfered with or 
destroyed, he may enter the premise without a search 
warrant. 
In Australia sections 31 and 33 of the Australian 
Securities Commission Commission .!\ct provide that i: the 
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Australian Securities Commission has reasonable ground to 
suspect that books etc have not been produced pursuant to 
a notice given under any . provisions of the Act, the 
Australian Securities Commission shall obtain a search 
warrant to seize the documents etc. 
Section 38 of the Securities Commission Act 1993 
states. that an examinee shall be legally bound to answer 
all questions and shall not refuse to answer any questions 
on the ground that it tends to incriminate him. 
Under section 68(1) (a) of the Australian 
Securities Commission Law it is not a reasonable excuse for 
a person to refuse or fail to give information on the basis 
that the information might tend to incriminate him or make 
him liable to a penalty. 
It is submitted that both the Malaysian 
Securities Commission Act and the Australian Commission 
Law have abolished the privilege against self-incrimination 
accorded to a person who gives evidence under the common 
law. 
4.1.2.3 Prosec·.ition 
Under section 39(2) of the Securities Commission 
Act, any officer of the Securities Commission authorised in 
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writing by the Chairman of the Securities Commission may 
conduct any prosecution of any offence under this Act. 
In Australia upder section 39(2) of the 
Australian Securiites Conunission Law the Commission can 
initiate prosecutions for a criminal offence ~here an 
investigation reveals contravention of the securities law. 
Under subsection 152 ( i) of the Criminal Procedure 
Code the Prosecution has to frame charges to meet the legal 
requirements of the law. To frame charges the Prosecutor 
has to rely on direct evi?ence and indirect evidence in the 
case. In an insider trading case of Public Prosecutor v 
Chua Seng Hua t in the Sessions Court, Kuching which is 
fixed for hearing on the 17th March 1997, Chua Seng Huat 
was charged under section 89 and 90 of the Securities 
Industry Act 1983 in that he made improper use of the 
informacion on the financial standing of the Kim Hin Group, 
if published and released, would affect the prices of 
securities, by disclosing the information to Kim Hin 
(Malaysia) Sendirian Berhad in their two transactions of 
1,200 lots of shares and 200 lots of shares in Kim Hin 
Indust:ry Berhad respectively. 21 
If the prosecution were to frame charges for the 
2l See .<;ppendix I 
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insider-tipper and the tippee it is extremely difficult, or 
if not impossible to do so under the present state of the 
laws under the Securities Industry Act 1983. 22 
When drafting charges, magi·strates and 
.. 
prqsecuting officers should bear in mind the advice of 
Thomson J. given in the case of Public Prosecutor v Leong 
Yoon ·Meow. 23 His Lordship held that where an accused 
person is alleged to have done cannot be described in the 
language of any statutory provisions creating an offence, 
or where it seems to depart from the language in the 
section in framing the c~arge,then the chances are that no 
offence has been committed. 
Lynda M.Ruiz stated that clarity regarding the 
prohibition of insider trading will facilitate more precise 
discovery requests and less waste during SEC 
investigation.H 
Mr. Kilsby, the Director of Market Services at 
the Stock Exchange, City of London commented that good 
quality regulation is absolutely vital to ensure confidence 
22 
2J 
See Chanter 2 on the eler:1ents of the o:::nce '"'~ 
insider -trading. 
(1953] MLJ xx.xv. 
In the European Community Directive on Insider 
Trading: ~ Model for Effective Enf8rcement o: 
Prohibitions on Insider Trading in the i~ternatior.al 
securities market in 33. Col, J. Transnational 229. 
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for all market users and to give investors the protection 
they deserve. 25 
In an insider trad~ng case where direct evidence 
is absent, the Prosecution should take into·consideration 
... 
the court's decision in Waldron v Green. 26 There the court 
held that where direct evidence is absent and reliance is 
on circumstantial evidence, the fact that the sale took 
place after the accused acquired the information is not 
sufficient to establish insider trading. Mc Inerney J. 
observed that something more than mere sequence in point of 
time of the gaining of t~e information and of the sale is 
required in the case. The mere occurrence of two events in 
sequence one to another does not establish causation. In 
the absence of other evidence, the inference of causation is 
at best an inference of equal degree of probability with 
the inference that the two events are not causally 
connected. 
Where the tipper and tippee are involved in an 
insider trading case, the prosecution has to consider the 
question of causation as stated in Leyland Shipping Co. Ltd 
v Norwi.ch Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd. 27 The court 
Times Newspaper, Londcn September 9th 1996. 
(1977-78) 3 ACLR 289. 
27 [1918) AC 350 at p.369. 
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commented on the question of causation, in that to treat 
the prima causa as the cause which is nearest in time is 
out of question. Causes are spoken of as if they were 
distinct from one another as beads in a row or links in the 
chain, but if this metaphysical topic has to be referred 
to, it is not wholly so. The chain of causation is a 
ha_ndy expression, but the figure is inadequate. Caustion 
is not a chain but a net. 
forces, events, precedents 
At each point influences, 
and simultaneous meet; and 
radiate from each point infinitely. At the point where 
these various influences meet, it is for the judgement 
based on the matter of f~ct to declare which of the causes 
thus joined at the point of effect was the proximate and 
which was the remote cause. The prosecution may have to 
apply common sense standards to determine the real or 
efficient cause from the whole complex of facts made 
available from any suspected cases of insider trading. In 
Chan Chwen Kong v Public Prosecutor9 Thomson CJ observed 
that in cases where the evidence is wholly circumstantial, 
what has to be considered is not only the strength of each 
individual strand of evidence but, also the combined 
strength of these strands when twisted together to make a 
rope. 
4 . 1.3 Immunity from Liability 
2 9 [ l 9 6 2 ] 2 8 MLJ 3 0 7 . 
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Under section 44A of the Securities Commission 
Act, the chairman and any officer of the Commission shall 
not be liable to any action or proceedings from damages for 
or on account of or in respect of any acts done or 
statement made, omitted to be done or made in pursuance of 
or .in execution of a se-~urities law etc. provided t·hat such 
act, statement, performance of function or exercise of 
power ·was done in good faith. In Public Prosecutor v Tunku 
Mahmood Iskandar 9 the court held that a person is in the 
act of good faith if the person can show that he had 
reasonable ground for believing that he ought to do what he 
did. In Little v Commonweal thJ 0 Dixon J. stated that 
protective provisions requiring notice of action, limiting 
the time within which actions may be brought or otherwise 
restricting or qualifying rights of action have long been 
common in statutes affecting persons or bodies discharging 
public duties or exercising authorities or powers of a 
public nature. "In provisions of this kind, it is common to 
find such expressions as 'act done in pursuance of this 
section' or 'statute', 'anything done in execution of this 
statute', or 'under and by virtue of a statutory 
provisions'. Such enactments have always been construed as 
giving protection, not where the provisions of the statute 
have been followed, for then protectio~ ~ould ~e 
29 [ 19 7 7 ] 2 MLJ 12 3 . 
)0 (1947) 75 C.L.R. 94 at 108. 
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unnecessary, but where illegality has been committed by a 
person honestly acting in the supposed course of the duties 
or authorities from the enactment." 
Under section 40 of the Securities Commission Act 
all members of the Commission or any of its co~ittee or 
any officer,servant or agent of the Commission while 
discharging their duties as such members, officers, 
servants or agents shall be deemed to be public servants 
within the meaning of the Penal Code. 
No doubt it is expressly stated in the Securities 
Commission Act 31 that officials of the Securities 
Cowmission are not liable for actions if they acted in good 
faith and that they are deemed to be public servants, it is 
submitted that the enforcement of the securities laws 
should be carried out by the office of the Registrar of 
Companies, but placed under the control of the Securities 
Commission. The reason is that the enforcement of the 
securities laws may involve both the national level and 
the international arena. Since the Securities Commission 
is a mere statutory body, and not a public body, it is not 
ll Section 126A of the Securities Industry Act 1983 
orovides that no person shall be liable to be sued i~ 
any court for any act or matter d?ne. or ordere? to be 
done or omitted to be done, by him in good faith and 
in che intended exercise of any power or performance 
of any duty, conferred or imposed on him by or under 
ch i s Act. 
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entitled to the full protection of a government body, 32 
and thus it may be susceptible to civil suits by the 
affected parties which render its enforcement works 
difficult and cumbersome i~ the process. 
Under the rule of law and the philosophy of 
separation of powers, the law makers or the policy makers 
can only make laws and policies, but the laws should be 
implemented by another body to provide the check and 
balances in the system of administration of laws. 
It is clearly mentioned in the Securities 
Industry Act 1983 that the officers of the Securities 
Commission and the Registrar of Companies are involved in 
the enforcement of the laws. In the enforcement of the 
laws on securities, it may be pertinent for the Securities 
Commission to make fast decisions and also to exercise 
certain discretion in its exercise of its powers. Such 
powers may be subject to judicial review by the court. Can 
the Securities Commission be represented by a 
representative who informed the court, his reasons for the 
decision or the reasons of all 11 the members 11 in the 
Securities Commission which made the decisions. To provide 
32 See the Government Proceedings Act, 1956 (Act 359), 
the Public Authorities Protections Act, 1948 (Act 
1998), Specific Relief Act 1950 (Act 137) and Order 73 
of the Rules of the High Court 1980. 
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uniformity, ease of reference and to facilitate the easy 
enforcement of the laws, it is submitted that the various 
persons mentioned in the Securities Industry Act 1983 to 
carry out the enforcement_ of the laws be designated 
re spec ti vely as Controller of Securities, Deputy Controller 
' 
of _Securities, Assistant Controller of Securit~es and 
Inspector of Securities etc. 33 
4 .1.4 Preventive Actions 
Prior to the listing of each issuer on the 
official list of the Stock Exchange, the Commission will 
scrutinize the character of its directors and its 
management. As for the intermediaries involved in the 
securities industry such as dealers, dealers' 
representatives, investment advisers etc. their operations 
are controlled by their licence issued under strict 
conditions on their dealings and the keeping of records.H 
33 An analogy can be drawn with the office of the 
Attorney General. In law, the Attorney General is the 
Public Prosecutor but for purpose of the 
administration of the office, he is the .l:\ttornev 
General. In law the Chairman may be the Controller of 
Securities, but in administration of securities 
matters, he is the Chairman of the Securities 
Commission. 
On 4th September 1995 the Lic7nsing Oficer, Ministry 
of Finance charged Teh Hooi Hong for breach of 
licensino conditions under subsection 21121 of the 
securities Industry Act 1983. Teh infringed 
conditions of her licence as dealer's representative 
by providing her clients with facilities to trade in 
a olace other than the principal place of business . 
Teh was fined RM 50,000 . 00. 
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To prevent insider trading the Securities 
Commission should indirectly enforce the policy of the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange . pertaining to the timely and 
accurate disclosure of m~terial information. In this 
respect the Securities Commission have issued guidelines35 
whi.ch must be adopted ., by the listed public com~anies as 
rules, prohibiting the directors or those connected with 
them, · .with access to or privy to price sensitive 
information, from trading in securities of their listed 
companies commencing from one month before the announcement 
up to one market day after the announcement of matters 
involving unpublished, price sensitive information (or 
where relevant, matters on any other listed public 
companies. As for the release of the financial results of 
the company, the directors cannot deal in securities during 
the period commencing from the expiry of the financial 
year, half-year or quarter year up to one market day after 
the announcement of the company's results for the financial 
year, half year or quarter, and/ or of any dividends or 
distributions to be paid or approved. As for negotiations 
on .corporate proposals, the directors are prohibited from 
dealing in securities for the period from the commencement 
of negotiation for a corporate proposal up to one market 
day after the announcement, or one market day ~fter tr.~ 
JS see Chapter s of the Policies .:'.illd Guidelines On Issue 
Or Offer Of Securities. 
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abortment of negotiations, whichever is applicable. But the 
directors may seek exemptions from compliance with the 
guidelines in circumstances ·such as when they exercise the 
options and rights under an ~!Ilployee share scheme and share 
option scheme; or when they accept an entitlements under an 
issue or offer of securities; or they act in pursuance of 
a takeover offer. However in the aforesaid guidelines a 
director shall not be liable for insider dealing when he 
deals in securities during the prohibited period if he 
obtained the clearance to deal in securities from the Board 
. 
of Directors, or the Chairman of the issuer of the said 
securities, accompanied with an announcement on the 
particulars of dealings to the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange. 36 Such guidelines remain in force to assess its 
effectiveness in curbing insider dealing. It is submitted 
that the Securities Commission should formulate rules in 
the Securities Industry Act 1983 to prohibit sale and or 
purchase by the directors during certain prohibited period 
and impose a penalty in breach of such rule. 37 
l7 
He has to make a declaration that he is not in 
pssession of unpublished price sensitive information 
prior to and at the time of his dealings in 
securities. 
In the Securities Industry Act 1983 the rules 
governing the operation.of the ~xchange are set by the 
st ock exchange in question subJect to the approval of 
Securities Commission and the Minister. There is no 
provision in the Se~urities. In~ustry Act 1983 that 
enables the Securities Commission to fo:::mulate the 
rules governing the working of the stock exchange. 
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4.1.4.1 Disclosure 
The principle behind the disclosure-based 
regulatory structure as mentioned earlier, is the need for 
the issuers or offerers Qf securities to provide the 
investors with sufficient and accurate disclosure of all 
relevant information p~rtaining to the company's ~atter to 
enable investors to make their own informed investment 
decisions, and the need to disclose adverse situations or 
known risks connected with the securities being issued or 
offered to the market. The Securities Commission advocates 
continuous disclosure of information to facilitate 
investment in an informed manner, and that public listed 
companies should take a more pro-active approach to 
continuous disclosure of information. It is suggested that 
the issuer's present practice of reporting to the Stock 
Exchange on any material developments of the issuer should 
be followed by a copy of its report to the off ice of the 
Registrar of Companies under the issuer's records for 
public inspection. 
4.1.4.2 Surveillance 
Effective surveillance and enforcement: by the 
regulators would be crucial to maintain the integrity and 
honesty of the stock market und.::r a disclosure based 
regime. Proper surveillance procedures would need to be 
put in place to check and verify the information disclosed 
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in the prospectus. This surveillance procedure should be 
followed by the effective enforcement for contraventions of 
the laws of securities. 
Whenever there is unusual· market movements in the 
" 
share price, the directors of the issuers should be 
summoned by the Securities Commission to make statements on 
the latest development in the issuer. Such statements of 
the directors should be published in the newspaper. If the 
directors should make a false statement, or omit to state 
a material fact in answer to the examination by the 
Securities Commission, the directors should be charged 
under section 38 of the Securities Commission Act. 
4.1.4.3. Other Actions 
Moreover the Securities Commission should 
introduce a civil provision in section 87rl of the 
Securities Industry Act 1983, in that a person may claim 
compensation for any loss or damage he had suffered if he 
relied on a statement which was materially misleading or 
there was a material omission in the statement. A 
misleading statement does not include a statement of 
intention of a future promise because the statement is 
neither true or false at the time it is made. In 3ecke ·.:: 
v Cohen33 the Division Court in interpreti:ig the false 
la [1973] 1 ALL ER 120. 
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and misleading statement under section 14 of the Trade 
Descriptions Act 1968 held that this provision did not 
apply to statements made in .regard to the future. 
It is arguable that the defendant should be 
entitled to have a defence that at the date he published 
the statement he believed on reasonable grounds that the 
false ·or misleading statement was not false or misleading, 
and in the case of an omission of material matter, he did 
not know that the omission was material at that particular 
time, and that when he became aware of the misleading, 
false fact or omission of facts . in his statement he had 
given reasonable notice to correct the deficiencies in the 
statement. 39 
In Australia, section lOOlA of the Corporation 
Laws provides that the issuer who, intentionally, 
recklessly, negligently fails to notify the securities 
exchange of information that is not generally available 
(and that a reasonable person would expect, if it were 
generally available, to have a material effect on the price 
or value of the securities) commits an offence. 
Section 33E\l) of the Securities Commission Act 
provides a defence that the person in default did make 
reasonable inquiries on the information and did 
believe in the truth of the information till the 
submission of the information to the Securities 
Commission. 
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In the United States of America the Securities 
Exchange Commission has to rely upon Rule lOb-5 40 made 
under section lOb of the ·Securities Exchange Act 1934 
(which is in pari materia with section 87A of the 
Securities Industry· Act 1983) to charge -insiders for 
ins.ider trading. 41 
The Securities Commission should refer cases 
suspected to be insider trading but involved criminal 
breach of trust under section 405 and 409 of the Penal Code 
to other authorities such as the Off ice of the Inspector 
General Of Police and Bank Negara of Malaysia. 42 
40 
42 
Rule lOb-5 provides that it shall be unlawful for any 
person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of 
the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange to employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud; to make any untrue statement of 
a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statement made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading, or to engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would operate as 
a fraud .or deceit upon any person, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security. 
~mong the cases of insider trading are SEC v Texas 
Gulf Sulphur (401 F 2d 833 (1968)]; Shapiro v Merrill 
Lunch (495 F 2d 28F (1980) 1; Chiarella (588F 2nd 1358 
(2d Cir 1978): rev''.i,100 S Ct.1108(192C)). 
The Star Newspaper March 15th 1997 quoted a report 
from the Asian Wall Street Journal that on the 14th 
March 1997 Bank Negara was investigating Pacific Bank 
Berhad an issuer listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Sxchan~e on its unusual movements in the price and 
~olume of shares traded on the exchange just prior to 
a merger announcement in 1996. 
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4 .1.5. Civil Proceedings 
There is no provisions in the securities laws43 
that enables the Securities Commission and the Registrar 
of Companies to take civil _ ~ctions, on grounds of public 
interest, for or on behalf of the issuer and an aggrieved 
party in an insider dealing transaction against any person 
suspected of contravening the laws on insider trading. The 
Securities Commission may commence a civil action, on 
grounds of public interest, on behalf of an aggrieved 
participant in the stock market, whose transaction was 
tainted with insider dealing, through a writ of summons in 
the courts for all gains made or losses avoided by an 
insider in insider dealing. However in such civil 
proceedings, the Securities Commission may face the problem 
of "causation" or "remoteness of damages" in a contractual 
claim. If the insider were to sell securities to a 
participant in the stock market, there is no privity of 
contract between the parties. Section 19(1) of the 
Contract Act 1950 44 provides that consent to an agreement 
was caused by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation, the 
contract is voidable at the option of the party. In a stock 
market, a participant's purchase of securities is not 
caused or induced by any fraud, coercion or 
mis:. 2;-r.::=sentat i.on 11nder thP common law. Provided that. th~ 
The securities laws refers to the Companies Act 1965, 
the securities Commission Act 1993 and the Securities 
Industry Act 1983. 
Act 136. 
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court is prepared to establish the relationship between the 
insider and the participant based on the "test of 
contemporaneity", an aggrieved party has no cause of 
action . As for the insider, ~ho purchases securities in an 
insider dealing trartsaction, from a shareholder, one may 
est.ablish the relationship of insider-sharehold~r between 
the parties. The aggrieved party may join with the company 
in an ·action for restitution and/ or breach of confidence 
or breach of fiduciary duty to the issuer. 
The Securities Commission and the Registrar of 
Companies merely concentr~te on the criminal matters in the 
securities laws that affect the public interest at 
large. The Securities Commission has emphasised in its 
annual report 1996 that it intends to push for wider 
recognition of civil remedies such as restitution and 
disgorgement of illgotten gains for the violations of 
securities laws. 
However in Australia, the Australian Securities 
Commiss.:.on has taken the initiative to be involved in the 
civil proceedings that is, to recover damages for fraud, 
negligence, breach of duty or other forms of misconduct 
committed in connection ·,.:i.th securities matters. The 
Australia Securities Commission may commence proceedings in 
the name of the Company (that is without the consent of the 
Company) against the directors of the Company who had 
commi t ~ed a breach of their fiduciary duties. The 
176 
Australian Securities Commission may also commence 
proceedings in the name of any shareholder or creditor (if 
he consents to it) in a civil case against any person who 
had committed an offence re~ating to securities laws. 
4 .2. 
4.2.1 
The Registrar of Companies 
Introduction 
The office of the Registrar of Companies is the 
keeper of both financial and non-financial records under 
the Companies Act 1965 45 for both listed and unlisted 
companies. If an investor wishes to search for any 
information on the companies, the first place of reference 
is the office of the Registrar of Companies. 
The file of each listed issuer in the Registrar 
Of Companies contain information relating to its 
prospectus,its annual accounts showing its assets and 
liabilities, profits and losses, its management and its 
future prospects. 
4.2.2 Centre of Information for Listed Issuers. 
Certain matters are required under the securities 
laws and listing requirements of the Stock Exchange to be 
included in the prospectus of each issuer. S1.lch ""atters 
include introductory matters on the issuer: its corporate 
directory; share capital; particulars of initial offering; 
(Act 12·5) . 
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directors; management and staff, AND financial matters 
such as the consolidated balance sheet, accountants 
reports, directors' report 1 . statutory and other general 
information, AND lastly p~ocedure for application and 
acceptance. 
Under section 46 of the Companies Act 1965 the 
directors and the promoter or those persons who authorised, 
or caused the issue of the prospectus shall be liable to 
pay compensation to all persons who subscribe for or 
purchase any shares or debentures in the issuer for damage 
sustained by reason of any untrue statement therein or by 
reason of wilful non-disclosure therein of any matte= of 
which he had knowledge, and which he knew to be material. 
He shall be guilty of an offence unless he proves either 
that the statement or non-disclosure was immaterial, or 
that he had reasonable ground to believe and did, up to the 
time of the issue of the prospectus, believe the statement 
was true, or the non-disclosure was irnmaterial.H 
The prospectus, being the principal public 
document of an issuer based on which their securities are 
offered to the public, may need to be revised in contents 
tc ~eet the disclosure requirements in the relevant laws 
that is Securities Industry Act 1983, the Securities 
Commission Act 1993 and the Companies Act 1965 pertaining 
See section 47 of the Cpmpanies Act. 
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to disclosure of information .This will ensure that there 
is stricter disclosure requirements on the part of the 
issuers. 47 The new Policies and Guidelines on Issue or 
Offer of Securities (Guideli_nes) released by the Securities 
Conunission on 18th December 1995 reveals maintenance of 
.·. 
high standard of disclosure as well as due diligence and 
professional responsibility expected of promoters, 
directors and management of public companies and their 
corporate advisers. 0 Moreover Part IV Division of 
Securities Commission Act on proposals in relation to the 
issue of offer of securities emphasise fu1i · and accurate 
disclosure and clear penalties for misrepresentation. 
-17 
'\8 
The present rule of disclosure under the Continuing 
Listing Requirements of the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange Corporate Disclosure Policy merely provides 
that the issuer should immediately release information 
in a timely fashion to the investing public. There are 
instances in which issuers have had not complied with 
such requirements. Among the cases is Ho Wah Genting 
Berhad Officials were asked by the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange to explain why it had not practised timely 
corporate disclosure on its acquisitions in 
Singapore's Horiguchi Engineering. Even an official 
of the Securities Commission in the Star Newspaper 
dated 19th May 1995 states that the annual reports of 
Malaysian Corporations have scant information on 
financial instrument activity and their disclosure 
were minimal to the point of non-existence where there 
is disclosure, it comes in the form of contingency 
note which reader of the report are in doubt of its 
contents . 
The new policies and guidelines will enable the 
parties concerned to have a better appreciation of the 
role of the Securities Commission and also to 
emphasise the importance of due diligence and 
professional responsibility of the corporate advisers, 
t:romoters, directors and management .of public 
companies and to maintain high standard of disclosure 
and accounting standard .. 
179 
In Australia, under section 1023B and 1024 of the 
Corporations Act 1989 whenever the company is aware that 
there is a significant change affecting a matter included 
in the prospectus, it must lodge a supplementary or 
replacement prospect·us. A company which fails to comply 
wit.h these sections commits a criminal offenc'e under 
Section 1312. The information contained in the 
supplementary prospectus is taken to be included in the 
original prospectus under section S1024(c). A replacement 
prospectus can be used to correct deficiencies and provide 
information about any new matters whether they are 
significant or not, and to be taken to have been issued 
when the original prospectus was issued under section 
1024(D). 
A cursory glance of the prospectus of a few 
issuers such as Kwantas Corporation Berhad, Bina Puri 
Hold~ngs Bhd. and ACP Industries Berhad showed that in 
general, these issuers used the same terms for certain 
subject matter mandated in the prospectus but the matter 
are differently itemised. In the abridged prospectus under 
the Fifth Schedule-A of the Companies Act, the full names, 
addresses and occupations of all directors, managers and 
secretaries is referred to in item 8. In t~e prospectus of 
Kwantas Corporation Ber~ad, the particulars relating to the 
directors, managers, secretaries are classified as under 
item 8 .7. In the prospectus of Bina Puri Holdings Bhd. the 
Particulars relating to directors are classf ied as 
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"Directors, Management and Employees" under item 7. a. 
Whereas for ACP Industries Berhad the particulars relating 
to directors are classified .under item 7. 0 
To provide · easy reference to the investors on the 
mat.ters as aforesaid, it is imperative that the Registrar 
Of Companies devises or makes it mandatory that such 
matters be classified under standard terms and standard 
item numbers. 
It is suggested that particulars · relating to 
directors etc. should be classified as "Directors, 
Mangement & Employees" only and not any other phrase to 
avoid any confusion in the later search for information on 
the nature of management of the issuer. 
4.2.3 State of Financial Affairs 
Under section 169(3) of the Companies Act the 
directors of every company shall cause to be made out, and 
to be laid before the company at its annual general meeting 
with the prof it and loss account and a balance sheet as at 
the dace to which the profit and loss account is made up . 
The balance sheet shall give a true and fair view of the 
state of affairs of the company as at the end of the period 
to which it relates, and every profit and loss account 
shall give a true and fair view of the profit and loss of 
See .~ppendi.x 2 . 
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the company for the period of accounting as shown in the 
accounting and other records of the company.so 
P.W. Wolnizer sp~~e on the Companies Act 1981 
(Cth) and stated that the Act does not ·specify what 
technical properties on account must possess in order to 
provide "a true and fair view " of a company's state of 
affairs and thus the disclosure provisions of the Act is 
open to various interpretations in regard to the technical 
properties of the accounts prepared under the Act.s 1 
It is observed that the state of the financial 
position of each issuer available at off ice of the 
Registrar of Companies is at one point of time and thus it 
may not be up to date at any time when an investor wishes 
to search for its latest financial position. To overcome 
this problem under the present state of affairs, the issuer 
is supposed to make immediate public disclosure of all 
material information concerning its affairs under section 
335 of the Continuing Listing Requirements of the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange. However under the Companies Act it 
is not mandatory for the issuer to file in the latest 
developments in its affairs in the office of the Registrar 
so See section 169(14) of the Companies ~ct . 
In Correspondence with the facts - A recurrent theme 
in commentaries on the statutory ~uality standard of 
truth and fairness in a~counts in C & SL 1985 at 148 
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of Companies . 52 
Gower stated that. the United Kingdom Companies 
Acts have contemplated inve~~or and creditor protection by 
financial disclosure, but suggests that this mode of 
Protection only works if the information disclosed can be 
safely taken as accurate. 53 
In ICAL Ltd v Country Natwest Securities 
Australia Ltd & Transfield (Shipbuilding) Pty Ltd.54 Bryson 
J made an observation in the case that ev~n though the 
information had been published by the Minister and had been 
the subject of news dissemination in newspaper it is not 
particularly significant as much information in the public 
domain fails to reach many members of the public. 
Furthermore it is often difficult for a member of the 
public to find out the information which had been published 
while the best informed people may miss some thing. 
The Registrar of Companies of the Ministry of 
Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs commented that the 
effectiveness of corporate disclosure is determined by two 
52 
SJ 
The issuer is required to file Form 44, Notice of 
Situation of Registered Office and of Offic'= Hours and 
Particulars of Change; Form 49, Return giving 
particulars in Register of Directors, Managers and 
Secretaries and changes of Particulars; Form 2-t, 
Return of Allotment of shares etc. 
In the Principles of Modern Company Law at p.-to3 . 
(1988) 6 ACLC 467 at 480. 
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main factors ie timing and adequacy. Adequacy deals with 
the extent and content of disclosure.However adequate and 
timely corporate disclosure may not be sufficient if 
updates on the development ~~ any matters of the issuer is 
not forthcoming. · . To have effective disclosure of 
·.-
information issuers should provide periodic updates on the 
development of any of its matters. ss 
It is submitted that the filing of a copy of the 
issuer's disclosure on the latest developments in the 
issuer in the Off ice of the Registrar of Comp·anies should 
be made mandatory to ensure at all times the matters 
contained in the prospectus of the issuer is updated and 
current at all times. s' The above suggestion is 
consonance with the principles of the securities laws that 
there should be full and fair disclosure of all material 
facts concerning the issuer whose securities are offered to 
the public. 
4.2.4 Dealing In Securities 
The provision of mandated information relating to 
shareholdings are contained in sections 69E, 135(2) and 158 
Of the Companies Act 1965. 
ss New Strait Times February 8th 1997. 
Each director should also file a statutory declaration 
of comnliance with the Continuing Listing Requirements 
of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange at the time the 
issuer forward a report on the latest developments i~ 
the issuer. 
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Under section 69E of the Companies Act a person 
who is a substantial shareholder shall give notice in 
writing to the issuer and the Stock Exchange stating his 
name, nationality, address and · full particulars of the 
voting shares and particulars of its change,if any, within 
fourteen ( 14) days after becoming a substantial 
shareholder. The company shall keep a register of the 
particulars relating to substantial shareholder filed under 
section 69E, 69F and 69G at its registered office and the 
register is open to inspection by any member of the company 
or member of the public. 57 
Under section 135 (2) of the Companies Act a 
director has to give notice to the company of his 
particulars relating to his shareholdings and such matters 
affecting or relating to himself as are necessary for the 
Purpose of compliance by the company of the requirements of 
the Ace within fourteen days after the date on which he 
become the Director. 
The issuer shall under section 158 of the 
Companies Act keep a register of its members, which shall 
be prima facie evidence of any matters contained the~ein, 
and the said register is open to inspection to any member 
57 Section 69L of che Companies Act 1965 . 
58 
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or any other person. 58 
It is submitted that to facilitate investigations 
into any suspected cases of _~nsider dealing, the filing of 
particulars of shareholdings of both the substantial 
shareholders and the d.irectors should be done with.in three 
days of the date of the event instead of the present 
fourteen (14) days. 
Section 160(2) of the Companies Act 1965. 
s.1 
CHAPTER 5 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORMS 
TO THE SECURITIES LAWS 
INTRODUCTION 
The provisons of the laws of insider trading 
in the Securities Industry Act 1983 and the Companies 
Act 1965 and the Listing Requirements in · the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange are comprehensive and wide-
ranging. No doubt the laws on insider trading may be 
amended to remove the weaknesses in the laws, but the 
laws on insider trading cannot achieved its goals 
without effective enforcement and supervision. 
It is proposed that to effectively enforce the 
laws on insider trading, a subsidiary legislation ie. 
the insider trading regulation such as "The Prohibition 
Of Insider Trading Order 1997" be made under the 
Securities Industry Act 1983. The Registrar of Companies 
has stated in its report on the enforcement of insider 
trading, that in its enforcement of the laws on insi~er­
trading, it is difficult to identify the insiders, who 
indulged in insider trading using local nominees when 
the insiders are persons or entities residing overseas. 
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As a more effective measure, it is proposed that the 
sales proceeds or the certificates of dealings be seized 
pending the investigation so that the insiders who are 
involved, will face financial problems in their 
dealings, and this may serve as an effective deterrent 
measure in the enforcement of the laws. 
As for each issuer,it is suggested that each 
issuer-should make rules on insider trading based on the 
policies of insider trading as stated in the Continuing 
Listing Requirements of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. 
5.2 Insider Trading Regulation 1997. 
SECURITIES INDUSTRY ACT 1983 
PROHIBITION OF INSIDER TRADING ORDER 1997 
In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection 
of Section of the Securities 
Industy Act 1983 the Controller of Securities with the 
approval of the Minister makes the following ~ule. 1 
1. This Rule may be cited as the Prohibitiou cf 
uiluer section 127 (-1) of the Securities Indust:::::-y 
Act 1983 the Minister may make such regulations to 
carry out or to achieve the objects and pu:::::-poses of 
this Act. This proposal is made under the premise 
that the Securities Commission should be given t~e 
powers under the securities laws to make rules for 
more effective enforcement of the securities laws. 
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2. 
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Insider Trading Order 1997 and shall come into 
force on the 
In this Rule unless the context otherwise 
requires:-
"insider" means any person who has both direct or 
indirect access2 to inside information. 
"Inside information" means specific 
information which is not generally available, and if 
generally available will affect the price of the 
particular listed transferable securities of a 
particular listed issuer on the Stock Exchange. 
"days" means the market days as stipulated in 
the Kuala Lumpur Listing Requirements (Main Board) . 
Those persons who have direct or indirect access to 
inside information includes those persons who 
obtained or received inside information, both 
directly or indirectly from the insider.This is to 
provide uniformity with the European Community 
Laws. This approach to insider trading emphasises 
the "securities market approach" but should 
restrict liability for those who has indirect 
access to inside information by the fiduciary 
nature of the relationship between the parties. 
"Access" is defined in Webster's New Twent:.eth 
Century Dictionary · Unabridged Second Edition, 
amongst others, as liberty to approach, come into, 
or use (with to) , often implying previous 
obstacles. 
"Access" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary 6th 
edition 1990, St. Paul, Minn.West Publishing Co. 
as access means freedom of approach,or 
communication, or the mepns,power or opportunity o f 
approaching, communicating or passing to and from. 
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3. {a) Every insider is prohibited from dealing in a 
listed transferable security of a particular issuer 
during the period of sixty. (60) days prior to and or 
after the date of the release of inside information on 
the particular issuer by the issuer to the Registrar of 
· ..... 
Companies. 
(b) If the Controller of Securities, The Deputy 
Controller of Securities, any Assistant Controller of 
Securities or Inspector of Securities suspect that a 
person has contravened this order, they may seize the 
proceeds from the sale or disposal of the persons' 
securities or the certificate of dealings in securities, 
as the case may be, during the period in question. 
(c) If proceedings are not instituted against the 
person within thirty (30) days from the date of seizure 
the sale proceeds or the certificates of dealings in 
securities, the sale proceeds or the certificates of 
dealings in securities shall be restored to the person 
from whom they were seized. If proceedings a=e 
instituted against him, the sale proceeds or the 
certificate of dealings in securities may be forfeited 
or otherwise disposed of in such manner as the court may 
direct. 
4. Any person who contravenes or fails to comply 
with any provision of this 0Fder shall be guilty of an 
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offence against the Securities Industy Act 1983. 
Made this day of 1997. 
Controller of Securities 
Approved this 
[Reference: 
Minister of Finance 
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5.3 The Rules On Insider Trading of the Issuer. 
THE CONTINUING LISTING REQUIREMENTS 
OF THE 
KUALA LUMPUR STOCK EXCHANGE 
THE RULES ON INSIDER TRADING 
. 
In the exercise of the powers conferred by Article 
of Articles of Association of the Company, the Board of 
Directors with the approval of the members at an annual 
general meeting do hereby make the following Rules . 
Part I 
Preliminary 
1. 0 Citation and Commencement 
1.1 These Rules may be cited as The Rules on 
Insider Trading and shall come into force on 
--- ·--·--
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Part II 
General Principles 
2.0 The Persons engag~~ in dealings in securities 
in the company must· observe the general principles of 
the.se Rules. In area:~ or circumstances which arises 
from the course of dealings in securities not explicitly 
covered by any rule, the general principle of these 
Rules will apply. 
2 . 1 Shareholders Right To Informed Investment 
Shareholders shall at all times have in their 
possession sufficient information on matters affecting 
the company to enable them to reach an adequate 
judgement and decision on the matters. 
information shall be withheld from them. 
No relevant 
2.2 Limitation on the Director's Dealings in Securities 
The Directors should restrict their dealings 
in securities whilst in possession of inside 
information. 
2.3 Inside Information 
All information which arises from the Company 
must be handled with care, and treated as confident i al 
and secret. 
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2.4 Disclosure of Information 
Only accurate and.precise information should 
be disseminated in a timely -~ashion. If the company has 
to make an announcement concerning the securities,and 
such information relates to predictions or estimates, 
the company must have reason to believe that it can and 
will ·be able to substantiate the predictions or 
estimates. 
3.0 
Part III 
Rules 
The Controlling Officer of the Company shall 
do all acts and things to ensure that all material 
inside information relating to matters affecting the 
Company are disclosed promptly and in a timely fashion 
to the shareholders and investors at large. 
3 .1 Each director shall take note of his duties 
under the common law and his prescribed duties under the 
relevant statutes. His duties are inter alia:-
(a) The Director should act in good faith, be 
fair and be loyal when he acts for and on 
behalf of the Company. 
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(b) The Director should exercise his powers 
for a proper purpose, and to avoid actual 
or potential conflicts between his 
personal interests and interests of the 
Company . 
(c) The Director should exercise duties of 
care and diligence and take a diligent 
and intelligent interest in the matters 
provided to them. 
(d) The Director should be kept informed on 
the developments in the Company by having 
information which he believes is 
necessary and be up to date with the 
company's financial position. He should 
seek independent expert opinion when 
necessary. 
(e) The Director should furnish information 
to shareholders to enable them to make 
an informed judgement. 
(f) The Director of the Company should 
schedule his purchases or sale o f 
securities of the Company. 
3. 2. 
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(g) The Director should make a statutory 
declaration of his purchases or sale of 
securities of. the company for a period of 
60 days prio~ to and after the date of 
declaration of unusual movements in the 
·.,,, 
securities by the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange. 
(h) The Director should not make use of 
inside information in his purchases or 
sale of securities. 
(i) The Director should not disclose inside 
information to any other person and/or 
procure any other person to purchase OY 
sell the securities of the company. 
In the event that any director is found 
engaging in or has contravened the securities law, the 
institutional shareholder should institute civil action 
to recover damages (if any) caused to the company by the 
director concerned. 3 
The rules proposed are self-regulatory rules to be 
aC.ooted bv the i.ss 1..!e!:"s as t!"'.e ~~:..e~ ~r: i:!s:.:.-::~::­
trading .i.i; L:neir company. How the issuers implement 
the rules and imposed the penalty in the event of 
non-compliance should be left to the issuer. I f 
there is evidence of insider trading being 
committed by the directors and the institutional 
shareholders ref used to take act ion against t:te 
directors, it is envisaged that the~e will be an in 
built mechanism in the , system of self-regulation 
that institutional investors will take act~ on 
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3.3. If the director is found to be involved in 
insider trading and such matters is brought to the 
attention of the company,. the company should not 
hesitate to institute civil suits to claim all losses 
caused to the company so as to maintain the good name of 
the. company and its reputation for integrity in the 
securities market. 
3.4. All inside information which arises from the 
company must be treated with strict confidentiality. 
If there is a necessity to erect Chinese W~lls in the 
company, such walls should be set upon to prevent the 
flow of inside information to the unauthorised section 
of the company. If a person (which includes the 
director, employee, independent contractor or persons 
under a contract for service with the company) has 
access to inside information, such person shall be under 
an obligation of confidence to the company or it may be 
inf erred from the circumstances of the case that he is 
under an obligation of confidence to the company to 
treat such information as confidential. In the event of 
unauthorised disclosure or use or misuse of insider 
information (as· the case may be) the company should 
institute a civil case of breach of confidence under the 
common law or file a case of unjust enrichment against 
against all insider dealings. If not, the i r 
holdings in the company will diminished in value i n 
the long run when other investors avoid investing 
in the company in the long term. 
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a third party. 
3. s. It is a rule that the disclosure of inside 
information by the Company _ ~hould · conform strictly to 
the Continuing Listing Requirements of the Kuala Lumpur 
.·• 
Ste.ck Exchange, that is, only precise specific 
information relating to the securities should be 
disclosed. If information relating to estimates or 
predictions are disclosed, such information should be 
based on facts which are realisable and do not mislead 
the investors at large. 
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APPENDIX 1 
PERTUDUHAN PERTAMA 
Pendakwa Raya 
la wan 
... •. 
Chua Seng Huat 
(Nombor Kad Pengenalan: K64495) 
"Bahawa kamu pada 23 Mei 1995 di Sarawak Securities Sdn. 
Bhd., Wisma Mahmud, Jalan Sungai Sarawak, Kuching, dalam 
negeri Sarawak, berhubungan dengan perniagaan sekuriti 
syarikat Kim Hin Industries Berhad (dirujuk terkemudian 
sebagai "syarikat tersebut"), yakni, berhubupgan dengan 
jualan 1,000,000 unit saham syarikat tersebut (dirujuk 
terkemudian sebagai "jualan tersebut"), ada maklumat 
dalam kedudukan kami selaku pengarah urusan syarikat 
tersebut bahawa syarikat tersebut telah mengalami 
kerugian kewangan (dirujuk terkemudian sebaga i "maklumat 
tersebut") yang 
jika diketahui umum mungkin dengan munasabah dijangka 
akan menjejaskan secara material harga hal perkara 
jualan tersebut dalam bursa saham; 
dipegang oleh kamu sebab kedudukan rasmi kamu selaku 
pengarah urusan syarikat tersebut; 
adalah munasabah menjangka seseorang dalam kedudukan 
rasmi kamu tidak menzahirkan maklumat tersebut kecuali 
bagi melaksanakan dengan wajar fungsi-fungsi yang 
diberikan pada kedudukan itu; dan 
kamu tahu adalah mamlumat sensitif harga belum 
diterbitkan berhubungan dengan sekuriti syarikat 
tersebut; 
dan kamu telah menggunakan secara tidak wajar maklumat 
tersebut untuk memperolehi secara tak langsung f aedah 
bagi syarikat Kim Hin (Malaysia) Sendirian Berhad; dan 
oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakuk~~ suatu kesalahan 
di bawah seksyen 90 Akta Perindustrian Sekuriti 1983 dan 
kamu boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 91 Akta yang sama. ·~ 
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PERTUDUHAN PERTAMA YANG TELAH DIPINDA 
Pendakwa Raya 
la wan 
Chua Seng Huat 
(Nombor Kad Pengenalan: K764495) 
Kamu adalah dipertuduh atas arahan Pendakwa Raya dan 
pertuduhan terhadap kamu adalah seperti berkut:-
"Bahawa kamu pada 23hb. Mei 1995 di Sarawak Securities 
Sdn Bhd., Wisma Mahmud, Jalan Sungai Sarawak, Kuching, 
dalam negeri Sarawak, berhubungan dengan perniagaan 
sekuriti syarikat Kim Hin Industry Berhad (dirujuk 
terkemudian sebagai "syarikat tersebut") , yakni, 
berhubungan dengan jualan 1,000,000 unit sah~m syarikat 
tersebut oleh kamu, (dirujuk terkemudian sebagai "jualan 
tersebut") ada maklumat dalam kedudukan kamu selaku 
pengarah urusan syarikat tersebut, tentang penurunan 
keuntungan operasi bagi syarikat-syarikat Kumpulan Kim 
Hin (dirujuk terkemudian sebagai "maklumat tersebut") 
yang 
jika diketahui umum dengan munasabah dijangka akan 
menj ej askan secara material harga hal perkara j ualan 
tersebut dalam bursa saham; 
dipegang oleh kamu sebab kedudukan rasmi kamu selaku 
pengarah urusan syarikat tersebut; 
tidak menzahirkan maklumat tersebut kecuali bagi 
melaksanakan dengan wajar fungsi-fungsi yang diberikan 
pada kedudukan itu; dan 
kamu tahu adalah maklumat sentsitif harga belum 
diterbitkan berhubungan dengan sekuriti syarikat 
tersebut; dan kamu telah 
menggunakan secara tidak wajar maklumat tersebut untuk 
memperolehi secara tidak langsung f aedah bagi syarikat 
Kim Hin (Malaysia) Sendirian Berhad; dan oleh yang 
demikian kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah 
Seksyen 90 Akta Perindustrian Sekuriti 1983 dan kamt: 
boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 91 Akta yang sama." 
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PERTUDUHAN PILIHAN 
Pendakwa Raya 
la wan 
Chua Seng Huat 
(Nombor Kad Pengenal_an: K764"495) 
Kamu adalah dipertuduh atas arahan Pendakwa Raya dan 
pertuduhan terhadap kamu adalah seperti berikut:-
"Bahawa kamu pada 23hb. Mei 1995 di Sarawak Securities 
Sdn Bhd, Wisma Mahmud, Jalan Sungai Sarawak, Kuching, 
dalam negeri Sarawak, sebagai seorang pegawai syarikat 
Kim Hin Industry Berhad, berhubungan dengan perniagaan 
sekuriti syarikat Kim Hin Industry Berhad (dirujuk 
terkemudian sebagai 11 syarikat tersebut 11 ) , yakni, 
berhubungan dengan jualan 1,000,000 unit saham syarikat 
tersebut oleh kamu (dirujuk terkemudian seba~ai 11 jualan 
tersebut 11 ) , telah menggunakan dengan tidak waj ar 
maklumat sulit tertentu, yakni penurunan keuntungan 
operasi bagi syarikat-syarikat Kumpulan Kim Hin, untuk 
memperolehi secara tidak langsung faedah bagi syarikat 
Kim Hin (Malaysia) Sendirian Berhad, dan 
kamu telah memperolehi maklumat 
tersebut oleh kerana kedudukan kamu 
syarikat tersebut; dan 
sulit tertentu 
sebagai pegawai 
jika maklumat sulit tertentu tersebut dikecahui umum, 
ianya mungkin dengan munasabah dijangka akan menjejaskan 
secara material harga hal perkara jualan tersebut dalam 
bursa saham; dan 
oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan 
di bawah seksyen 89 Akta Perindustrian Sekuriti 1983 dan 
kamu boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 91 Akta yang sama." 
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PERTUDUHAN KEDUA 
Pendakwa Raya 
la wan 
Chua Seng Huat 
(Nombor Kad Pengenalan: K764.495) 
" 
"Bahawa kamu pada 26 Jun 1995 di Sarawak Securities 
Sdn.Bhd., Wisma Mahmud, Jalan Sungai Sarawak, Kuching, 
dalam negeri Sarawak, berhubungan dengn perniagaan 
sekuriti syarikat Kim Hin Industries Berhad (dirujuk 
terkemudian sebagai "syarikat tersebut") , yakni, 
berhubungan dengan jualan 200,000 unit saham syarikat 
tersebut ( diruj uk terkemudian sebagai "j ualan 
tersebut") , ada maklumat dalam kedudukan kamu selaku 
pengarah urusan syarikat tersebut bahawa syarikat 
tersebut telah mengalami kerugian kewangan (dirujuk 
terkemudian sebagai "maklumat tersebut") yang 
jika diketahui umum mungkin denganmunasabah dijangka 
akan menjejaskan secara material harga hal perkara 
jualan tersebut dalam bursa saham; 
dipegang oleh kamu sebab kedudukan rasmi kamu selaku 
pengarah urusan syarikat tersebut; 
adalah munasabah menjangka seseorang dalam kedudukan 
rasmi kamu tidak menzahirkan maklumat tersebut kecuali 
bagi melaksanakan dengan wajar fungsi-fungsi yang 
diberikan pada kedudukan itu; dan 
kamu tahu adalah makluma sensitif harga belum 
diterbitkan berhubungan dengan sekurit syarikat 
tersebut; 
dan kamu telah menggunakan secara tidak wajar maklumat 
tersebut untuk rnernperolehi secara tak langsung f aedah 
bagi syarikat Kim Hin (Malaysia) Sendirian Berhad; dan 
oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan 
di bawah seksyen 90 Akta Perindustrian Sekuriti 1983 dan 
karnu boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 91 Akta yang sama." 
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PERTUDUHAN KEDUA YANG TELAH DIPINDA 
Pendakwa Raya 
la wan 
Chua Seng Huat 
(Nombor Kad Pengenalan: K764495) 
~ 
Kamu adalah dipertudah atas arahan Pendakwa Raya dan 
pertuduhant erhadap kamu adalah seperti berikut:-
"Bahawa kamu pada 26hb. Jun 1995 di Sarawak Securities 
Sdn Bhd, Wisma Mahmud, Jalan Sungai Sarawak, Kuching, 
dalam negeri Sarawak, berhubungan dengan perniagaan 
sekuriti syarikat Kim Hin Industry Berhad (dirujuk 
terkemudian sebagai 11 syarikat tersebut") , yakni, 
berhubungan dengan jualan 200,000 unit saham syarikat 
tersebut oleh kamu, (dirujuk terkemudian sebagai "jualan 
tersebut") ada maklumat dalam kedudukan kamu selaku 
pengarah· urusan syarikat tersebut tentang penurunan 
keuntungan operasi bagi syarikat-syarikat Kumpulan Kim 
Hin (dirujuk terkemudian sebagai "maklumat tersebut") 
yang 
jika diketahui umum dengan munasabah dijangka akan 
menj ej askan secara material harga hal perkara j ualan 
tersebut dalam bursa saham; 
dipegang oleh kamu sebab kedudukan rasmi kamu selaku 
pengarah urusan syarikat tersebut; 
adalah munasabah menjangka seseorang dalam kedudukah 
rasmi kamu tidak menzahirkan maklumat tersebut kecuali 
bagi melaksanakan dengan wajar fungsi-fungsi yang 
diberikan pada kedudukan itu; dan 
kamu tahu adalah maklumat sensitif harga belum 
diterbitkan berhubungan dengan sekuriti syarikat 
tersebut.; 
dan kamu telah menggunakan secara tidak wajar maklumat 
te=sebut. untuk memperolehi secara tak langsung f aedah 
bagi syarikat Kim Hin (Malaysia) Sendirian Berhad; dan 
oleh yang dimikian kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan 
di bawah seksyen 90 Akta Perindustrian Sekuriti 1983 dan 
kamu boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 91 Akta yang sama." 
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PERTUDUHAN PILIHAN 
Pendakwa Raya 
la wan 
Chua Seng Huat 
(Nombor Kad Pengenalan: K764495) 
. ~ .. 
Kamu adalah dipertuduh atas arahan Pendakwa Raya dan 
pertuduhan terhadap kamu adalah seperti berikut:-
:Bahawa kamu pada 26hb. Jun 1995 di Sarawak Securities 
Sdn Bhd, Wisma Mahmud, Jalan Sungai Sarawak, Kuching, 
dalam negeri Sarawak, sebagai seorang pegawai syarikat 
Kim Hin Industry Berhad, berhubungan dengan perniagaan 
sekuriti Syarikat Kim Hin Industry Berhad (dirujuk 
terkemudian sebagai "syarikat tersebut"), yakni 
berhubungan dengan jualan 200,000 unit saham syarikat 
tersebut oleh amu (dirujuk terkemudian sebagai "jualan 
tersebut 11 ) , telah menggunakan dengan tidak waj ar 
maklumat sulit tertentu, yakni penurunan keuntungan 
operasi bagi syarikat-syarikat Kumpulan Kim Hin, untuk 
memperolehi secara tidak langsung faedah bagi Syarikat 
Kim Hin (Malaysia) Sendirian Berhad, dan 
kamu telah memperolehi maklumat 
tersebut oleh kerana kedudukan kamu 
syarikat tersebut; dan 
sulit tertentu 
sebgai pegawai 
jika maklumat sulit tertentu tersebut diketahui umum, 
ianya mungkin dengan munasabah dijangka akan menjejaskan 
secara material harga hal perkara jualan tersebut dalam 
bursa saham; dan 
oleh yang dimikian kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan 
di bawah seksyen 89 Akta Perindustrian Sekuriti 1983 dan 
kamu boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 91 Akta yang sama." 
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APPENDIX 11 
The subject matter "Management" as shown in each 
prospectus of the various public listed companies:-
PROSPECTUS OF KWANTAS CORPORATION BERHAD 
=- .-. 
8.7 Directors, Management Team And Employees 
Board of Directors 
The following provides a brief profile of the 
Directors of KCB: 
Kwan Ngen Chung, aged 36, is one of the founder 
directors of the Group and is currently the Group 
Managing Director and Chief Executive.Officer of 
KCB .... 
Management Team 
The profile of the senior management team of the 
KCB Group are as follows: 
Rajendran A/L C. Thanapalasingam, aged 46, is the 
Project Manager of KOSB responsible for the 
management and supervision of the company's 
refinery .... 
PROSPECTUS OF BINA PURI HOLDINGS BHD. 
7.8 DIRECTORS, MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEES 
(i) Dato' Jaafar bin Jamaludin, DSDK, aged 
48, is the Chairman of BP Holdings. 
Datuk Tee Hock Seng, A.S.D.K., J.P., aged 
45, is the Managing Director of BP 
Holdings and was appointed to the Board 
of BP Holdings on 5 November 1990 .... 
(ii) Management 
The biref profile on the key management 
of the BP Holdings Group is set ouc 
below: 
Cheah Ban Seng, aged 3 0, is che Group 
Administration and Financial controller, 
(iii) 
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primarily responsible for all 
administrative and financial matters of 
the Group .... 
Relationship 
Management 
between Directors and 
Datuk · Tee Hock Seng, Tee Hock Loo, Tay 
Hock Lee and Tee Hock Hin are 
brothers .... 
(iv) Employees 
As at 31 October 1994, BP Holdings Group 
employs 323 employees .... 
PROSPECTUS OF ACP INDUSTRIES BERHAD 
7. Directors of ACP Industries 
(i) Directors 
Dato' Kamaruddin bin Ahmad, aged 55, has 
been the Chairman of ACP Industries since 
20 October 1994 .... 
(ii) Senior Management 
(iii) 
Roger Kook Siew Ming, aged 45, is the 
General Manager (Development) of ACP 
Malaysia, a position he has held since 
April 1994 .... 
Family Relationship 
None of the above Directors nor Senior 
Management have any family relationship 
with one another ... . 
(iv) Employees 
The ACP Industries Group currently has 
409 employees, spread out between its 
subsidiary companies, .. . . 
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Family Relationship 
Save for Mr. Kwan Ngen Chung, Mr. Kwan Ngen Wah, 
Ms. Kwan Jin Nget and Ms. Kwan Min Nyet and Madam 
Kwan Chiew Giok who are brothers and sisters, and 
Madam Kwan Jin Nget and Mr. Ding Yu chai who are 
spouses, there are no family relationship among the 
Directors and management stafts mentioned above .... 
Employees 
As at 30 September 1996, the KCB Group has a total 
of 966 employees under permanent appointment in 
various capacities which includes foreign labourers 
with contractual work permits .... 
